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Philosophy and word-play in the Epistles of Horace

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Philosophy and Word-Play in the Epistles of Horace

by

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Vita

Anthony Gini was born on August 18, 1961, in New York City. He earned his Bachelor of Arts Degree in Classics, Summa Cum Laude, with Honors, from Brooklyn College in 1982, at which time he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He taught courses in Classical Civilization at the University of Rhode Island from 1986 to 1988, and in Greek and Latin at Brown University since 1985. In February of 1987 he delivered a paper entitled "Catullus' Galliambic Poem" at the Southeast Conference for Foreign Languages and Literatures, at Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida. For the Academic Year 1988-89, he holds an appointment as Lecturer in the Department of Classics at Brown. His article, "Naming the Victor in Pindar: Chromios in Nemeans One and Nine", is forthcoming in *Classical World*.

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PHILOSOPHY AND WORD-PLAY IN THE EPISTLES OF HORACE

INTRODUCTION: HORACE AND PLATO'S CRATYLUS

Studies of the philosophy of Horace's *Epistles* inevitably invoke the poet's own "manifesto" of eclecticism (Epi. 1.1.13-15):

> ac ne forte roges quo me duce, quo lare tuter,
> nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri,
> quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.[1]

Yet it remains a favorite endeavor among Horatian scholars to try to disentangle the Stoic material from the Epicurean. The question will forever be *sub judice* ; and it is likely, were some contemporary biographical detail of Horace's intellectual life suddenly to surface, that long-held opinions would not move an inch. It was not Horace's purpose, as all have agreed, to produce a poetic version of a prose treatise that might have otherwise borne a title such as *peri physeos* or *peri tou kathekontos*. Instead, Horace could look back upon the work of Lucretius as inaugurating the serious treatment of philosophical issues in Latin hexameters. And Horace the Academician is not likely to have been ignorant of Parmenides' marriage of poetry and philosophy.[2] If the *Epistles* are not as ambitious, and not as lengthy, as these, they nevertheless are of the same *genre*. Still, the casual reader of the *Epistles* inevitably finds himself immersed in philosophical discussions, but has the sense that these discussions are philosophically defective and lack a clear sequence of thought.

At present, there seem to be two viable methodologies in the reading of the *Epistles*.[3] In one of these schools, *Horatius philosophus* is taken to be a mask or smoke-screen behind which the true manifestation of the author, *Horatius poeta*, is to be sought. In the fore of

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1 All citations of the text of Horace, unless otherwise noted, are from F. Klingner's Teubner text (3rd edition, 1959).

2 See the discussion of Parmenides' poetics in Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven 1970), Chapter 1 on "Epic Form" (esp. p. 39ff.). The suggestion that the dramatic context of Parmenides poem derives from a synthesis of Homeric materials is made by Eric A. Havelock, "Parmenides and Odysseus", *HSCP* 63 (1958), pp. 133-143.

3 In this scheme I am omitting the work of C.O. Brink, who is concerned chiefly with the literary content of the *Epistles*.

this movement are Gordon Williams, Roland Mayer, and Ross Kilpatrick. Williams, whose *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* is actually a kind of epic excursus on issues raised in the *Epistles*, sets out his program clearly in his introductory chapter.[4] In trying to understand why Horace chose to write poems in the form of hexameter epistles, he suggests the following:

> First, it provided the opportunity to write in an ever-changing variety of styles; the whole stylistic spectrum could be used, appropriately to an infinitely varied tone -- from ordinary colloquial to the heights of epic grandeur. Secondly, and connected with this, the form gave him the opportunity to play with ideas but it did not put him in a logical strait-jacket. There was adequate excuse for reducing connection of thought to an inspired type of association of ideas, as a great conversationalist might do. This feature can only be illustrated by a wide reading of the *Epistles*, but it is immediately recognizable that, though the appearance of logical argument is kept up, it is the interest and excitement of a mind at play which catches the reader's attention. Thirdly, and again connected with the second feature, Horace pretends that his interest is largely in philosophy; this was a widely interesting subject in the ancient world, indulged not only by narrow professionals but also by educated amateurs. Philosophy still conveyed to its practitioners the idea that the world was full of problems (including that of the world itself) and that valid answers could be reached by argument. Of course, professionals occupied themselves in constructing deductive systems, finding a large solution to the problem of the world and existence and then working downwards, fitting the answers to smaller and smaller problems consistently with the main system. Such a procedure was of no interest to Horace. In fact, his "philosophy" is of the most informal type, concentrating on morals, often using the arguments of professionals simply to make fun of them and substituting for systematic philosophy a home-spun concoction of sense and wit. But since his points are made more by implication than explicitly, his words are seldom elucidated by quoting from solemn Greek philosophers and they are often obscured by that process. This very cavalier attitude to the Greek professionals (whom he nevertheless knows very well) is most attractive in Horace -- and highly original. (pp. 28-9)

Here Horace's interest in philosophy seems a pretense, and it is consequently useless to discuss Horace's works in comparison with texts of "professional" philosophers. One may forgive Williams his scepticism if he is reacting to the *comparanda*, by now trite, which mechanically reappear in each new commentary of the *Epistles*. However, when Williams speaks of Horace's "inspired type of association of ideas" which is worthy of a "great conversationalist", he is using, perhaps unconsciously, a periphrasis for the notion "Socratic".

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[4] Oxford, Clarendon, 1968 (hereafter cited as *TORP*).

From this perspective, the method which Horace has adopted seems akin to that of Plato. Much later in the book (pp. 336-400ff.), in his analysis of the *Ars Poetica*, he argues brilliantly that Horace has re-worked a Platonic passage in a poetic way, but with a full appreciation of the original context of the passage. But Williams is not consistently attached to this method of analysis.

In two recent articles, Roland Mayer shares the anti-philosophical point of view.[5] Inspired by an essay of Lionel Trilling on manners,[6] Mayer insists that Horace does not even offer the bare outline of a philosophy, namely a "criterion of judgement and an ethical goal"; therefore we must not apply to him the label "eclectic", for this connotes a serious philosophical intention which Horace plainly lacks.[7] Thus Horace is not writing for the philosophical schools, but for the circle of Augustus. The poet is essentially a courtier,[8] and his *Epistles* are a sort of *Libro d'il Cortegiano*. This attitude, as it seems to me, does great violence to the admitted purpose of the *Epistles (Epi.* 1.1.10-11):

> quid verum atque decens, curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum;
> condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.

It is as if one were to read the *Republic* of Plato as a lecture delivered for the sake of wealthy Cephalus, and to hold the interlocutors of Socrates, with their several distinct personalities, to be a group of courtiers. At one point Horace seems, to Mayer, to be a Socratic figure; but such a figure cannot be reconciled with the courtier.[9]

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5 These are "Horace on Good Manners" *Procceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 211 (1985) pp. 33-46, and "Horace Epistles 1 and Philosophy" *AJP* 107 (1986) pp. 56-73). The two studies complement one another, and will accordingly be treated together here.

6 "Manners, Morals and the Novel", in *The Liberal Imagination* (New York 1951) 205-222.

7 "Horace on Good Manners", p. 33. W. S. Maguinness gives spirited arguments in favor of describing Horace as an eclectic in his "The Eclecticism of Horace", *Hermathena* 52 (1938), 27-46.

8 "Horace on Good Manners" p. 44.

9 "Horace, Epistles I", p. 72. For Horace and Socrates see W.S. Anderson, "The Roman Socrates: Horace and his Satires" in J.P. Sullivan, *Critical Essays on Roman Literature*

The most recent book-length study of the *Epistles*, Ross Kilpatrick's *The Poetry of Friendship,*[10] resumes a theme which had been treated at some length by W.S. Macguiness.[11] Kilpatrick endeavors to show how the theme of friendship, manifesting itself in several different species,[12] is the controlling factor in the structure of the first Book of *Epistles*. Concerned in great measure with identifying the genre of the *Epistles*, Kilpatrick on occasion touches upon the Platonic and Academic tradition. But he never makes a strong case that Horace had before him, either as a model or as an inspiration, any of the important philosophical texts of the Academy with which the poet would doubtless have been familiar.[13]

A second school of methodology applies *Quellenforschung* to fix Horace's ideas to the tenets of one or another of the ancient schools. M.J. McGann is the most recent representative of this approach. His study, while not directly concerned with Horace as poet, has enlivened the scholarly debate upon Horace as philosopher.[14] But McGann occasionally loses sight of the poetic context of the notions whose history he seeks to elucidate.

Few Horatians have concerned themselves with the investigation of their author's direct use of Plato. Paul Shorey, who was a great champion of Plato, and who proved his interest in Horace by publishing a school-text of the *Odes*, detected in the *Satires* of Horace

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2: Satire (London 1963) 1-37.

10 *The Poetry of Friendship. Horace, Epistles I* (University of Alberta Press, 1986), hereafter abbreviated POF.

11 "Friends and the Philosophy of Friendship in Horace" *Hermathena* LI (1938) 29-48.

12 See Kilpatrick's chapter-headings: *Potentes Amici*, etc.

13 Kilpatrick does devote some space (Introduction, p. xx-xxi) to specifically Academic discussions of friendship.

14 *Studies in the First Book of Horace's Epistles* (Brussels, Collection Latomus 100, 1969). A number of dissertations of the late nineteenth century which are the precursors of McGann's work have effectively disappeared from scholarly attention; they survive only as titles to be read in the bibliography of N.I. Herescu, *Bibliographie de la Litterature Latine* (Paris, Editions Belles-Lettres 1943) pp.174-5. McGann is today the most visible exponent of the tradition of philosophical *Quellenforschung*.

a point of reference to Plato's *Theaetetus*.[15] More recently, C.W. MacLeod has offered a Platonic discussion for some of the material in the first book of *Epistles*.[16] The work begun by MacLeod in this direction deserves elaboration. His many notices of Platonic sources for ideas in the *Epistles* do not treat the question of how these sources relate to other themes in the poems. Another important figure in recent Horace scholarship, C.O. Brink, takes up the question of Plato's *Phaedrus* as a source for one section of the *Epistle to Florus* ;[17] but, as I shall later argue, I believe that he has misunderstood the connection between the two texts. Brink's work on the *Ars Poetica*, always on guard for Aristotelian sources, is but little concerned with the influence of Plato. It is truly mysterious that the question of Horace's Platonic allegiance should have been so thoroughly ignored.[18] For, apart form the influence of the Academic writings of Cicero, which Horace was bound to know, we are well aware of the importance that the *Cratylus* had for the linguistic work of Marcus Varro;[19] and the scholars most concerned with the literary aspects of the Horatian *Epistles* have discussed the likely connections between Varro and Horace.[20]

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15 Shorey argued for a connection between Horace's description of the origins of justice and Plato's in "Horace *Satires* i. 3. 112-13 and Plato *Theaetetus* 172 A, B", *Classical Philology* 16 (1921) 164-68.

16 In "The Poet, the Critic, and the Moralist: Horace, *Epistles* 1.19" *CQ* XXVII (1977) 359-376, and "The Poetry of Ethics: Horace, *Epistles* I" *JRS* LXIX (1979) 16-27.

17 See *Horace on Poetry. Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge University Press 1963) pp. 519ff.

18 Except by a very few: see K. Gantar, "Horaz zwischen Akademie und Epikur", *Ziva Antika* 22 (1972) 5-24; and W.S. Macguiness, "Friends and the Philosophy of Friendship in Horace" (cited above), speaks of the Platonic Academy as "the only school with which he (Horace) had ever any formal connection" (p. 43).

19 Hellfried Dahlmann, *Varro und die hellenistische Sprachtheorie* (2nd ed., Berlin and Zurich, 1964). St. Augustine records Varro's admiration of the Academy at *Civitas Dei* 19.1.

20 C.O. Brink, "Horace and Varro", *Entretiens Hardt* 9 (1962) 173-206; also Hellfried Dahlmann, "Zur Struktur von Horaz, ep. II,1,139ff." in *Studien zu Varro "De Poetis"* (Wiesbaden 1963) 111-112.

I believe that a firm case can be made that Horace directly alludes to Plato's *Cratylus* (440Cf.) at line 108 of the first *Epistle*, and that a fundamentally better understanding of the *Epistles* will grow out of the appreciation of this. I shall argue that Horace frequently looks back to the text of Plato, not only for philosophy, but for anecdotes, images, off-hand remarks, and especially word-play. The basis of my argument for a more Platonic reading of *the Epistles* will be rooted in a reconsideration of Epistle 1.1, in the light of the conclusion of the *Cratylus*. Critics by and large agree with Fraenkel in describing the opening Epistle as "programmatic".[21] In the *Cratylus*, as often enough in the Epistles, it seems that certainty is in flux; just at the point when certainty seems within reach, Socrates announces that he sees the argument falling to ruins. The principal error in the *Cratylus* is a result, as Socrates implies, of too much confidence in the Heraclitean description of Nature and the overapplication of *panta rhei* as a physical law.[22] I shall argue that Horace has adapted the notion of an ever-shifting, Heraclitean perspective directly from Plato's image, and that he weaves it throughout the text of the Epistles, sometimes with reference to the fluidity or instability of the perceptible world, and sometimes with reference to the flux of opinion which torments the philosophical *prokopton* (in other words, Horace himself). The unstable and corruptible nature of material things, or *res*, is one of the major themes of the First Book of Epistles. This image, which for the Academicians is essentially a puzzle about the nature of language, becomes for Horace a means of unifying his book of poems.

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21 Eduard Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 309.

22 Many of the Presocratics seem to have been criticized for their puns; recall Aristophanes' "hymn" replacing *Dia (Zeus)* with *Dinos (Whirl)* at *Clouds 379 ff.*, as typical of philosophical obfuscation. See also the note in K.J. Dover's commentary (Oxford 1968) p. 150.

Modern criticism of the *Cratylus* has come to no agreement as to Plato's ultimate seriousness on the matters which it takes up.[23] There has, however, never been a question as to the educational role that Plato held in the cultural life of Romans.[24] If Plato's conclusions are essentially playful, as Shorey, for instance, believed,[25] then a writer of *Sermones*, forever blending serious truths with humor, would have been naturally drawn to the *Cratylus*. None would claim that an author who took up the question of Heracliteanism, as the *Cratylus* presents it, and wove it into his philosophical poetry, is using philosophy in an amateurish manner. Yet it has long been recognized that Horace has a marked interest in Heraclitean images, and there is no more likely text than Plato's from which

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23 There has been a recent surge of interest in the *Cratylus*. See Nos. 3-5 in the Festschrift for G.E.L. Owen, *Language and Logos* (ed. by Malcolm Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum, 1982): Malcolm Schofield, "The Denouement of the *Cratylus*" pp. 61-81; Bernard Williams, "Cratylus' theory of names and its refutation" pp. 83-93; Julia Annas, "Knowledge and language: the *Theaetetus* and the *Cratylus*" pp. 95-114. See also R.H. Weingartner, "Making sense of the Cratylus" *Phronesis* 15 (1970) 5-25; Nancy Demand, "The Nomothetes of the Cratylus" *Phronesis* 20 (1975) 106-109; Mary Richardson, "True and False Names in the Cratylus" *Phronesis* 21 (1976) pp. 135-145; Richard C. Ketchum, "Names, Forms and Conventionalism: Cratylus 383-395" *Phronesis* 24 (1979) 133-147; John M. Rist, "The Theory and Practice of Plato's *Cratylus*" in *Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury* ed. Douglas Gerber (Scholars Press, California 1984), pp. 207-218. One senses in this recent work that the ancient crux of the *Cratylus* -- just how seriously does Plato intend his reader to take the etymologies -- is still the focus of the debate. For my part, far the most satisfying of recent work on the *Cratylus* is the inspired article by Seth Benardete, "Physics and Tragedy: On Plato's *Cratylus*" *Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1981) 127-140, which stands apart from the others in taking seriously the dramatic contexts created by Plato in the dialogue, and in respecting the sequence of arguments of the *Cratylus* as Plato presents them.

24 One ought to recall that Cicero credits L. Licinius Crassus with a critical and ironic reading of Plato's *Gorgias* at *De Oratore* 1.47:

"Sed ego neque illis assentiebar, neque harum disputationum inventori et principi longe omnium in dicendo gravissimo et eloquentissimo, cuius tum Athenis cum Charmada diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur."

25 Paul Shorey, *What Plato said* (University of Chicago Press, 1933) 268:

"And anyone with a feeling for Platonic style must recognize that the tentative and hesitating language of the last two pages of the *Cratylus* is playful and ironic. Plato has no more doubts than he always had as to the issue between the relativity of the flowing philosophy and the stability of absolute ideas."

Horace would have absorbed them.[26]

Before venturing into a reading of the *Cratylus* as a source for Horace's interests in etymology and in philosophical imagery, I feel that I must apologize for side-stepping a powerful current in recent thought and criticism. A modern study in poetic puns and anagrams might be expected to begin with Ferdinand de Saussure, who seems to have come to the conclusion that recurring patterns of phonetic components closely govern the form and substance of the Latin poetry which he dissected.[27] However, while I believe that Horace was more interested in (and his work more dependent upon) word-play than has hitherto been thought, I am equally convinced that Horace's manipulations of language must, and can readily be, viewed strictly in the light of similar devices exploited by the ancients as a habit in philosophical discussions.[28] One of the pioneering efforts in this kind of analysis is the fundamental study of puns in Lucretius by Paul Friedlaender, which pointed out Lucretius' "atomistic" treatment of words as a reinforcement of Epicurean atomism in nature.[29] The Stoics were as much concerned, though not in an atomistic sense, with the

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26 Ettore Bignone, "Una Dottrina Eraclitea in Orazio" *SIFC* 4 (1924) 69-75 is concerned with the Platonic origins of the phrases *concordia discors* (Epist. 1.12.19) and *symphonia discors* (Ars Poetica 374).

27 See Jean Starobinski, *Les Mots sur Les Mots. Les Anagrammes de Ferdinand de Saussure* (Paris, Gallimard 1971), translated into English by Olivia Emmet, *Words upon Words* (New Haven 1979). The discussion of de Saussure's exact relation to Plato falls under the scope of modern philosophical linguistics; it is treated at length (and in the context of, among others, Locke, Leibniz and Kant) by Jetske C. Rijlaarsdam, *Platon ueber die Sprache. Ein Kommentar zum Kratylos* (Utrecht 1978) 227-336, "Die Quelle der Zeichentheorie Ferdinand de Saussures".

28 I am especially indebted to the work of Frederick Ahl, *Metaformations* (Cornell Univ. Press, 1985); his introductory chapter ought to be supplemented by William Dudley Woodhead, *Etymologizing in Greek Literature from Homer to Philo Judaeus* (Toronto 1928), remarkably perceptive in detecting etymologizing tendencies in the major Greek authors, but nowadays largely unread.

29 "Pattern of Sound and Atomistic Theory in Lucretius" *AJP* 62 (1941) 16-34. Alexander Dalzell has recently published a belated attack upon the whole of Friedlaender's argument in "Language and Atomic Theory in Lucretius" *Hermathena* 143 (1987) 19-28. Dalzell states his motives clearly at p. 28:

> "It is a persistent fault of academic criticism to take too intellectual a view of poetry, to see it as a complex network of conscious systems and structures."

persuasive potential of etymology, as we can clearly see in such a work as Cornutus' *Theologia.*[30] Perhaps all of the Hellenistic schools had incorporated etymological arguments in one form or another. An optimist would grant to Horace a familiarity with both the Platonic sources for the etymological discussions, as well as a familiarity with Hellenistic treatises and later third-rate handbooks on the same questions. The pessimist, who would look principally to contemporary and derivative compilations for Horace's philosophical sources, not only does injustice to the author, but walls off a potentially fruitful search in the original texts.

I propose to discuss briefly the *Cratylus*, not for the sake of making a contribution to the question of Platonic linguistics, but rather in the hope of finding material of interest to Horace, a poet who read his philosopers with keen interest. I will then offer new readings of the *Epistles* and the *Ars Poetica*, arguing that Horace's word-play is essentially Platonic in inspiration. My hope is that, if we find in Horace a poet who utilizes Platonic allusions and word-play to create a level of meaning in his poems deeper than that which we find on the surface, then we ought to grant him his due as a "philosophical poet", and acknowledge his skill and originality in handling philosophical texts.

Even if Dalzell is ultimately correct in saying (p. 27) that "there is no reason to believe that Epicurus accepted the Stoic view that names are naturally suited to things or that he would have been much interested in the discussion in Plato's *Cratylus* of the rightness of names", he ought neither assume that Epicurus was ignorant of this discussion, nor that Latin poets would not have been interested in it. In brief, Dalzell's article uncovers his deplorably simplistic view of poets and their motives. Friedlaender's work has inspired a full-length book by Jane M. Snyder, *Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura* (Amsterdam 1980).

30 Theological etymologies are thought to have been especially favored by Cleanthes and the early Stoics (see Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 1.7.7-13 and Ahl (op. cit.) page 47. For Cornutus, the edition by Carolus Lang (Teubner 1881) of the so-called *De Natura Deorum* is in need of revision; on Cornutus see A.D.Nock in Pauly-Wissowa suppl. 5 (1931) coll. 955-1005. For Cornutus' attitude towards Homer and Hesiod see J. Tate, "Cornutus and the Poets" *CQ* 23 (1929) 41-45.

Perhaps more than any other dialogue of Plato, the nature of the discussions which are taken up in the *Cratylus* was bound to strike a responsive chord in Horace.[31] The dialogue begins with the absurd situation that Hermogenes has "lost his name"; for his ineptitude in financial matters argues that he could never have been "born of Hermes" (to put it in Roman terms, he is in no wise "mercurial"). But Hermogenes is not merely upset because his name has proven to be an effective joke against a notable shortcoming of his. He is worried because his older brother Callias is turning out, in the eyes of many, to be a more substantial personality. Hermogenes runs the risk of losing not only his name, but his patrimony as well. This dramatic situation ties together perfectly with the subsequent discussion. Socrates will "come to the rescue" of Hermogenes by laying the groundwork for an examination of *onomata*. It is hoped, at least at the outset, that the fruit of this examination will be the restoration of Hermogenes to his true name. Coincidentally, the word *onoma*, which most intrigues Plato in the *Cratylus* (principally because of its apparent identity with *nomos*, or law), is connected by modern etymologists with the Latin *nomen*, *numerus*, and *nummus* ; Horace will explore the semantic intersections of these words in the *Epistle to Augustus* and the *Epistle to Florus*.[32] The wide range of meanings of *onoma*, which was evident to Plato, engenders a difficulty his modern readers, who strive to pinpoint the denotative meaning of the word.[33] But Horace had no intention of entering the

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31 In what follows, all translations from Plato (unless otherwise specified) are those of Benjamin Jowett.

32 This is an elaborate question which will have to be postponed for the time being. For Plato's interest in *nomos* and *onoma*, see *Cratylus* 384D-388D; also in the *Laws*, Plato connects *nomos* (law) with *nomos* (the musical form) (*Laws* 799e; for other instances see Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton 1960) p.311 note 48, and page 355). It is this Platonic pun which seems to inspire Horace's frequent connection of correct musical and artistic structure with legal terms in the *Ars Poetica*. The connection between *nummus*, *numerus* and *nomen* can be found in Walde-Hoffman (s.vv.).

33 One ought to remember that the *Cratylus* is generally thought to pre-date the formulation of technical grammatical categories, which are attributed first to Aristotle and the Stoics. A concise description of Stoic ideas on grammar can be found in A.A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (2nd ed., University of California Press, 1986), pp. 131-9.

debate at this level; as a poet, he was free to use the ambiguity which adhered to *onoma* and *nomen*.[34]

One feels that there is more than the usual Platonic conversational tone in the opening of the *Cratylus* ; indeed, the first part of the dialogue is, for Benardete, a "farce".[35] Socrates himself is chiefly responsible for the relentless compounding of humor, intially at the expense of Hermogenes, but finally recoiling on to Cratylus himself. By addressing Hermogenes as "son of Hipponikos, Hermogenes", Socrates seems to be taunting his interlocutor by keeping the question of his true patronymic in a state of uncertainty. Hermogenes' discomfort seems to be at the bottom of his rather nervous contribution to the argument (384d5), that he has control, at least, over the names of his own slaves, being able to change them at his whim (one is tempted to compare the end of Horace's Satire 1.2.125ff., in which the lover is free to create new names for the freedwoman he consorts with). Hermogenes has been humbled by the fact that he is not in control of his "patroia", but Socrates is using the discomfort engendered in Hermogenes to extract him, in due course, from the philosophical family of Callias and the Sophists, and adopt him into his own.

Rudolf Pfeiffer gives a summary of pre-Hellenistic grammatical thought in Chapter Three of his *History of Classical Scholarship, I* (Oxford, 1968). A clear discussion about the exact meaning of *onoma* in the *Cratylus* is Richard Robinson's "The Theory of Names in Plato's *Cratylus*" in *Essays in Greek Philosophy* (Oxford 1969) 100-117.

34 At Sat. 2.4.10, Horace has an interesting pun in which *omen* seems to be extracted from *hominis* by elision, in the phrase *ede hominis nomen.*

35 Benardete, "Physics and Tragedy" (cited above), 127. Richard Robinson, in "A Criticism of Plato's *Cratylus*" (in the collection of his essays cited above) describes the dialogue as a tragedy:

"Plato was a dramatist and thought of himself as such; and the business of a dramatist with ideas is to present them, not to judge them. And the dramatic play of ideas is more prominent in the *Cratylus* even than in the *Phaedo.*" (p.119)

Robinson's opinion may go too far for some readers; but it is salutary insofar as it reminds us of the dramatic features of Platonic dialogue.

Socrates further troubles Hermogenes by suggesting, apparently in earnest, that only by close association with the Sophists can one attain true knowledge of language (391B). Such association requires money -- fifty drachmas more than Socrates can afford (although he has heard the introductory one-drachma lecture).[36] Hermogenes now begins to see his brother Callias not only as his elder and superior but, inasmuch as he has greater financial responsibility, as one privileged to become a philosopher. But Hermogenes, in a great *peripeteia* in which he tries to establish his individuality (391), professes that he is willing to set aside the teachings of Protagoras as worthless. As soon as Socrates sees that Hermogenes is willing to repudiate Protagoras' teachings, he suggests that they transfer their allegiance to Homer (and secondarily to the archaic poets) on the strength of his educational authority. Socrates gives no argument for petitioning Homer for a lesson on the correctness of names; he rather lures Hermogenes into tacit agreement that Homer is the universal authority on all questions; though this assumption was shown to be problematic in the *Ion*, Socrates' use of Homeric names in what follows makes it clear that he is using Homer merely as a point of departure into his dizzying concatenation of *etyma*. Socrates of course is merely reminding his interlocutor that Homer is universally held to be the wellspring of *paideia* in all respects, beginning with the correctness of names. Horace makes a similar request of Lollius in Epistle 1.2, where he insists, in the spirit of Socratic *odium* for "professional thinkers", that Homer states his philosophy *planius ac melius* than the schoolmen Chrysippus and Crantor. One must not judge too quickly the merits of all the details in all the episodes presented by Homer; rational thought can take only a few of them at a time into detailed consideration, and must keep the rest in unprejudiced suspension. This method is typical of Socrates, and he explains it in the *Phaedrus* (229ff.):

> Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories (i.e., the tale of Boreas and Orithyia) are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them; much labor will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must

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36 Horace frequently discusses education in terms of bare cost. The most personal instance of this is *Sat.* 1.6.71ff.; much is made of the apparent impossibility of uniting literary and economic education in the *Ars* (lines 323ff.).

> go on and rehabilitate Hippocentaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous natures. And if he is sceptical about them, and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take a great deal of time. Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance about my own self, would be ridiculous. And therefore I bid farewell to all this; I want to know not about this, but about myself: am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier destiny?

And Phaedrus perhaps thinks Socrates to be a monster because of his self-imposed confinement in the city. But Socrates explains that, for one who loves wisdom, men in cities are better teachers than trees in the country. Only in cities can men be found with whom to enter into ethical dialectic, and the only thing which can partially substitute for life in the city -- because it mimics dialectic -- is reading. Socrates is concerned with philosophical efficiency; in a life which is ruled by discussion, time is most profitably spent in the city. Thus Horace, complaining about a lack of time in the opening *Epistle* (line 20f.), and comparing himself there to a laborer *(opus debentibus),* adopts a Socratic posture when he confesses that he has to make do with the *elementa* of philosophy. In the *Phaedrus,* as in the *Epistles,* the lack of time is not a real problem; by presenting it as such, both Plato and Horace create an atmosphere of humor, in which the putative philosopher finds himself at leisure, but is nonetheless tormented by an almost neurotic fear that he has insufficient time to think out the most urgent problems. Horace reflects this in the phrase *Romae Tibur amem, ventosus Tibure Romam* (Epi. 1.8.12). The city offers dialogue, and the country offers the leisure to read; but trying to strike a balance between the two turns out to be a source of anxiety.[37]

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37 A book held before him, like fruit before a hungry cow, can draw Socrates anywhere, indeed even beyond the city's walls. The question of whether wisdom thrives better within or without the city will be taken up in Epistle 1.10, and to a lesser degree Epistle 1.16. One ought also note the last words spoken by Socrates to Cratylus in the dialogue (440):

> "Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on

Once Socrates has induced Hermogenes to attend to his "Homeric lessons", he chooses to begin his inquiry with cases of disparity between human and divine names; after these have run their course, Hermogenes will be responsible for the sequence in which topics will be taken up (397a). Homer provides the matter for their theological speculation, as is only just, since the ancients enjoyed a closer relationship to the divine world than do contemporary men.[38] The discussion is casual, with enough slack for Socrates' etymological stream of consciousness. The fact that the naming of a noble son is the first item to be discussed is clearly of great significance to the developing relationship between Socrates and Hermogenes, for the inquiry into the name of Hector's son might prove to be a remedy for Hermogenes' "loss of name". The discussion reveals a principle which Socrates seeks to ground firmly for the remainder of the discussion: creatures generate their own likenesses. Hector (from *echein)* is by name a holder or possessor, therefore a king.[39] Astyanax, his son, is likewise an *anax*. The corollary to this principle is given at 394: the impious son of a pious man cannot be called "Theophiles" or "Mnesitheus". But the discussion will soon drift far from these transparent relationships, and Hermogenes will be confronted by the terrible spectre of sons who degenerate so far from their fathers as to become diametric opposites, thereby reckoned to be monstrosities.

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your way."

Socrates makes it clear in parting that the kind of philosophy suitable to Cratylus is introspective and eremitic, and wholly dissonant with his own kind of dialectic.

It is notable that this very section of the *Phaedrus* is important for the philosophical heritage of the diatribe of the city mouse in Sat. 2.6.92 ("vis tu homines urbemque feris praeponere silvis?") as discovered by David West in "Of Mice and Men", in *Quality and Pleasure in Latin Poetry* (ed. by Tony Woodman and David West, Cambridge University Press 1974) pp. 67-80. See also the interesting article by R. P. Bond, "Dialectic, Eclectic and Myth (?) in Horace, *Satires* 2.6" *Antichthon* 19 (1985) 68-86; Bond sees the myth of the *Satire* as Platonic in spirit.

38 This is perhaps why we may learn from Homer the truly correct (i.e. divine) names of certain familiar things, such as the river Scamander (392).

39 Cf. Epi. 1.1.65, in which *res (scil.*, money) and *rex* are sarcastically conflated.

This shift becomes ever more clear as the persons whose names are taken into consideration become more godlike. Orestes is the starting-point (394) for a genealogy which quickly reaches the level of the gods: Socrates proceeds backwards, from Agamemnon to Atreus, Pelops, Tantalus, Zeus, Cronus and finally Uranus. While the etymologies of Orestes, Agamemnon and Atreus are all connected with human passions and are all specifically illustrative of their human experiences, the name of Pelops is understood to be indicative of an intellectual flaw. Pelops, "he who sees only what is near", is responsible for the curse that descends through his line. In his race, descended directly from the supreme gods, there is clearly a discrepancy between the original seed, which was essentially reflective and intelligent, and its degenerate, short-sighted offspring. The listener is led to consider the variance between fathers and sons in the capacity for philosophy; genetics cannot, as the etymological arguments suggest, predictably sustain intelligence within a blood-line, and philosophical talent is thus not necessarily inherited.[40]

Cratylus rejoins the conversation after Socrates' inspired etymologies have "run their race" (428B).[41] Complimenting Socrates on his verbal skill, Cratylus addresses him as Achilles had addressed Ajax at *Iliad* 9.644-5. But Socrates seems to take this as a "loaded" joke, for in his rejoinder he refers to the possibility that he is suffering, like the Sophoclean Ajax, from delusions (428D); this is what seems to lie behind his reply:

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40 Cronos is "pure mind"; Uranus -- "he who sees what is above" -- is the prototype of the astrological philosopher (and, as we learn later, is essentially the equivalent of *anthropos*, both words indicating a reflective or contemplative nature). One might reflect that the tone of this argument on inherited virtues is less similar to the Hesiodic metal-analogy of the *Republic* (545Dff.) than it is to the "home-spun" discussion of Socrates' inherited skill at *maieutike* in the *Theaetetus* (151Bf.).

41 Socrates traces the cause of his enthusiasm to "the steeds of Euthyphro", an image reminiscent of the "horses of the soul" in the *Phaedrus*, and one of the likely inspiration for Horace's worn-out horse in the opening of the first Epistle (lines 8-9):

solve senescentem mature sanus equum, ne
peccet ad extremos ridendus et ilia ducat.

Roland Mayer astutely detects, in the anonymous *qui* which precedes this image, the *daimonion* of Socrates ("Horace, Epistles I" (cited above) p.66).

> I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself, what am I saying? For there is nothing worse than self-deception -- when the deceiver is always at home with you.

The treacherous line between *enthousiasmos* and rational philosophy, Socrates suggests, has perhaps been crossed more than once in the effusion of etymologies. At some point, the inquirer into names is no longer sure whether he is eliciting the meanings sealed within names by the *nomothetes/ onomatothetes*, or is simply creating new meanings of his own; the resulting perplexity is akin to madness. The abrupt self-awareness, bold enough to entertain the possibility that the whole of the preceding discussion is nothing but madness, reminds a Horatian reader *imprimis* of the sudden shift from the "sane poet" to the "mad poet" at the conclusion of the *Ars Poetica* (lines 347-476).[42]

Finally, the conclusion of the *Cratylus* has Socrates scolding Cratylus for his Heraclite-anism (440Af.); the reasonable man, says Socrates, will not consider that all things suffer from the same instability and "leakiness" that characterizes gross physical matter:

> Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heraclitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but it is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a doctrine; for

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42 On this point G.K. Fiske makes this penetrating observation: *(Lucilius and Horace. A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation* (Madison, Wisconsin 1920), p. 47):

"Now the perfect poet is really the counterpart of the ideal Stoic sage, trained in Stoic Philosophy and working in the field of poetry."

you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me.

A remarkable echo of this "running at the nose" (a pun on *katarrhe,* a head-cold, literally a "downward flow") and the principal of universal flux in the Heraclitean formula *panta rhei)* is found in the famous last line of the First Epistle; the sapiens is *praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.* In these instances, which to my knowledge have never been compared,[43] a philosophical attitude has been humorously conflated with a nagging malady. Such a conflation is rare enough (I have found no other examples of it between Plato's time and Horace's) to warrant closer attention. Both in the *Cratylus* and in the opening *Epistle,* the image of a "runny nose" suggests a confusion which threatens the integrity of the philosophical efforts which have preceded it. In Horace it follows, and to some extent sums up, the portrait of the suffering *prokopton* whose external imbalance mirrors the disorder which has taken command of his soul, causing him confusion on an elemental level (lines 97-100):

rides: quid ? mea cum pugnat sententia secum,
quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,
aestuat et vitae disconvenit ordine toto,
diruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis?

Here, and later on in *Epistle* 1.8, Horace enters into the Platonic discussion which closes the *Cratylus* on the level of Heracliteanism: not, of course, in order to decide upon the ultimate persuasiveness of the Heraclitean flux as a world-view, but in order to adopt the philosophical notion of the flux as an image of poetic value. The *aestus* to which Horace alludes in line 99, and which is taken up more fully in *Epistle* 1.2, translates the "flux of certainty" of the *Cratylus* into a poetic symbol. It allows Horace to allude to notions of natural elements *(stoicheia* or *rhizomata)* in his poetry, which carry with them the flavor of Presocratic cosmologies, and it reminds the Platonically-inclined reader of the the instability of meanings around which, whether seriously or not, the *Cratylus* unfolds. By pointing out

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43 The commentators (e.g., Orelli-Baiter, Kiessling-Heinze,) refer to this *topos* in the form which it assumes in Epictetus (1.6.36).

the numerous instances in the *Epistles* in which philosophical matters are described in terms of flux (which might be generically labeled "liquid imagery"), I hope to convince the reader that the *Cratylus*, supplemented by many other Platonic works, was indeed one of the most important philosophical sources for the *Epistles*.

EPISTLES ONE THROUGH TEN: THE PHILOSOPHER VINDICATED

The most comprehensive feature of these first ten Epistles is the discussion of *res* and *natura,* specifically as regards their effect upon the *sapiens. Res* is introduced in the opening Epistle, but it is only in the Tenth Epistle that Horace fully develops the notion that physical nature, ever in flux, is the enemy of *sapiens.* Horace himself turns out to be victorious over the flux of physical *natura,* by rejecting the permanence both of economic *res* (i.e., money) and landed wealth in general in the Tenth Epistle. Gordon Williams devotes some space to *natura* as it appears in the Tenth Epistle; he offers the following interpretation:[44]

> No Stoic could disagree with the proposition that one must live in accordance with nature; it was a fundamental tenet. But in that sense "nature" meant something like "reason". Horace is perpetrating a confidence trick by using "nature" in the sense in which it is contrasted with convention and society.

A bit further on (p. 595f.), Williams elaborates the "confidence trick":

> If Horace's thought expressed in *Epistles* 1.10 is examined in the light of these passages,[45] it becomes clear that his fraud is even greater than was suggested above and that when he speaks of *natura* here (scil. Epi. 1.10.24-5) he is visualizing those natural features of landscape -- trees, grass, rivers, etc. --which characterize the country. This is a very far cry from the Stoics and from any reasonable sense that could be attached to *naturae convenienter vivere.* Horace has taken philosophical commonplaces and warped them into a new meaning of his own, with wit and imagination.

What precisely is the "new meaning" which Horace has woven from the traditional meanings of *natura?* The "newness" of Horace's idea of *natura,* consists, I believe, in his awareness that the physiological speculation which had accrued around the word *physis* could be used as poetic material. This is neither a "trick" nor an immersion into "commonplaces"; Horace demands of his reader a willingness to recall the classical texts of philosophy as he reads the following poems.

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44 *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry,* p. 594.

45 Williams here refers to the use of "natura" in antiquity, citing the collection of texts by A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (Baltimore, 1935) 447-456.

Epistle 1

One of the most interesting questions raised by this poem is how Horace might address an essentially didactic series of philosophical *dicta* and *exempla* to a figure such as Maecenas, who cannot be thought to stand in need of such advice. In the letters to Lollius, Horace can place himself in the position of a master addressing a younger pupil, in the Theognidean tradition. But here quite the opposite tone must be adopted; Horace sees himself as inept, unstable, and ludicrous in the presence of his patron, who readily laughs at Horace's philosophical uncertainty. In this respect, Maecenas resembles Democritus, the "laughing philosopher", who appears in the middle of the *Epistle to Augustus* (lines 194 ff.) to comment on the absurd behavior of the Romans in their theatres.

Although it seems to have gone unnoticed by all the major commentators, the anagram on Maecenas' name which appears within the first three lines of the Epistle (Maecenas/ Camena) announces that verbal play will be an essential component in what follows. It is generally agreed that Horace is setting up Maecenas to be his Muse.[46] Maecenas is not the source of Horace's wisdom, but rather the source of his inspiration. Even more than this, he is the *tutela* of Horace's *res* (line 103). Yet *res* surely cannot mean "money"; it more probably hints at the fact that Maecenas is the protector of Horace's art -- and now, of his philosophy. One is reminded of how Heraclitus entrusted his work to the goddess of Ephesos, that the *vulgus* might never lay eyes upon it.[47]

For the first half of the Epistle, Maecenas is a silent and perhaps somewhat threatening character. Horace is to a degree powerless against Maecenas' wish that the poet return to his *ludus* (line 3).[48] Maecenas comes to life at line 95 *(rides)*, only to stop laugh-

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46 See McGann, p. 33 note 1, on the hymnodic form adopted here.

47 Diogenes Laertius (9.5) tells of how Heraclitus deposited his book in the Artemision at Ephesus, in order that only the most powerful of the Ephesians *(hoi dunatoi)* might have access to it, and that it might not be easily disdained by the more vulgar element of the city *(to demodes)*. See the discussion in G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1962) pp. 184-5.

48 One ought to note the apparent *schema etymologicum* in the phrase *includere ludo*.

ing at line 101 where, as it seems, Horace becomes recalcitrant and no longer willing to provide amusement with his unkempt appearance. Thus the final lines of the poem (95 ff.) return to the opening *spectaculum (spectatum satis et donatum iam rude, 2).* Horace has, in past literary productions, put his reputation on the line in the same way that the gladiator risks his life; indeed, Horace will have to ask for a *diludia* in Epistle 19 (line 47), when it becomes clear that he has made enough enemies among the Roman *litterati* to put himself in danger. Much like the grotesque image that opens the *Ars Poetica* (where *spectatum* in line 5 is also connected with ridicule), Horace has objectified himself in this opening Epistle. He will be a spectacle of disheveled appearance to some; but to his addressees he will seem to be a "working model" of the philosophical *prokopton,* ever aware that his soul retains elements of disorder and imbalance, and ever trying to find ways of correcting them.[49] On the other hand, Maecenas is Horace's point of attachment to stability and certainty, a canon of order *(de te pendentis,* etc., line 105), who highlights Horace's irregularities and shortcomings. The badly cut nail, the ill-fitting toga, and the unflattering haircut are similar, but certainly not identical, to the external signs of one who claims to be a philosopher.[50] Horace does not affect this sort of appearance; it is the result of psychic *discordia.*

Ludus here (with gladiatorial overtones) is hardly amusing or amatory; instead it is restrictive or binding *(includere).*

49 One ought to compare the beginning of the long Stoicizing sermon at *Satires* 2.3.77 ff., in which a well-ordered toga is a sign of mental attention in preparation for philosophy:

Audire atque *togam iubeo componere,* quisquis
ambitione mala aut argenti pallet amore
quisquis luxuria tristive superstitione
aut alio mentis morbo calet, *etc.*

50 Roland Mayer describes an alleged "philosopher's uniform" in connection with the Epistles ("Horace, Epistle I" (cited above) p. 55 note 3).

Horace concludes the poem with Jupiter as a model of happiness (line 106). The *sapiens*, at best, is second to Jupiter *(uno minor est Iove)*, and will take Jupiter as a model. The conclusion takes the reader back to the proem and its allusive identification of Maecenas and the Muse. Inquiring into the sources of Horace's personifications of divinity, one finds two sources, at least, for the ethical models that Jupiter and Maecenas represent. The first is the Homeric (and Sophoclean) Athena, the protectress of Odysseus. The second is the type of perfect beings which the Epicureans postulated as gods, inhabiting the *intermundia*. Lucretius' description of these beings, revealing themselves in dreams to mortal men, is the fullest available to us *(DRN*, 6.50-95).[51] The favor shown by Athena to Odysseus in the *Odyssey* often manifests itself in the goddess' smiling; after Odysseus is ferried to Ithaka by the Phaeakians, he meets Athena disguised as a local girl and immediately spins out a yarn about his identity, and she responds thus *(Odyssey*[52] 13.287ff):

> The grey-eyed goddess Athena smiled and stroked him with her hand and said "Harsh man, versed in wiles, insatiate of tricks, you after all had no intention of putting aside your deceptions and thievish words, even though you are in your own country."

Athena is fond of the mortal's craftiness while knowing full well that it cannot compare with her own, no matter how far he exceeds other mortals in wit. She can condescendingly laugh at his awkwardness without malice, just as Maecenas can with Horace. When Horace reveals the sufferings that underlie his displays of ineptitude, he does not lash out angrily at Maecenas, but laments his own human weaknesses. He is made of poorer stuff than the great man, or rather Muse. Maecenas' external perfection (a consequence of his apotheosis) makes him critical of human frailty. The second component of the divine *prosopon*, inspired most likely by Lucretius, is suggested by Horace's complete lack of *ataraxia*,

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51 See Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (New York 1964) 438ff. A full discussion is Walter Scott's "The Physical Constitution of the Epicurean Gods" *Journal of Philology* 12 (1883) 212-247. As to the opposite camp, visual descriptions of the Stoic god had become rather comical by Horace's time; see Cicero *De Natura Deorum* on anthropomorphism (especially 1.71ff. and 2.46ff.), and later Seneca's *Apokolokyntosis* (9) for the globular Stoic god.

52 The translation is that of Richmond Lattimore.

especially in lines 97-100:

> rides: quid? mea cum pugnat sententia secum,
> quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,
> aestuat et vitae disconvenit ordine toto,
> diruit aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis?

Psychic commotion is here pictured in elemental terms: the lack of *ordo*, the conjuction and disjunction of ideas *(diruit aedificat)*, the replacement of elements by others which are incompatible with the whole *(quadrata rotundis)*. This kind of description demands that the reader orient himself in the language of *physiologia*. Whether Lucretian atomism or Platonic physics is at the bottom of this imagery, *(Timaeus 53ff.)*, one cannot read these lines as merely "popular philosophy".

A verbal echo further confirms Horace's reflection upon Lucretius' divinities (line 105):

> de te *pendentis*, te *respicientis* amici, *etc.*

This should be compared with the description of Mars and Venus in Lucretius' proem (1.35-36):

> atque ita *suspiciens* tereti cervice reposta
> pascit amore avidos inhians in te, dea, visus,
> eque tuo *pendet* resupini spiritus ore.

In each case, the absorption of the spectator is described with *seeing (spectare, suspicere)* and *attachment (pendentis, pendere)*. Of course, one cannot press the equation too far, and suggest that "Mars is to Venus as Horace is to Maecenas". But the echo does suggest that Horace has made use not only of Lucretius' Epicurean divinities (the formally perfect beings), but also his traditional iconography of the gods. One might be so bold as to infer that Horace understood clearly the contradiction between these two types of divinity.

The *Odyssey* is the source of a second important element of the philosopher's struggle. Horace describes his occasional "plunge" into public life (line 16):

> nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis.

Homer's Odysseus is the model of the "unsinkable" hero, as Epistle 1.2.22 will emphasize *(adversis rerum immersabilis undis).*[53] Like Odysseus clinging to Leucothea's veil, Horace is *agilis*, safe in his possession of *vera virtus.*[54] The metaphor linking a distressed soul in need of an ethical program and the violent swell of the sea vividly recalls the opening of Lucretius' Second Book:

suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis, *etc.*

Horace's *sapiens* stands apart from the flux or *katarrhe* which public life resembles.[55] This flux or confusion can be described in another way, and equally well; for this Horace turns to the Homeric Proteus *(Odyssey* 4.351ff.). Like Menelaos struggling to extract desperately-needed information from Proteus, Horace wrestles with the *populus* in the hope of finding some ethical model to which he can attach himself (line 76):

belua multorum es capitum. nam quid sequar aut quem?

Finally, in despair, Horace realizes that the *populus* is simply part of the flux which he is set against (line 90):

quo teneam voltus mutantem Protea nodo?

Horace's great precursor in the assimilation of Proteus into philosophical arguments is Plato.[56] From these allusions, one can safely say that Odysseus is the first element in the composite sketch of Horace's ideal *sapiens* ; his wisdom enables him to manage the vicissitudes of physical nature.[57]

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53 Perhaps also Pindar's "unsinkable cork" (abaptistos phellos, Pythian 2.86) is to be compared here (Kiessling-Heinze give the Greek equivalent without citing Pindar).

54 Horace may be here employing *agilis* as a technical term, translating *praktikos* in the sense of *bios praktikos* (See Kiessling-Heinze ad loc.).

55 The flux appears as Horace's obstacle in line 23:

sic mihi tarda fluunt ingrataque tempora, *etc.*

56 In connection with the attempt to escape from Socrates' dialectical grip, at *Euthyphro* 15d, *Euthydemus* 288b, and *Ion* 541e.

57 Roland Mayer argues (in connection with Epistle 1.2.19-20):

As Mayer persistently argues, Horace's espousal of Aristippean hedonism is an indication of his philosophical amateurism. This kind of philosophy, it is alleged, does not commit Horace to the position of one or another school, and proves his unwillingness to enter into the contemporary debates of the schools as a professional. Yet if one considers the way in which Horace has chosen to formulate the Aristippean ethos, one finds that he is primarily interested in re-stating the question of hedonism in terms of *res:*

> et mihi res, non me rebus subiungere conor.

This done, he returns constantly to *res* in its wide variety of meanings, and finally offers a way to understand the true nature of *res* via an etymological insight, drawn from (of all places) a children's song *(nenia,* line 63). We recall, for instance, that *res* means "money" in lines 55-6, obligations in line 81, and Horace's own concerns (apparently his poetry) in line 103. The way to tie all of these together is suggested by the connection of *res, rex,* and *recte* (lines 59-61):

> plebs eris. at pueri ludentes "rex eris" aiunt,
> "si recte facies". hic murus aeneus esto.

At first, the kingship is connected with *orthotes (recte facere).* The "bronze wall", a philosophical bulwark, seems to allude further to *aes* as money; for the perversion of the *nenia* (which, as Horace emphatically claims in line 64, encapsulates the *mos maiorum)* seeks to align *rex* (and perhaps *lex)* with *res (lines 65-6):*

> isne tibi melius suadet, qui, rem facias, rem
> si possis, recte, si non, quocumque modo, rem, *etc.*

This *nenia* is the only positive contribution to *prokope* which the opening Epistle has to offer.[58] It represents a multi-faceted *schema etymologicum,* to which the poet returns in

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> qui domitor Troiae multorum providus urbes
> et mores hominum inspexit latumque per aequor, etc.

that Horace chose the *lectio difficilior* of *Odyssey 1.1* reading *nomon* for *noon.* If this is true, it helps my case that Horace was specifically interested in exploring the semantic field of *nomos,* most likely in connection with his reading of the *Cratylus* and the *Laws* (see my Introduction).

58 Both the moralizing *nenia* and the forensic perversion of the *mores maiorum* are songs

the close of the Epistle (lines 106-8):

> ad summam: sapiens uno minor est Iove, dives,
> liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
> praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.

Jupiter stands as a symbol of *rex*, a dangerous word, to be sure, but one that looks back to the important consideration of *res* and *recte* which has preceded.[59]

Epistle Two

In his first letter to Lollius, Horace is concerned with proving to Lollius (as Socrates was concerned with proving to Hermogenes) that more wisdom may be found in Homer than in so-called professional philosophers.[60] Homer's role as ethical teacher *par excellence* is merely the evolution of the many Odyssean allusions in the first Epistle. Horace prescribes, above all, reading as a *therapeia* for the ills of the soul *(relegi*, line 2; *librum* line 35ff.). Reading, it seems, is better suited to quiet Praeneste than to Rome, where the company of friends lends itself to dialectic (this will be developed in Epistle Five, to Torquatus).[61]

Horace is able to "boil down" the ethical material contained in the Homeric epics into *aestus* and the avoidance of it (line 7ff.). The *Iliad*, a document of the *floods* of human stupidity *(aestus, 8)*, describes how the elemental rage and jealousy of the Achaean heroes redounds upon the people at large *(quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi*, line 14). A

(decantata, line 64; *recinunt*, line 55). The effect of singing suggests medicinal *epodai.* (see, e.g., Plato *Charmides* 156Cf.).

59 One might also find a *schema etymologicum* in the juxtaposed words *Iove, dives* in line 104 (the root of each is "di"); the *Cratylus* takes up the etymology of Zeus/ Dios at length (ch. 396Af.), where the root given is "dia" (through); perhaps Horace had this in mind at c.1.34.5-6 when he associates *Diespiter* and *dividere (namque Diespiter/ igni corusco nubila dividens).*

60 Surely *planius* is to be preferred over *plenius* in line 4: how can anyone think that Homer's work is more voluminous than that of Chrysippus? Furthermore, *plenius* cannot mean that Homer's ethical lessons are "dragged out" more than those of Chrysippus, for Horace stresses the economy of the Homeric character-portraits (Antenor, Nestor, etc.; lines 9ff.).

61 Cf. the passage from the *Phaedrus* quoted below.

"solution" to the *Iliad* is to be found in the *Odyssey*, which describes the moral success of one who survives every storm *(immersabilis, 22)*. By imagining ethical *vitia* as chaos in physical nature, Horace seems to be returning to the flux of the first Epistle.[62]

The Odyssean material introduces liquid images in several ways. Had Odysseus succumbed to Circe's *pocula*, her liquid magic, he would have wallowed like a pig in mud (line 23 ff.). Not only is the poison liquid. As a cure for the the temptations which threaten to rob Lollius of his *autarkeia*, he is exhorted to drink the words of philosophy while his opinions are not yet contaminated (lines 67-8):

> nunc adbibe puro/ pectore verba puer, nunc te melioribus offer.

To continue the fluid images, the flux of *aestus*, which appeared earlier, is mitigated to a quiet *amnis*, a symbol of Lollius' hesitation:

> vivendi qui recte prorogat horam
> rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis: at ille
> labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.

It is Plato's *Phaedrus* which establishes the river-bank as a proper place for philosophical discussion. We ought to read the word *rusticus* as ironic, for it is only a sophisticated and philosophical awareness that would be intrigued by the flow of a river. A neat word-play connects *omne* with *amne* (these words translate *panta rhei)*. Thus once again an Heraclitean allusion seems to be at the core of the scene: "one cannot step into the same river twice".[63]

We come now to the positive precepts which Horace has set down for Lollius' benefit. As in the preceding poem, these seem to be overwhelmed by poetic concerns, and expressed allusively. The text-book prescribed for Lollius is Homer; the method of reading is inspired by Plato. The thing most to be avoided, Horace suggests, is also drawn from

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62 *Aestus* here complements the image of Epistle 1.23, *sic mihi tarda fluunt ingrataque tempora.*

63 Known to us from Plutarch, *de E apud Delphos* (18, 392B), and important here because of its appearance in *Cratylus* 402A. The dramatic force of the Ilissus for the *Phaedrus* was first suggested to me by an unpublished paper on this dialogue by Catherine Torigian.

Homer. This is the *ethos* of the Phaeacians, who are so worthless as to sleep away the mid-day. Like Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, Horace insists upon the relentless exertion of philosophical inquiry; there is no leisure to *desipere in loco*. I cite here the relevant passage from the *Phaedrus* (258-9):

> *Phaedrus:* For what should a man live if not for the pleasures of discourse? Surely not for the sake of bodily pleasures, which almost always have previous pain as a condition of them, and are therefore rightly called slavish. *Socrates:* There is time enough. And I believe that the grasshoppers chirruping after their manner in the heat of the sun over our heads are talking to one another and looking down at us. What would they say if they saw that we, like the many, are not conversing, but slumbering at mid-day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think? Would they not have a right to laugh at us? They might imagine that we were slaves, who, coming to rest at a place of resort of theirs, like sheep lie asleep at noon around the well. But if they see us discoursing, like Odysseus sailing past them, deaf to their siren voices, they may perhaps, out of respect, give us the gifts which they receive from the gods that they may impart them to men. *Phaedrus:* What gifts do you mean? I never heard of any. *Socrates:* A lover of music like yourself ought surely to have heard the story of the grasshoppers, who are said to have been human beings in an age before the Muses. And when the Muses came and song appeared they were ravished with delight; and singing always, they never thought of eating and drinking, until at last in their forgetfulness they died. And now they live again in the grasshoppers; and this is the return which the Muses make to them -- they neither hunger, nor thirst, but from the hour of their birth are always singing, and never eating or drinking; and when they die they go and inform the Muses in heaven who honours them on earth. They win the love of Terpsichore for the dancers by their report of them; of Erato for the lovers, and of the other Muses for those who do them honour, according to the several ways of honouring them; -- of Calliope the eldest Muse and Urania who is next to her, for the philosophers, of whose music the grasshoppers make report to them; for these are the Muses who are chiefly concerned with heaven and thought, divine as well as human, and they have the sweetest utterance. For many reasons, then, we ought always to talk and not to sleep at mid-day. *Phaedrus:* Let us talk.

It is the duty of the philosopher to carry his inquisitive behavior beyond the city walls; or, put another way, there is, according to Socrates, a religious reason to extend the philosophical life into the state of nature.[64] Socrates prefers the dialectical life of the city;

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64 Clyde Murley, in "Plato's *Phaedrus* and Theocritean Pastoral" *TAPA* 71 (1940) 281-295, demonstrates with many examples how the images of the *Phaedrus* are incorporated by Theocritus. One might make a case, then, that the whole tradition of ancient Pastoral looks back to Plato at least for its setting; Horace very likely was aware of the debt of pastoral poetry to Plato's dialogue.

when he is alone or cut off from other mortals his dialectic is still scrutinized by the Muses. This Platonic tableau is at the heart of Horace's descriptions of the "examined life" in a country setting. Horace does not allow Lollius the leisure of an unoccupied mind for, as we shall see in the Eighteenth Epistle, Horace will find a way for Lollius to carry his philosophical disposition into the country.

The Second Epistle thus re-models the idea of flux, which had been introduced in the preceding poem. The flux here is not merely external *aestus*, but also a component of the physical condition of the *prokopton*, whether for evil (Circe's *pocula)* or good (the precepts offered to Lollius). And the *prokopton* can be described as a vessel to contain the flux *(sincerum est nisi vas, quodcumque infundis acescit).*[65]

Epistles Three, Four, and Five

These three poems seem to be somewhat interdependent. Kilpatrick believes that the tone of Epistle 1.5 follows closely on that of 1.4, inasmuch as the former is an invitation addressed to a poet, and the latter one to a lawyer.[66] Only the Epistle to Torquatus mentions a precise hour and day *(supremo sole*, 5.3) but there is an indefinite undertone to the immediately following *manebo* ; Torquatus is likely to turn up at any time after dusk. The one element which is fixed in both Epistles Four and Five is the place; in Four it is implied metaphorically in the phrase *Epicuri de grege porcum* (Horace is thinking here of a pigpen); in Epistle Five it is explicitly *domi* (5.3). Thus it seems that these two Epistles are not so much placed together because of the contrasting personalities or occupations of their addressees, but rather for their focus on Horace's own location. Likewise in Epistle Three, Horace inquires into the whereabouts of the cohort and mentions, with considerable flair, several possibilities; it eludes the casual reader that Horace must have had some idea of where the cohort is if he expects that his letter will ever reach them. In the conclusion of

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65 cf. Plato's fondness for the adjective "leaky" *(sathros)*, a metaphor from containers: *Cratylus* 440D; *Philebus* 55C; *Laws* 736E; *Gorgias* 479B and 493E; *Theaetetus* 179D.

66 Kilpatrick, POF 61.

Epistle Three, Horace returns to the question of place:

> ubicumque *locorum* vivitis, indigni fraternum rumpere foedus,
> pascitur in vestrum reditum votiva iuvenca.

The return of the cohort will be cause for celebration. Horace must be thinking of Rome as the focus for the return of all the addressees in these Epistles. It is the "talk of the town" *(Romana ora* 3.9) that makes the doings of the cohort seem so important. Since these three Epistles are framed by the weightier, more doctrinal Epistles Two and Six (where the discussion of *res* and its ethical importance is resumed from Epistle 2.50), and they seem to be occasional pieces, some important philosophical allusions in them have escaped notice.

Epistle Three

Horace's Rome, like Socrates' Athens, stands at the focus of all philosophic effort. From his Roman vantage, Horace can reflect clearly on the experiences of his friends abroad. Although he begins the Third Epistle with an anxious question *(scire laboro,* 2), he ends by withdrawing the question *(ubicumque locorum vivitis,* 34-35) because it is ultimately of little interest where the cohort finds itself, as long as it returns safely home. Of course, the military labor of the cohort requires that it be removed far from the city. Yet Horace's friends in the cohort are *litterati* and the Epistle creates the amusing fiction that the whole troop is interested primarily in letters *(quid studiosa cohors operum struit?* line 6). The labor of letters, needless to say, is best accomplished in the city, even if the Palatine library tempts the pretentious young author Celsus to plagiarism (line 17); and so, without excessive concern for military details, Horace offers the soldiers some literary advice, couched in moral terms (28-9):

> hoc opus, hoc studium parvi properemus et ampli
> si patriae volumus, si nobis vivere cari.

By *hoc,* Horace seems to mean the exercise of *caelestis sapientia* from which Florus is inhibited by virtue of his *curae* (line 26). Clearly we have drifted considerably far from the

quotidian concerns of *milites*.[67]

At this point we might consider how the geographical display which opens the Epistle is meant to elucidate the enclosed literary precepts. Horace here creates a sort of composite landscape with three prominent features: Thrace, the Hellespont *(vicinas...turres)*, and Asia. The nature of Thrace is summed up by a river whose flow is checked by snow;[68] the Hellespont is known by its twin promontories, even more so than by the water which flows between them; finally Asia, as tradition warrants, is essentially languid. Horace seems to have intended a link between these places and the three litterateurs mentioned, Titius, Celsus, and Florus the addressee. Munatius comes in as an afterthought at line 31, and it is not at all clear if his relationship with Florus is at all literary. Celsus the plagiarist, who shows little zeal, may be fitted into the Asian landscape; Titius the Pindarist has a huge, ferocious talent which suits Thrace. This pairing leaves the Hellespont as a metaphor for the two "towers", Florus and Munatius.[69] The motif of dissimilar brothers, which the Hellespont conveys, is of importance at other points in the Book (Horace and Aristius in Epi. 10, Amphion and Zethus in Epi. 18). Perhaps the rupture of the *fraternum foedus* concerns matters literary or philosophical, and ought not be allowed to ruin their public *amicitia*. In any case, the "rupture" of their amity is made visible by the water which flows between the promontories (4):

an freta vicinas inter currentia turris, *etc.*

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67 While D.A. West's reading (in *Reading Horace*, Edinburgh 1967, pp. 29-39), comparing the allusion to bees and the Fourth Georgic of Vergil (esp. lines 88-98) is both attractive and important in amplifying the sense of the phrase *caelestis sapientia*, it fails to convince in the matter of the alleged controlling of bees by sprinkling water on them. This is no proper analogue for Florus, who has a will of his own, and is purposefully seeking his proper medication. Still, the idea that *caelestis sapientia* is a property of bees might make for a joke on Florus' own name (i.e., *flos)*.

68 The description of the Hebrus is most likely a stock epithet; see Kiessling-Heinze *ad locum* for the Hellenistic equivalent (from *Anth. Pal.* IX.56).

69 Kilpatrick properly brings into his discussion of the Epistle the well-known Socratic description of fraternal solidarity from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.3); see POF p. 35.

This is a new mainfestation of the flux, carried over from Epistle Two; we hear in the phrase *inter currentia turris* the "rho" which, according to Socrates' is the audible proof of the Heraclitean dictum *panta rhei.*[70]

While all of the personalities mentioned in the Epistle have a place in the "landscape", it is Florus who stands at the center of the Epistle, and the *curae* to which he must apply *frigida fomenta* are not revealed in the letter.[71] But these *curae* are likely to be the same as those which torment Tibullus in the following poem, which are spelled out more clearly *(curantem quidquid dignum sapiente bonoquest,* 5). Moreover, the dominance of the landscape carries over from Epistle Four into Five. Epistle Four again advances the image of the flux, and compels us to consider the ethical precepts in physical terms.

Epistle Four

Since Epistle 1.4 is usually considered a *consolatio,* curiosity has always demanded the disclosure of the source of Tibullus' anxiety. Kirkpatrick's assessment, that a failed romance is at the root of the elegist's withdrawal from his familiars,[72] is dissatisfying for two reasons. First, it is abhorrent to the tone of the Epistles that amatory distress should be dealt with so gently; the specific for this ill is always stated in the most blunt terms (e.g., at Epi. 1.2.55: *sperne voluptates: nocet empta dolore voluptas).* There is no room for elegiac sentiments in the Epistles; elegy is roundly dismissed, along with all "light" poetry, as *ludicra* at Epi. 1.1.10. Even if the elegiac tone is at home in the expectation of death, the ethical advice to Albius *(omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum, 12)* is hardly applicable to the sufferings of an *amator.*

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70 *Cratylus,* 426D-E.

71 Kilpatrick's equation of *frigida curarum fomenta* and *gratia male sarta* as "ineffectual (even harmful) remedies for ailing friendship" (POF p. 36) takes the phrases out of context. *Gratia male sarta* is something which, for the reader, remains in the dark.

72 POF, pp. 60-61.

To pin-point an exact source for Tibullus' grief is simply impossible. The suggestion of Kiessling-Heinze -- that Tibullus' alleged hypochondria was actually grounded in fact, since he seems to have died (19 B.C.) only a few years after the publication of *Epistles I* -- is chronologically satisfying. But Horace specifically reminds Tibullus of his splendid *forma* and his abundant *valetudo* (lines 6,10). His "hypochondria", therefore, must have been just that. Horace must have been thinking that a philosophical nature such as that of Tibullus, engaged in a continuing emotional struggle similar to his own, could fall into a like "madness" (as he describes in Epistle Eight) and thus stand to benefit from his experience.

Horace's advice has seemed superficial to some. But on closer inspection, the precepts which he offers to Tibullus reveal themselves to be tailor-made. To begin with, Horace mentions the quality of candor in the poem's opening:

> Albi, nostrorum sermonum candide iudex.

This has justly been called a pun, but the extent of the pun has not been fully explored.[73] In the first place, the "whiteness" of Albius' own name is part and parcel of the focal ethical precept which Horace offers him (ll. 13-14):

> omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum;
> grata superveniet, quae non sperabitur, hora

with "lux" bridging the opening *"Albi"* to the concluding description of Horace as *nitidum*. Whereas Albius is naturally "splendid", an indication of his health, Horace's veneer is the result of his excessive (his "Phaeacian") interest in cosmetics. Tibullus is praised for his *mundus victus*, while Horace the *porcus* is by nature *immundus*. In this the reader will naturally hear the echo of Epistle 1.2.26, which speaks of Odysseus' adventures with Circe:

> vixisset canis immundus vel amica luto sus.

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[73] see E. Flores, "Ad Horat. Ep. 1.4.1", *RAAN* 37 (1962) 59-62.

All this is to direct Tibullus' attention to his own external shape and color, and to ponder whether the exterior is a fair indication of the interior man. There is an Aesopic quality in the animal, *porcus*, which Horace chooses as his emblem, and it leads us to reconsider the opening of the Epistle (lines 4-6):

> an taciturn silvas inter reptare salubris
> curantem quidquid dignum sapiente bonoque est?
> non tu corpus eras sine pectore, *etc.*

With *reptare*, Horace compares Tibullus to a snake. The sound-quality of *silvas inter reptare salubris*, with is sibilant assonance, and the phonetic grouping *"lubr"* in *salubris* (recalling perhaps *coluber* or *lubricus)* support the image. The snake indeed has no *pectus*, and Tibullus' melancholy threatens to strip him of his human *forma.*[74] If Horace intends to make humans into animals, then the anagram of *corpus:porcus* (line 6: line 16) leads the reader to consider physical *forma.* Perhaps Horace's *porcus* is meant to recall the humor of Sat. 2.7.86, in which the Stoic god seems to be equally plump *(totus teres atque rotundus)*. The flux, as it manifests itself in this Epistle, is the flux of *forma*, the danger that Tibullus' excessive melancholy will distort his outward appearance. One would have thought this externalization of emotion to be a peculiarly Ovidian notion.

Epistle Five

Epistle Five is treated by Kilpatrick primarily as a hurried and superficial invitation, probably written and delivered on the very same day, enncouraging Torquatus to "come to a party that evening, and forgetting everything else, to sit up drinking with his friends, perhaps even *dum rediens fugat astra Phoebus.*"[75] Kilpatrick stresses the "occasional"

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74 The animal imagery here is vividly discussed by M.C.J. Putnam in "Horace and Tibullus" *CP 67 (1972)*, 81-88: see especially pp. 86-88.

75 POF, 64-5. Agreement upon this Epistle will perhaps always be precluded by uncertainty about *Archiacis* in the first line. The remarks of the commentators seem to be merely inferences from the text; the best modern explanation (or guess) is that of A. Bourgery ("A propos d'Horace", *RPh* 9 (1935), 130-132), who adduces the Theban Archias from Nepos' *Life of Pelopidas* (3.2). It is hard to be completely convinced that this allusion would have been accessible to Horace's readers.

nature of the poem, but still maintains that it must be understood in the light of *Odes* 3.21; this would require a bit of research for the casual reader and a demand upon Torquatus' memory. One cannot have it both ways. I am inclined to think that the poem is indeed a rather studied piece, and that it invites comparison not only with the Torquatus Ode, but with the tradition of texts discussing intoxication and the examined life; I will be most concerned here with the relevant portions of Plato's *Laws* (Book 2).

How will Horace discover the true personality of Torquatus the *jurisconsultus?* The most powerful tool is wine. Torquatus may think this a torture, for wine is in some cases an instrument for extracting information. We might compare Epi. 1.18.37-8:

> arcanum neque tu scrutaberis illius umquam,
> commissumque teges et vino tortus et ira.

Again the proper name is connected to a root-notion in the Epistle *(torquere).*

The devoted reader has just completed two Epistles (3,4) in which a landscape or backdrop has been used to reveal the *physis* of its addressees; Horace has summoned images of Thrace, Asia, the Hellespont, and *silvae* (in the case of Tibullus) to this end. Now with a fine sense of *spoudaiogeloion* Horace paints Torquatus into a canvas, but a thoroughly urban one. For Torquatus to deceive his client by exiting through the back door is plainly the stuff of comedy, complete with its urban back-drop, and here it seems discordant with the *dignitas* of the addressee. But if this legal mind can bring himself to play the buffoon for the sake of an evening among friends, Horace will offer him a symposium where wine will prove itself to be the great leveler of all men, confounding all of the well-demarcated boundaries of *dignitas* and the forum. Horace's clever usurpation of legal terms is not intended, as some claim, to be an attraction for Torquatus.[76] It is rather a sign or a proof that the interrelations between drunken men at a symposium are parallel to those of sober men in the forum.[77] Wine is quite as able to uncover secret information

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76 e.g., Kilpatrick POF 65.

77 It is tempting to think that Horace here also had in mind the well-known story of the Persian symposia, in which important matters of state were reconsidered with the

as the clever lawyer (operta recludit, 16); it tempers our characters with reason (spes iubet esse ratas, 17) and is thus a champion of moderation; it makes rhetors of everyone (fecundi calices quem non fecere disertum, 19);[78] it can extricate people in financial straits (contracta quem non in paupertate solutum, 20). With *solutum* we inevitably think of Bacchus as *Lyaeus*. The symposium "loosens" all of the familiar bonds of society, and rearranges them, so that human extremes are exchanged for their opposites. The forensic life thus has no claim to superiority over the symposiastic life; this is the odd lesson that Horace would have Torquatus learn of himself.

Horace's *munda suppelex* is a sobering instrument of self-revelation, for the reflections that it will offer to Torquatus are the images of a persona who mistakenly looks for all the answers to his cares in the life of the forum (23-4):

ne non et cantharus et lanx/ ostendat tibi te, *etc.*

The fruits of rhetorical study and public authority can be had instantly from the Circaean magic of Horace's *pocula*. Horace's magic instruments of self-revelation remind us of the opening of Epistle 14: *Vilice silvarum et mihi me reddentis agelli.* The *agellus* works in the same way as does the *suppelex* here.

In sum, each of these three Epistles masquerades as an invitation, but each has a "hidden agenda", in which Horace offers *therapeia* of a specific nature to each of his correspondents.[79] In this respect they do not diverge widely from the underlying tone of Epistles Two and Six. There is, however, less dependence in these brief Epistles upon philosophical precepts. Their familiar banter provides *variatio*, insofar as Epistles Two and Six frequently adopt the tone of a lecture. If these letters began their lives as actual messag-

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help of wine. Unfortunately I have not seen D.W. Montgomery's "Wine the revealer. The effects of wine on different people as demonstrated by Horace in the eighth Satire of the second book" *Annals of Medical History* 4 (1942) 181-188.

78 Note the pun on *fecundi* and *disertum*, which suggests *facundus*.

79 Horatian *therapeia* by means of poetry is the topic of Harold Burton Jaffee's *Horace: an essay in poetic therapeia* (Chicago 1944).

es, it seems likely that there was some re-working of them so that they would blend into the book as a whole. A symposium is the perfect setting for Horace's *psychagogia*, thanks to the morally edifying energy inherent in wine; yet the fact that this is likely inspired by an intricate and lengthy argument of the Second Book of Plato's *Laws* (637a-640) is completely masked by the colloquial tone of the letter.[80]

Epistle Six

It has long been remarked that Horace's dictum *nil admirari* reflects an element common to all the schools of Hellenistic philosophy.[81] The opening lines seem to be perfectly straightforward:

> nil admirari prope res est una, Numici,
> solaque, quae possit facere et servare beatum.

One odd feature, which has not attracted much critical attention, seems to compromise the clarity of the introduction, and that is the force of *prope*. It seems to apologize for the phrase *nil admirari*.[82] As it turns out, the apology is well warranted; for the Epistle's lesson shifts rather suddenly from *nil admirari* to *noli spectari* at line 19. Typically, then, Horace has taken a trite dictum and applied it in an unexpected way. We will have to examine the phrase as it applies to the situation created by the Epistle, rather than by comparing its appearances in other authors.

Horace begins by giving Numicius a paradigm of *ataraxia:* the astronomer proves that he is a true philosopher by his indifference to the awesome spectacle of heaven (3-5):

> hunc solem et stellas et decedentia certis
> tempora momentis sunt qui formidine nulla
> imbuti spectent, *etc.*

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80 While MacLeod ("The Poet, the Critic, and the Moralist" (art. cit. above), p. 361 n. 11-12) rightly pointed the source of this in the *Laws*, he did not explore the possibility that this theme was indeed the major unifying principle of the Epistle.

81 See Kiessling-Heinze ad. loc. on *ataraxia, athambia, apatheia.*

82 Cf. *prope* in the phrase *ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi* (Sat. 1.3.98), marking the metaphor.

Up to line 18, Horace argues that, *a fortiori*, nothing is a *spectaculum* to the philosopher. Thus, paradoxically, the philosopher is the consummate *spectator*. The effect of *spectacula* upon the untrained is thoroughgoing torpor (14):

> defixis oculis animoque et corpore torpet.

But the astronomer cannot be surprised, when he understands the laws which hold the heavenly bodies in their course, and the fixed stars in place. From line 18 to line 23 the tone drifts steadily into diatribe:

> gaude quod spectant oculi te mille loquentem;
> navus mane forum et vespertinus pete tectum,
> ne plus frumenti dotalibus emetat agris
> Mutus et -- indignum, quod sit peioribus ortus --
> hic tibi sit potius quam tu mirabilis illi.

Numicius will not only have to be a wise *spectator*, but he will have also to guard against his becoming a vulgar *spectaculum* himself, as he pursues his forensic career. The world of the forum is made to mirror the celestial sphere; the thousands of public "stars" shall be obscured by Numicius' brightness. Only two line previous to this (17-18), it was precious metal and ivory that was *mirabilis*. Now it is clear that true brightness is proved in the forum. The reader who has in mind the previous Epistle (to Torquatus) will feel the continuity of the forensic situation. Moreover, the *oculi* which appear at lines 14 and 19 allude to stars: the metaphor is a favorite of Ovid.[83] There is an irony in the name of Numicius' probably fictitious rival; he is afraid that a certain Mutus will outshine him. Mutus, clearly cannot succeed in the forum on the strength of his voice; he is *mirabilis* only because of his wealth.[84] Mutus has risen from dim stars (as *ortus* suggests), but the forum is illumi-

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83 Cf. Argus of the hundred eyes *(stellatus Argus*, Met. 1.664) and the sun as *oculus mundi* at Met. 4.228.

84 Note lines 34-5:

> mille talenta rotundentur, totidem altera porro et
> tertia succedant et quae pars quadret acervum.

This seems to be a humorous reminiscence of

> diruit aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis

nated only by the brightness that comes from money. The luster of metals figures into all of this as well (24-25):

> quidquid sub terra est, in apricum proferet aetas
> defodiet condetque nitentia, *etc.*

The language here is perhaps Lucretian; in any event, the idea of metallurgy is at the root of these words.[85]

The revolution of the celestial spheres turns out to pre-figure the cyclical nature of political careers: an obscure man rises to prominence, only to fade and be replaced by another. Everyone who has risen must proceed into the darkness (24-27):

> cum bene notum
> porticus Agrippae, via te *conspexerit* Appi,
> ire tamen restat, Numa quo devenit et Ancus.

Numicius is warned that he must follow the lead of fate, like a Stoic; he must recognize that he cannot burn brightly forever.

A transition follows the exemplum of Numa and Ancus (and here one wonders whether Numa is chosen as a reflection of Numicius' own name).[86] From line 32 to the end of the Epistle, the tone again changes (from paternal admonition to diatribe), but the discussion is logically connected with what has preceded. As an emblem for the examples to fol-

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from Epi. 1.1.100; here, as there, an exchange of "rounds and squares" is connected with a soul fraught with passion.

85 Cf. Lucretius 5.1241-80, esp. 1273-5:

> nam fuit in pretio magis aes, aurumque iacebat
> propter inutilitatem hebeti mucrone retusum.
> nunc iacet aes: aurum in summum successit honorem.

See Bailey's Commentary (III, pp. 1520-4).

86 Kiessling-Heinze adduce the Lucretian passage (3.1025) in which Ancus appears as part of a diatribe aimed at the man who refuses to let go of life *(lumina sis oculis etiam bonus Ancus reliquit)* ; the phrase smacks of archaic Latin wisdom. Also relevant is Sophocles' *Ajax* (646), cited but not discussed by Kiessling-Heinze. If Odysseus is being proferred in the *Epistles* as a paradigm of virtue, it would be clever for Horace to allude to the wisdom of the dying Ajax, Odysseus' mortal enemy; Horace was interested in the suicide of Ajax and its aftermath, as we know from *Satire* 2.3.187ff.

low, Horace scornfully puts words into Numicius' mouth (31-2):

> virtutem verba putas et/ lucum ligna

The difference between a sacred grove and the trees which constitute it is intangible; only a pious disposition can compel someone to treat the grove as sacred. For the Stoic, the manner in which one treats worldly situations is the touchstone of ethical *prokope*. There is virtue in "playing one's part" well in life. To accord with this, Horace's remaining lessons are drawn from the stage. There are four principal figures: The King of Cappadocia, Lucullus, the *nomenclator*, and Gargilius. It is pointless, Horace suggests, for one to surround himself with people who create an impressive *species* ; a respectable family and estate are necessary for a public candidate, but they cannot produce virtue. The King of Cappadocia has surrounded himself with "extras", creating for himself an absurdly extended and swollen "family", which he then fails to support financially. He is the paradigm for one who abuses *amicitia*. While The King of Cappadocia cannot put on a good show, Lucullus clearly can. His peculiar vice is *avaritia*, which has driven him to acquire more goods than he can ever reckon; but he is brought into the argument as a *choregus*, marshalling illusions on the stage. In the third instance, the *nomenclator* will be of use to Numicius in reducing everyone he meets to "stock characters" *(frater, pater,* line 54). All these demonstrate the most illusory qualities of the dramatic stage.

Finally, in the person of Gargilius, we have a dramaturge worthy of the name. While one is first tempted to read Gargilius as a type for gluttony, Horace has in fact portrayed him as a clever and remarkable Cynic,

> qui mane plagas, venabula, servos
> differtum transire forum populumque iubebat,
> unus ut e multis populo spectante referret
> emptum mulus aprum, *etc. (ll. 58-60).*

Gargilius, like Lucullus, enjoys enough leisure and means to stage lavish scenarios; unlike Lucullus, he takes an active interest in doing so. Does Gargilius parade his hunting party in the forum merely to amuse the daily throng, earning the reputation of a madman? It

rather seems that Gargilius' "show" is intended as a mockery of the forum. Of course, the hunt in itself is a proper concern for a gentleman, and it has its place in literate culture as well (beginning with Xenophon's *Kynegetica).* But by bringing his "primitive economics" into the forum, Gargilius seems to be reminding the *populus* how far they have strayed from the state of nature. This situation will be resumed in the subsequent Epistle, in which Volteius Mena is detached from his meager forensic livelihood, only to prove himself a failure in husbandry.

The Epistle ends (ll. 62-8) on a note of disenfranchisement: the faithlessness of Caere and of Odysseus' crew are taken as examples of treason. This is a fitting conclusion for an essentially political Epistle; the critique of forensic life closes with the erosion of the *patria* through *voluptas.* Horace has retained a grip, in this poem, on the notion of flux through his meditations upon the cyclical careers of political men.

Epistle Seven

The Seventh Epistle breaks neatly into two halves (at line 46). An introductory lecture upon the etiquette of giving and receiving gifts is followed by an example of an inappropriate gift. All the while, the reader is fully aware that the relationship of Horace and Maecenas is barely concealed below the surface. Thus critics have always demanded from this poem a ransom of autobiographical detail.

The crux of interpretation in Epistle 7 will always be the story of Philippus and Volteius Mena. McGann's attempt to assess the motives of Philippus in his near-enslavement of Mena is cited here as typical:[87]

> When he first catches sight of Mena, Philippus is in some distress (48 f.). Mena seems completely at ease, and the slave's report on him indicates that he is in truth living a contented life. But Philippus will not let him be. He is certainly behaving in an interfering way in wishing to take him from among his *parvi sodales* and set him at his own table. But it may be suspected that there is more than this to his behaviour. Is he perhaps jealous of Mena's happiness, and does he wish to destroy it? There are certainly elements in the later part of the story which point in that direction.

87 McGann, p. 55.

To read Philippus as a sadist is, I think, somewhat crude. Furthermore, it engenders a "coolness" in the history of Maecenas' friendship with Horace that cannot be corroborated. Philippus certainly enjoys getting a laugh out of Mena, as Maecenas enjoys poking fun at Horace; so, for that matter, did Augustus.[88] The very premise of the opening Epistle is Horace's role as *ludicrum.*

Philippus here seems to be absorbed with Mena's independence, the simplicity of his life, and most of all his apparent lack of *vincla,* which keep Philippus trapped in the daily routine of the forum. This is the source of humor in line 67, in which Mena turns down Philippus' invitation to dinner:

excusare laborem et mercennaria vincla, *etc.*

Of course, Mena's "business obligations" are ridiculous (l. 65):

vilia vendentem tunicato scruta popello.

So Philippus concocts an experiment to see whether Mena is truly free of *vincla.* If he is capable of leaving his home in the city, and applies himself to rustic labor, then Philippus can be sure that he is no mere *parasitus.* If he cannot do so, he will reveal to Philippus his sentimental attachment to mundane concerns, and thereby lose his privileged status as a *comes* to Philippus.

Philippus' interest in Mena begins, it seems, in the lines which open the tale (49-51). The great figure spots a nonentity in the shade of a barbershop, trimming his own nails. This in itself triggers Philippus' imagination: why does Mena not avail himself of the barber?[89] The display of self-sufficiency reminds Philip of his own *vincla* ; he has just been reflecting, one must remember, upon the difficulty of forensic life (lines 48-9). Philippus' inquisitive servant at first seeks to uncover Mena's *vincla (unde domo, cuius fortunae, quo*

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88 One should remember the jibes (e.g., the *sextariolus)* aimed at Horace by Augustus, as recorded in the Horatian *Vita.*

89 The connection in thought between the fingernails and artistic perfection becomes important in the *Ars Poetica* (line 32). I owe this observation to Professor Michael Putnam.

patre, quo patrono): he wants to know who wields authority over Mena. Mena is "hooked" at last in line 70, and is soon drawn into Philippus' circle of *clientes.*[90] Philippus' advice to Mena in line 71 *(nunc i, rem strenuus auge)* presages Mena's purchase of the farm in line 81. Disaster is soon to follow, and Mena does not accept his losses with an *aequus animus* (86-93):

> verum ubi oves furto, morbo periere capellae,
> spem mentita seges, bos est enectus arando:
> offensus damnis media de nocte caballum
> arripit iratusque Philippi tendit ad aedis.
> quem simul adspexit scabrum intonsumque Philippus,
> "durus", ait, "Voltei, nimis attentusque videris
> esse mihi." "pol me miserum, patrone, vocares,
> si velles", inquit, "verum mihi ponere nomen.

Now that Mena has failed, the question arises (humorously) as to his true name. He lacks the Aristippean flexibility which was postulated as a virtue in Epistle 1 (and which will be developed in Epistle 17). Ironically, he is addressed as *Voltei,* which suggests *volvere.*[91] Was Philippus pondering all along that this name -- Volteius -- had some significance? At first it seemed an accurate description of the man, a token of his flexibility. But in the end, Volteius turns out to be the opposite of what had been expected of him. In his misery, he is "durus" (was he perhaps "flaccus" before this?), and drawn thin ("attentus", very unlike Horace *rotundus).*

Philippus comes away as the hero for being able to see through Volteius, and perhaps Horace paid a complement to Maecenas' acumen with this ending. Maecenas finally seems to get his proper name in the end *(patronus,* line 92). Beside the apparently Cratylean

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90 The possibility of a pun on Mena's name has been suggested to me by Professor Michael C. J. Putnam. The phrase *miluus ad hamum* (l. 76) makes it likely that Horace was thinking of the word *maena.* However I can see nothing in the idea of Mena as an anagram for *mane,* as suggested by L. Monte in "Mena mane venit: An unnoticed pun in Horace Epist. 1,7,61ff." *CW* 60 (1966) 8-10.

91 Cf. the divinity Vertumnus/ Vortumnus, who appears in Epi. 1.20.1 (also the Etruscan goddess Voltumna; cf. Livy 4.23). The god is mentioned by Varro, *De Lingua Latina* 5.46, but no etymology is given. Of course, in Ovid *(Metamorphoses* 14.622 ff.) Vertumnus is a wooer (of Pomona) of many disguises; but in the context of Ovid's poem this is hardly out of the ordinary.

interest in "finding one's proper name", which forms the climax of this poem, we are again rooted in a consideration of the flux -- here, it is encapsulated in Volteius' own name.

I have reserved discussion of Epistles Eight and Nine for a "Postscript" to this chapter. It should be clear that these two brief poems do not sustain the same philosophical burden as do the longer ones. Moreover, the Seventh Epistle ought to be kept in mind fully while reading the Tenth, for the controversy of *rus* versus *urbs* is at the center of both poems.

Epistle 10

Epistle 10, which is the next philosophically developed Epistle after Seven, differs in one fudamental way from all that has come before it: it is explicitly a treatise *de natura rerum* instead of *de moribus*. That such a boldly Epicurean document should come in the very center of the book is a testament to the importance of Epicureanism in the whole. In the letter Horace creatively strives to build a bridge between the physical doctrines which allow the wise man to maintain an *aequus animus* in the face of natural phenomena and the moral posture which he must adopt when faced with the *mirabilia* which attend to the greatest men of the city. The kernel of the argument is similar to that of Epistle 1.6, and its development follows the same strategy: great events in the natural world are shown to be of more moment than human artifice, and by overcoming the former the wise man is shown, *a fortiori*, to have overcome the latter.

Despite the congeniality offered by the image of *vetuli notique columbi*, there is a broad streak of competitiveness and sarcasm,[92] which works to cleave Horace's persona from that of Fuscus all throughout the Epistle.[93] The initial difference in character between the

92 The rhetorical questions of lines 12 ff. must, I think, be read as sarcastic.

93 The *columbi* naturally invite comparison with the mice in *Satires* 2.6. One ought to note that, in one sense, the personalities of this Aesopic pair invert those of the former; in the Epistle, the self-assured character is the one who "builds his nest" in the city; the complacent life in the Satire, on the other hand, seems to belong to the

two turns out to be a cardinal point in the moral philosophy that Horace evolves in the poem.[94]

One cannot fail to notice the density of comparatives, or their effect upon the tone of the poem, which slowly evolves into a battle on behalf of a *modus vivendi*.[95] By way of reassessing the tone of the poem as adversative rather than cooperative, we may consider in sequence the major dichotomies which Horace has created. As I see it, they can be described thus: *regnum* versus *servitium* ; nature versus artifice (perhaps equally well expressed as *rus* versus *urbs)* ; and true color versus false color (lines 26-29).

Horace boldly proclaims that he "lives and reigns" *(vivo et regno)* as soon as he has left behind those things which interest other men (lines 8-9). The reader will naturally recall at this point the tone of the opening of Epistle Seven to Maecenas, in which we are given more than a hint that Horace has avoided the company of Maecenas for the sake of his own *autonomia*. The emblem of the *sapiens* which closed the First Epistle, *rex denique regum*, is more or less repeated here at line 33 *(reges et regum... amicos)*. Once again (as in the first Epistle) the discussion focuses on *regere* as an abbreviation of *regere se ipsum*. This virtue is not the part of men who strive skyward (*ad caelum ....rumore secundo, 9)*, but rather it is the property of those who are in some way connected with the *terra*. It is also difficult to obtain in the places in which Horace typically finds himself; therefore, one must first flee *(fugitivus, fuge magna)*.[96]

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country-mouse.

94 Courbaud (p. 118) is alert to the tenderness of this one point of difference between the two men.

95 One might categorize them thus: in respect of size (minus 18; minor 35; maior, minor 43); in respect of quantity (plus 15 and 30; plura 48); in respect of strength (potiore 11, 14 and 39; potius 48); the remainder are miscellaneous (gratior 15; deterius 19; purior 20; certius and propius 28; melior 34). The predominance of adjectives in the first three categories listed creates in the Epistle an atmosphere of imbalance, adversity and competition, which does not fit comfortably with the notion of *vetuli notique columbi*.

96 Through the simile of the *sacerdotis fugitivus* Horace is repudiating (most likely fictionally and for the sake of his present philosophical persona) his role as *sacerdos* in the

Horace, playing the part of the *sapiens*, thus recognizes that he is out of the mainstream of society. In this guise, he becomes more frank; he "corrects" the initial image of the *columbi* by replacing it with the pairing *cervus/ equus:*

> cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis
> pellebat, donec minor in certamine longo
> inploravit opes hominis frenumque recepit.
> sed postquam victor violens discessit ab hoste,
> non equitem dorso, non frenum impulit ore. (ll. 34-8).

Like the *cervus*, Horace is capable of fending for himself, as long as he is in the wild (that is, apart from the world of masters and slaves). But those who, like stags, live in a state of nature are driven from the "common pasture" by the ambitious, who arrogate to themselves "artificial" powers -- even if it requires the sale of their own liberty. In the forum -- the *herba communis* -- one becomes more conspicuous than the creatures which live in nature. But the issue is not settled with the establishment of a "pecking order"; for the weak and servile beast is also a violent one (line 37), and he conspires with his master to hunt down the unspoiled creature. Horace is clearly suggesting that political life is positively dangerous for those who roam about in the *herba communis*, armed with nothing more than the conviction that they should live *naturae convenienter.*[97]

Apart from the animal images in the poem, in two separate places we have architectural images. The first of these is the discussion of building, with which the central part of the Epistle is concerned (23):

> laudaturque domus, longos quae prospicit agros.

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public life of Rome (i.e., as the *Musarum sacerdos* of carm. 3.1.3), having found it in some way to be too much embroiled in artifice and erring from life *naturae convenienter.*

97 See Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1966) pp. 46-94 ("Philosophers") on the conflict between philosophers and society at large. The secession of the *sapiens* from the *populus* resumes the train of thought of Epistle 1.70ff., where Horace imagines himself in a conversation with the *populus Romanus.* Horace's philosophical persona can still dwell among the *populus* in Epistle 1, but by Epistle 10 the renunciation of public life is complete. This is one of several ways in which Epistle 10 brings to fulfilment notions which were generated in Epistles 1 and 2.

The second is the appearance of the *fanum putre Vacunae* as the "return address" of the letter (line 50).[98] The two edifices complement one another perfectly: the *domus* of line 23 is an instance of the superimposition of artifice upon nature; the *fanum putre* is hard evidence of the effect of nature upon artifice, over time. At first it might seem that the intrusive *domus* reiterates the buildings of Epistle 1.1.83ff., where the landscape is shown to suffer at the hands of an insanely passionate builder (see *sentit amorem*, line 84.). But in Epistle 1 there is no suggestion of the final outcome of the struggle between nature and artifice; Horace deliberately postpones it until now, in order that the philosophical life can be vindicated along with the triumph of *natura*.

Horace's choice of the word *putre* merits discussion. He may well have been the first to use the word in the sense of "dilapidated".[99] The radical meaning of *putre* is closely connected with the notions of water, seepage and rotting.[100] The *tempietto* is in ruins precisely because of the damage inflicted by water (recall the *imber edax* of Odes 3.30). Thus we return here to an image of both philosophy, and corruption, as liquid forces. The potency of water is not always manifested in its violent aspect, as when its bursts the plumbing that carries water -- unnaturally -- into the city. It is also evident over time, leaving traces of its corrosiveness.[101]

Erosion by water brings us back to the image of flux. Clearly the wise man will show concern as to the "liquids" he allows himself to absorb (26-29):

> non qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro
> nescit Aquinatem potantia vellera fucum
> certius accipiet damnum propiusve medullis
> quam qui non poterit verum distinguere falsum.

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98 Of course Horace has chosen the *fanum* carefully, and its presence is integral to the message of the whole. But some would see in it merely a record of the actual place of composition (see Williams, TORP (p. 11)).

99 Cf. Teles, p. 27 (ed. O. Hense, Teubner 1909), in which a house is described as *sapra (putris)*.

100 Cf. Walde-Hoffman s.v. "putre".

101 The same image used by Lucretius, 4.1286-7, as a metaphor for *consuetudo*.

Unlike dyes, the liquids of philosophical wisdom seep into the very marrow of the person, where they can work the most grievous damage, if they are tinged with *falsum*. One must be able to distinguish the *verum* from the *falsum*, despite their similarity in color. The *sapiens* is constantly put upon to make these difficult moral disctinctions, guided by the same canons which allow him to distinguish fresh water from "tap-water", or true grass from Libyan mosaics.

In Epistle 10 we have a reevaluation of themes important from the beginning of the Book. The spiritual condition of the wise-man *manque*, unable to discern square from round, makes it impossible for him to establish an ethics which is architecturally secure. He absorbs the *res* which the forum offers, but its Protean inconsistency is not satisfying to one who seeks secure foundations. To better accomodate the inherent instability of both the human condition and the nature of the philosophical quest, the poet develops these liquid images, in which both the inconsistency of character, and the precepts aimed at curing it, are thought to be fluid. The principal revelation of Epistle 10 is the notion that a kind of stability or calm can be achieved through the understanding that all forms of *res* are subject to some form of liquescence or decay. Horace's philosophic hero is the creature who is as much as possible detached from *res* and the desire to preserve or increase it, and who, by looking on as *natura* works its destruction upon *res*, derives a kind of meditative contentment.

At this point we ought to recall the closing image of Epistle One and its connection to Plato's *Cratylus*. Horace has made free use of the liquid images to convey the difficulty of the philosopher's quest, the instability of knowledge, the fluctuations of souls that are inclined towards philosophy; he has given us the moral paradigms of those who succumb to the flux (Achilles) and those who can overcome it (Odysseus). Horace sets himself the task of championing the struggle against the flux, and for his paradigms he has drawn upon the perennial Hellenic *paideia*.

POSTSCRIPT

In considering the first ten Epistles of Book One as something of a whole I have been more attuned to the fact that certain strains of argument are made to culminate in the exact center of the Book than to a kind of reading which demands of every poem an equal contribution to the advancement of the important themes. Thus Epistles Eight and Nine are omitted mainly for their brevity and lack of philosophical and literary allusions. There is, it seems, only one element which Epistle Nine contributes to the context of the Book, and this is to be found in *frontis ad urbanae descendi praemia,* an interesting point of reference in the study of the *persona.* Epistle Eight, however, suggests a concern with the disruptions of physical reality which I believe leads directly into the climactic vindication of nature in Epistle Ten. Nevertheless, since the argument I wish to make about the symbols latent in Epistle Eight is bound to be dissatisfactory to some, I have thought it best to add this as an hypothesis -- perhaps of the sort which will never be verifiable -- at the close of the chapter.

Horace recalls in Epistle Eight the infirmity which was last discussed at 1.94. We are again admitted into the disturbed soul of the *sapiens*, and again the physical manifestations of the illness are given only as a symptom of emotional upheaval, despite the fact that those who seem to know the *sapiens* are unable to penetrate their true meaning. Here, however, Horace calls into play an alternative set of symbols to describe the imbalance. In Epistle One, the imbalance is mainly a result of confusion of shapes and order *(mutat quadrata rotundis/ disconvenit ordine toto).*[102] Now come into play, under the guise of physical realities of life on the farm,[103] the traditional elements of materialism: water,

[102] Horace was already toying with physical models for ethical qualities in the Satires (cf., *teres atque rotundus).* Such things inevitably call to mind Lucretius' description of round atoms, as well as the idea of the spherical Stoic god in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum.* For an argument that Horace was not alone among the Augustan poets in the matter of physical speculation, see David O. Ross, *Virgil's Elements. Physics and Poetry in the Georgics* (Princeton 1987).

fire, earth, and air. They are cast, respectively, as *grando* (line 4), *aestus* (line 5), the plague among the field-animals (i.e., "fire", line 8), and *ventosus*, characterizing the poet (line 12).[104] Admittedly, the scheme is somewhat carelessly wrought and broadly allusive. But it provides us with a road back into a materialist description of the constitution of the *sapiens*, whose authority ultimately rests in an ancient speculation concerning bodily humors and human behavior.[105] Most importantly it reminds us of the initial image of the "philosopher's head-cold" and the evolution of philosophy as a liquid medium. If one should be convinced that analogues for the physical elements are central to the Epistle, it is then simple and satisfying to read the confusion of Epistle 8 as an overture to the catharsis of Epistle 10.

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[103] I agree with McGann that there is a connection in thought between this poem and the preceding (p. 56). McGann does well to point out (p.48) that the Epistle 8 "conveys a sense of failure" , but that "the reader is not expected to choose between the accounts given in Epi. 7. and 8. any more than he need choose between accounts of happy and unhappy love in a book of elegies. The two Epistles must be read in the order in which they have been placed." The parallel with a book of Elegies I find very apt; I am firmly convinced that the philosophical nature of the Epistles as a whole partakes of the experimental, rather than of the dogmatic, mode of thinking.

[104] For fever described as "fire *(pur)*", cf., e.g., *puretos* (Hippocrates, *Aphorismoi* 2.26; Aristophanes, *Vespae* 1038; Plato, *Timaeus* 86A).

[105] For Alcmaeon of Croton, see Kirk-Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, pp. 232-235. His theory of *isonomia* in bodily health comes down to us in Aetius, 5.30.1. One need not read deeply into treatises such as *On Ancient Medicine* or *On Airs, Waters, Places* to realize that medical discussion had long been dependent upon this model of *physiologia.*

THE PERSONA OF THE PHILOSOPHER

The second ten Epistles of the first Book seem, at first glance, to lack coherence as a group. While the first ten are concerned with the unfolding of *natura* and *res* as philosophically charged ideas, and the philosopher's struggle to overcome the flux, the next ten turn away from *physiologia* and explore the interrelation of the *sapiens* and the various human types. The shift, loosely speaking, is from physics to ethics. Yet when we look more closely at the characters that develop in this second group, an order becomes visible. The narrative voice, in the second cycle of poems, is much more self-assured than previously. Gone is the obsession with the physical awkwardness of the *sapiens*, and his ineptitude when compared with the great *patroni*. The series of Epistles now moves towards the establishment of a place in society for the poet/ *sapiens*, which is brought home in Epistle 19, an encomium of poetry and a review of the *diadoche* which culminates in *Horatius lyricus*.

On the whole, Horace approaches the subject of social relationships in these poems in a clear and categorical fashion: the relation of master and slave (Epistle 14); of patron and client (Epistle 13); of *scurra* and *amicus*, (Epistle 18); of literary *poseur* and true philosopher (Epistle 19). This, however, does not preclude his blurring of some of the traditionally accepted relationships. The clearest case is that of Epistle 14, which ends up demonstrating that both master and slave are held under the sway of their emotional inconsistency.[106]

If we look for philosophical precepts, we find that Horace has concentrated them into three Epistles (16-18); but these are the very three, as I shall argue, which adapt dramatic material in a way which is far more allusive than it is descriptive. Epistles 13 and 20 take the reader out of philosophical and into specifically literary concerns, and ponder the fate of Horace's poetry-books. These will therefore be considered last, since they offer an *ars legendi*, and invite a reconsideration of the effect of the book, as a whole, upon its likely

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106 The discussion in Epistle 14 seems to spring from a Stoic paradox (cf. Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum 33-41)* ; it is also an Academic *topos* (cf. Philo, *Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit).*

readers. Therefore, while I do not see any advantage in fabricating a complex structural scheme for these ten poems, they do seem to cluster naturally into groups of two or three, and I propose to discuss them with that cohesion in mind.

Epistles 11-12

Briefly, I shall argue that Epistle 11 presents a sketch of an obsessive tourist by the name of Bullatius, incapable of dispassionately judging the merits of an unfamilar place, and that Epistle 12 offers the solution to Bullatius' distress. The cure for his malady is embodied in the equanimous figure of Iccius, his virtue unmoved by the temptations of his surroundings, to whom Horace, in the conclusion of Epistle 12, offers some rather banal news about life at Rome. In form, Epistle 12 is a letter of recommendation undertaken for the sake of Pompeius Grosphus, and it is traditionally compared to other such letters.[107] Despite their superficial difference, one senses a unity of purpose in the two poems, especially in view of their connection with the *Odes:* Iccius is the recipient of Odes 1.29, while Epistle 11 vividly recalls phrases from Odes 1.3 and 1.7.[108]

The idea that Bullatius' name is a paronomasia is not new, but recent interpretations of this Epistle have ignored the notion.[109] Bullatius (cf. *bullire*, to seethe) is the quintessentially feverish soul, and his name picks up one of the important themes in the book: *fervet avaritia miseroque cupidine pectus* -- the *aestus* of Epistle 1.1. The unity of the Epistle

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107 As collected in Book 13 of Cicero *ad familiares:* see Kilpatrick's introductory remarks (POF, pp. xviiff.).

108 On the question of whether the Pompeius Grosphus of Epistle 12 is to be identified with the Pompeius of *Odes*, 2.16, see R.G.M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace's Odes: Book II* (Oxford 1978), pp. 252-3.

109 The pun was suggested by Victor Estevez, "Problem of Unity: Horace to Bullatius (Epist. 1.11)", *CB* 37.3 (1961) pp. 36-7. Estevez reads the poem as an "organic unity", but sees its overall import as "a variation of an old song, *carpe diem*, tempered by the Horatian *aurea mediocritas.*" He does not see any further philosophical nuance in the Epistle. The etymology of *bulla* is connected with *bullire*, to boil (alternatively *bullare)*, in A. Walde - J.B. Hofmann, *Lateinisches Etymologisches Woerterbuch* (3rd. ed., Heidelberg 1938) pg. 122. To be *bullatus* is perhaps a mark of distinction (see Juvenal 14.5, *bullatus heres)*, which notion Horace may be toying with by asking Bullatius to make his principal residence the backwater town Ulubrae.

consists in the balance between Bullatius' name, which appears in the first line of the poem, and the need to establish an *aequus animus,* which appears in the last. The frequently-noticed Lucretian allusion in line 10 *(Neptunum procul e terra spectare furentem)* harmonizes with the play upon the name of the addressee, as the swell or *furor* of the sea mirrors the fervor in Bullatius' soul.[110]

The travel-catalogue which opens the poem is a *topos* familiar from the *Odes,* most especially recalling the opening of Ode 1.7: *Laudabunt alii claram Rhodon aut Mytilenen/ aut Epheson bimarisve Corinthi, etc.*[111] But the Ode is still more important to the texture of the Epistle. The note of exile, which many have sensed in Epistle 11, is undoubtedly tied to the exile of Teucer in the Ode. Teucer, held responsible by Telamon for the death of Ajax, is forced to leave Salamis along with a band of *tristis amicos* (c.1.7.24).[112] He is full of hope, nonetheless, that Apollo's promise to him will come true (28-29):

certus enim promisit Apollo/ ambiguam tellure nova Salamina futuram.

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[110] I take lines 7-10 as belonging to Bullatius, since the following *sed* (line 11) clearly has a *corrective* force, which is blunted if the speaker has not changed. See Kilpatrick *POF* p. 145 (note 111) for a history of the attributions of the lines. However the lines are attributed, the sea-imagery retains its force as a characterization of Bullatius.

[111] Horace is employing a Hellenistic sight-seeing motif in his opening lines; see Eiliv Skard, "Zu Horaz, Ep.1.11" *SO* 40 (1965) 80-81, citing *Anthologia Graeca* XVI. 298. Kiessling-Heinze see the influence of the Plancus Ode beginning only at line 21.

[112] Bullatius has been viewed as a Republican exile since Walckenaer *Histoire de la Vie et des Poesies d'Horace* (Tome I, Paris 1840) p.469ff. Kilpatrick (POF pp. 80-81) adduces some correspondence of Cicero as corroboration for Walckenaer's view. But the political climate of Cicero's correspondence is so thoroughly different from that of the *Epistles* that comparisons are not convincing. The text here is not helped by an ill-supported insistence upon its historicity.

A great deal has been written about the historical context of the Plancus Ode; the most recent full discussions are: J.P. Elder, "Horace, Carmen 1.7" *CPh* 48 (1953) 1-8; F.R. Bliss, "The Plancus Ode" *TAPA* 91 (1960) 30-46; and J. Vaio, "The Unity and Historical Occasion of Horace, Carm. 1.7" *CPh* 61 (1966) 168-175. In none of these, however, is there any attempt to correlate the Teucer-myth with themes in the *Epistles.*

Teucer's voyage is "one-way" *(cras ingens iterabimus aequor*, 32), but *iterabimus* poignantly reminds the reader that the voyage from Troy has been arduous enough. Horace wisely counsels Bullatius in the Epistle (15-16):

> nec si te validus iactaverit Auster in alto,
> idcirco navem trans Aegaeum mare vendas.

It seems hard to believe that Horace would use such a homely image as that of line 16 if there were any danger at all in Bullatius' returning to Rome. But even more importantly, the author of Ode 2.7 *(O saepe mecum)* would be an authority on Augustan *amnestia* (lines 9-10):

> tecum Philippos et celerem fugam
> sensi, relicta non bene parmula, *etc.*

When one further considers that, but for this Epistle, Bullatius is unknown to us, it is hard to imagine how he could have fallen so much out of favor as to merit permanent exile.

Of course, there is another cause for exile and withdrawal which concerns Horace in the Epistles. We have seen the effect of self-imposed "exile" upon Albius in Epistle Four. The cause for his withdrawal, as with that of Horace in Epistle Seven, is a melancholic need for privacy and reflection. It is much more plausible to see Bullatius as one who has set out abroad "in search of wisdom"; Horace's aim, in this letter, is simply to convince Bullatius that wisdom is not contingent upon location.

Everyone sympathizes with Teucer for having been blamed unjustly for the death of Ajax, but his exile is directed towards an end, like Aeneas', which has divine sanction. Bullatius, however, looks forward to no *nova Salamis* ; indeed, the places -- Gabii, Fidenae, Ulubrae -- upon which the Epistle dwells are long deserted. This sort of allusion is more properly addressed to Augustus, the *restitutor urbis*, than it is to Bullatius, especially in light of Augustus' role as the savior Mercurius (in *Odes*, 1.2).[113]

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[113] Epistle 13 allows us to eavesdrop on the presentation of the *Odes* to Augustus.

It seems to me, then, that the importance of the exile-motif in Epistle 11 has been too much personalized by Walckenaer and his adherents. Bullatius' travels, in all likelihood, had none of the political and historical gravity of of Teucer's. The need for the restructuring of Rome was not a public issue in 21/20 B.C. in the sense that it was in the time of Actium and the earlier *Odes*.[114] Bullatius' concern is to locate an ethical bulwark, a *murus aeneus* in the language of Epi. 1.1.60. Horace has translated the political language of exile and restitution into the philosophical language of the *prokopton* and his search for a place of rest. The compelling need to be at Rome, as well as the compelling need to be away from Rome, is a clear symptom of a soul which needs to emancipate itself from invisible restraints. Ulubrae is prescribed as a "spa", only because of its emptiness.[115]

The proof of the philosopher's ease in any milieu is given in the next poem, Epistle 12. That Horace had been keeping his Plato close at hand is nowhere better demonstrated than here. However, the philosophical sources for the poem remain controversial. McGann[116] discounts its Heracliteanism; and it is indeed unlikely that Horace's source is *only* an Heraclitean one. Heraclitus was available to Horace primarily through the work of the Hellenistic schools, including the Academy and the Lyceum. When McGann goes on to say[117] that "there seems to be no reason to separate Horace's *concordia discors* from the other Empedoclean and Pythagorean elements in the epistle", he obscures an important point concerning Horace's use of his sources. The collocation "Empedoclean and Pythagorean" does not take into account that, for the late Republic, an active Pythagorean school (or perhaps cult) was still visible, principally in the person of Nigidius Figulus *(iuxta Varronem doctissimus,*

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114 This is not meant to suggest a specific date for Epistle 11, which does not seem possible. I am merely referring to the traditional date of publication for *Epistles I.*

115 Cf. *vacuum*, applied to Tibur in *Odes* 1.7.21, the "precursor" of this Epistle.

116 p.64, note 4.

117 *ibidem.*

according to Aulus Gellius).[118] The Pythagoreanism of the closing Book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* strongly suggests a keen interest in this material among Horace's contemporaries.[119] As to the "Heracliteanism" which McGann rejects, I have argued in my discussion of Epistles One through Ten that Horace's concern with these notions is likely rooted in his reading of the *Cratylus* and other Platonic works.

Iccius, alone among the *personae* of the Epistles, is described as a kindred spirit of one of the great historical thinkers -- Democritus -- in line 12. However, the story to which Horace alludes in making this point is told of Thales, and is to be found in Plato's *Theaetetus* (173Eff.). Iccius, as it seems, had once abandoned his philosophical studies in favor of a military career. In *Ode* 1.29, the impression that this change of heart made upon Horace is described in cataclysmic terms (lines 10ff.); if Iccius can sell his his Stoic and Socratic books, collected with difficulty, then

> quis neget arduis
> pronos relabi posse rivos
> montibus et Tiberim reverti, *etc.*

But now Iccius has found a way to merge *negotium*, in the service of Agrippa in Sicily, with the philosopher's *otium*.[120] Indeed, Iccius occasionally loses his hold on the business at hand, when he allows his soul to leave its earthly confinement and speculate upon cosmological questions (lines 12-15):

> miramur, si Democriti pecus edit agellos
> cultaque, dum peregre est animus sine corpore velox,
> cum tu inter scabiem tantam et contagia lucri
> nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures.

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118 Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 19.4.2. The few fragments of Nigidius (chiefly his *brontoskopia* are collected by A. Swoboda (Vienna/ Prague 1889; reprinted by A.M. Hakkert, Amsterdam 1964). A full treatment of the fragments is Lucien Legrand, *Publius Nigidius Figulus, Philosophe Neopythagoricien Orphique* (Paris 1931).

119 F. Boemer, in his commentary on Pythagoras in Book 15. 60-478 (vol. 7, Heidelberg 1986, pp. 268-380), mentions (p. 271) Nigidius.

120 The change of heart is expressed with *mutare* in line 15 of Ode 1.29 as well as at line 10 of the Epistle. I might suggest that the violent reversal of the course of nature in the *Ode* is, at root, a Platonic image: compare the mythic reversal of the direction of celestial rotation at the accession of Atreus, discussed in the *Politicus* (268Eff.).

This is similar enough to several features of Plato's portrait of the absent-minded thinker to merit a quote *(Theaetetus*, 173Eff):

> *Soc:* Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city; his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is "flying all abroad", as Pindar says,[121] measuring earth and heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not condescending to anything which is within reach. *Theodorus.* What do you mean, Socrates? *Soc.* I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer different from any other.

The absorption in thought which Socrates describes is just that of Horace in the first Epistle *(curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum*, line 11). While Iccius is so absorbed, he risks the ruin of his crop. The enjambed word *culta* (line 13) thus suggests several things; it reflects the sort of *cultura animi* that is familiar to us from Epistles 1.40 *(si modo culturae patientem commodet aurem)*, and reappears as the *cultura* of another in Epi. 1.18.86 *(dulcis inexpertis cultura potentis amici).*[122] *Fructus*, along with *cultura*, creates a metaphor of planting and harvesting; it is almost as if the "fruitful" ambience of this Epistle is intended to counteract the "barrenness" (the "deserted" cities) of the previous poem. But Iccius is shepherd as well as farmer and philosopher. His astronomical contemplation is couched in terms that

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121 One might make a case here that Horace's *peregre* (line 13) is a direct echo of the *Theaetetus* passage. In Plato's dichotomy between the body and the soul of the philosopher, the body is said to be "in town" *(epidemei)*, and the soul is said to be "borne in all directions" *(pantachei pheretai)*. Admittedly, *apodemein is* the proper antonym for *epidemein* ; and *apodemein* is the *mot juste* for *peregre esse.* The parallel texts are adduced by Wickham (vol. 2, p.270 *ad. loc.)* without any further discussion.

122 The phrase may have originated in Cicero (*Tusculan Disputations* 2.13: *cultura animi philosophia est).*

make the stars seem to be sheep (line 17):[123]

stellae sponte sua iussaene vagentur et errent.

Reflecting upon this rustic characterization of Iccius, it seems possible to make a case that his name has suggested to Horace that of *Occator*, a divinity of interest primarily to farm-hands.[124]

We have then in Epistle 11 an admonition to a body that cannot stay put in one place, and in Epistle 12 an encomium for a soul which is free to fly whithersoever it will. The question of the philosophic life in the city is again raised; now, however, the distinction is not between life in the city *par excellence* (i.e., Rome or Athens) versus life in the country, but rather the necessity of living in human society as opposed to living in isolation. Typically, Horace does not insist upon a dogmatic solution to Bullatius' problem of where to live. But, most interesting of all, the reader of Epistles 11 and 12 has to reassess the value of life in the city. Here we are surprised to find that the philosopher in the country has to protect himself from the *contagia lucri*, which one would have thought a specifically urban danger. Moreover, a contemplative soul, such as Iccius, is by nature a "vagrant": he is present only in body, while his soul is "flying all about". Bullatius must learn from Iccius the technique of detaching himself from specific places.

As I have explained in the preface to this chapter, I shall postpone consideration of Epistle 13, in order to consider it in connection with Epistle 20. These two Epistles are reflections upon the effect of books on their readers, and thus have something to say about the evolution of the *liber* of Epistles. Horace separates them, I think, primarily for the sake

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123 Usually adduced in connection with this line is Cicero, *de re publica, 1.14: stellae quae errantes et quasi vagae nominantur.* Democritus' sheep "wander off" as he contemplates the "wandering stars".

124 For the *Sondergott* "Occator" (derived, of course, from *occare*, "to harrow"), see L. Preller and H. Jordan, *Roemisches Mythologie II* (3rd. ed., Berlin 1881) pp. 225-6; also A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Latine* II (4th ed., Paris 1959) pp. 456-7 s.v. "occare"; and Walde-Hofmann, p.197.

of *variatio*.

Epistles 14 and 15

These two Epistles are the most neglected of the Book.[125] They present no interesting prosopographical problems.[126] McGann perhaps hits upon the cause of the neglect of Epistle 14 by suggesting that it treads over the same ground as Epistles 7, 10 and 11.[127] As for Epistle 15, some would claim that its satirical form is inconsonant with the philosophical tone of the longer Epistles.[128]

The form of Epistle 14 harkens back to that of Epistle 10, in which Horace chooses a character-foil for himself, in order to illustrate the pains he is undertaking for the sake of philosophy. Unlike Aristius Fuscus in Epistle 10, the *vilicus* is not a social peer of Horace. But the poet spares no effort in creating a colorful image of his servant. The contest between the two -- one favoring life in the city, the other in the country -- is set out plainly in line 10. The two men are at odds, but are interested in the same end: the removal of *spinae*. This humorous touch demonstrates to the bailiff that he and Horace are leading parallel lives; for Horace the consolation of Lamia at Rome is a kind of *officium*, or in his own words *negotia* (line 17).[129]

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125 While there seems to be no modern article-length discussion of Epistle 15, there is for Epistle 14 the discussion of Otto Hiltbrunner, "Der Gutsverwalter des Horaz (Epist. 1.14)" *Gymnasium* 74 (1967) 297-314.

126 Lamia of Epi. 14 has been identified; see K. Kraft, "Q. Aelius L.f. Lamia Muenzmeister und Freund des Horaz", *Jahrbuch fuer Numismatik und Geldgeschichte* XVI (1966) 13-21. He does not play a major role in the poem's argument.

127 McGann, p. 14.

128 So Kilpatrick, POF 93-6.

129 As J. Perret suggests, Horace most likely would not have resigned his position as *scriba quaestorius*, and his presence in Rome may have been demanded on occasion by the *collegium* of *scribae* ; his duties may not have been exacting, but it is reasonable that he should call them *negotia* (see Perret, *Horace* (English translation) pp. 22-3).

When Horace thinks of himself as a spirited horse, eager for the open spaces of the country (line 9), and of the *otium philosophicum* that only the country can afford him, he is yet again revising his notion of the philosophic spirit (lines 6-9):

> me quamvis Lamiae pietas et cura moratur
> fratrem maerentis, rapto de fratre dolentis
> insolabiliter, tamen istuc mens animusque
> fert et avet spatiis obstantia rumpere claustra.

These lines hardly reflect insensitivity on Horace's part. Instead of offering a sermon on *mors nihil est nobis* (which will come, in a remodeled form, at the end of Epistle 17), Horace alludes to a philosopher's conquest of death by the ability of his mind to break free of his bodily constraints. In the First Epistle, it seemed that the life of the philosopher, when contrasted to that of the poet, resembles the retirement of a once-great racing horse. But in Epistle 14, the spirited horse recalls the Platonic allegory of the soul in the *Phaedrus* 254ff. The Platonic image focuses upon the noble and base emotions of the soul's two horses; a Stoic or Epicurean *consolatio* here would suppress the force of emotions altogether.

The core of the Epistle is Horace's dispute with the bailiff (lines 10-12):

> rure ego viventem, tu dicis in urbe beatum:
> cui placet alterius, sua nimirum est odio sors.
> stultus uterque locum immeritum causatur inique.

This points towards a diatribe on *mempsimoiria*. But Horace maintains the posture that he is a sort of yoke-mate of the bailiff, and his lesson treats the importance of the division of labor; thus he concludes with the following appeal (43--4):

> optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus:
> quam scit uterque, libens, censebo, exerceat artem.

Their labors will be parallel, in as much as they will both involve the removal of *spinae* (lines 4-5):

> certemus, spinas animone ego fortius an tu
> evellas agro, et melior sit Horatius an res.

The bailiff's tool will be made of iron, but the philosopher will need some sort of literary tool to complete his task. It will not do for the two to exchange their tools, for they can in

no wise exchange their capacities for work. Horace's *officia* and *negotia* are in Rome. His skill is that of the *scriba* in the widest sense. In Rome the bailiff can accomplish nothing. The sharpest criticism which Horace has for the bailiff, lines 25-8, sums up their disagreement:

> nec vicina subest vinum praebere taberna
> quae possit tibi, nec meretrix tibicina, cuius
> ad strepitum salias terrae gravis, *etc.*

The bailiff longs for the *taberna*, which represents nothing more than the vulgarization of music. One hears the play between "tibi" and "tibicina" -- the music that the vulgar slave-girl has to offer to menials like the bailiff -- as a counterpoint to "mihi me reddentis agelli" in the first line. Both Horace and the vilicus have a "mirror", as it were, in which to see themselves reflected: for the philosopher it is the "agellus", for the hedonist the "tibicina". To fill out the tableau of music in the taberna, Horace ends the line with a whistling, trisyllabic "cuius". The bailiff's response to the cheap *strepitus* of the flute is his heavily thudding dance *(salias terrae gravis)*, making it perfectly clear that he is not the man to spend his time with music.[130]

It is not cruelty which compels Horace to advertise the bailiff's lack of education and taste; no reader of the Epistles would have expected these of the bailiff. When we consider that Horace, a few lines further on, gives a clear expression of the waning of his own lyric powers, we begin to suspect that the indignation is not aimed at the bailiff, but at Horace himself (31-6):

> nunc age quid nostrum concentum dividat audi.
> quem tenues decuere togae nitidique capilli,
> quem scis immunem Cinarae placuisse rapaci,
> quem bibulum liquidi media de luce Falerni,
> cena brevis iuvat et prope rivum somnus in herba;
> nec lusisse pudet, sed non incidere ludum.

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[130] Even the debate ("rus" vs. "urbs") is framed as a sort of singing-contest *(nostrum concentum dividat,* line 31). The last word of the poem, *artem*, contains the notion of *ars* as *techne* as well as that of *ars* as *mousike*.

It need hardly be said that this image is meant to be read against that of the poet in his prime, with which Horace prefaces the *Odes* (c.1.1.19-20): *est qui nec veteris pocula Massici/ nec partem solido demere de die/ spernit,* etc.). Coming as it does directly after Epistle 13, the "presentation-letter" of the *volumina* of *Odes* to Augustus, the image of the sleeping poet draws a clear line between Horace's earlier career and his present one.

One wonders whether Horace has made any other indication in the poem that the loss of his lyric powers is to be lamented. As a land-holder, who on occasion fancies himself a farmer (line 39: *rident vicini glaebas et saxa moventem),* Horace once betrays a superstitious concern that his rustic happiness will be spoilt by envious neighbors (37--8):

> non istic obliquo oculo mea commoda quisquam
> limat, non odio obscuro morsuque venenat.

Here we seem to have a fear of evil incantations directed against Horace's fields. But the magic that might offend Horace is, in some sense, lyrical or musical.[131] The supersition here implied may well be exaggerated. Still, there is a hint in line 30 that the physical order of the fields must be preserved by *doctrina* in the farmer's struggle with the elements (29-30):

> addit opus pigro rivus, si decidit imber,
> multa mole *docendus* aprico parcere prato.

This is one of the clearest suggestions in the *Epistles* of the response of physical nature to verbal *doctrina* ; Epistle 18 continues the thought with the figure of Amphion, who will appear, along with Orpheus, in the conclusion of the *Ars Poetica* (lines 391ff.).[132] If Hor-

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131 Pliny (Nat. Hist. XXVIII.17) in discussing superstition, preserves a formula from the Twelve Tables, *qui fruges excantassit.* The *obliquus oculus* is likewise a magical device; *odium obscurum* sounds very much like the tone of the furtive prayer to Laverna in Epistle 17.60. Kiessling-Heinze take *limare* as "abfeilen", citing Cicero, Epist. 3.8.8.).

132 The importance of Amphion (as a kind of doublet of Orpheus) in Senecan tragedy is discussed by Charles Segal, *Orpheus: The Myth of the Poet* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) 95-117. Segal makes mention of some of the Horatian appearances of Orpheus and Amphion (e.g., p. 212 note 11). I hope that my discussion of the motif in Horace has strengthened the case that Seneca's Orpheus and Amphion are descended from Horace's.

ace felt his lyric voice weakened, he realizes in passages such as this one that he still has need of it. One might recall the lines from the opening Epistle where the efficacy of verbal medicine is first mentioned (1.1.36-7):

> laudis amore tumes: sunt certa piacula, quae te
> ter pure lecto poterunt recreare libello.

Perhaps Horace feels that his hexameters must sustain the burden of *epodai*, or verbal magic, that his lyrics once did.

There is much in Epistle 15 that recalls the *Satires*. Indeed, Kilpatrick takes the poem to be a comic interlude.[133] The poem does seem uncomfortable with its context, treating matters of philosophical interest in an off-hand way. Its form is unique; a question posed to Vala in line 1 is left unfinished until line 25. Vala is a kind of "travel-guide", from whom Horace requests information at three separate junctures; these are interrupted by a discussion of Baiae and other salutary places (lines 2-13) and then by an encomium on wine (lines 16-21). Having posed his elaborate question, Horace digresses into a comic portrait of Maenius (lines 26-41), ostensibly resurrected from the *Satires* for the sake of pointing out Vala's *mania* in wasting all of his money on his villa.[134] When he finally explains Maenius' presence in the poem as an illustration of *himself*, and not of Vala *(nimirum hic ego sum*, line 42), Horace shifts suddenly back into the familiar and loquacious tone of lines 1-25, and thus the poem concludes with the focus squarely upon the poet and his addressee, in the manner of Epistle 10. Thus the philosophical content of the Epistle is deeply embedded in satire.

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133 POF, pp. 93-96.

134 Maenius is of course a stock Lucilian figure; but his name makes the reader wonder how *mania* figures into this context. It may be significant that Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, just before the winged-steed metaphor (246), discusses (244) the supposed connection between *manike* and *mantike* and with poetry. This portion of the *Phaedrus*, as I argue below, is an ancestor of both Epistle 14 and 15.

Horace does not allow us to laugh harmlessly at Vala, as we could at the bailiff in the previous poem. Vala is a man of leisure, and a liberal education is expected of him. The humor of Epistle 14 seems to have given way to indignation here. But Maenius' vice, unlike that of Vala, is gluttony (26-32):

> Maenius, ut rebus maternis atque paternis
> fortiter absumptis urbanus coepit haberi,
> scurra vagus, non qui certum praesaepe teneret,
> impransus non qui civem dignosceret hoste,
> quaelibet in quemvis opprobria fingere saevus,
> pernicies et tempestas barathrumque macelli,
> quidquid quaesierat ventri donabat avaro.

The focus on Maenius' *venter* (the word recurs, in a different context, in line 35) recalls the story of Erysichthon, the violator of Demeter's grove, whom the goddess cursed with insatiable hunger. Recounted by Ovid at *Metamorphoses* 8.738-884, the story received its classic shape at the hands of Callimachus *(Hymn to Demeter,* lines 31-117). Erysichthon is an incarnation of the Freudian *id:* in the language of Plato's *Repubic,* the lowest part of the soul. Moreover, with the word *stomachosus* in line 12 and *stomachum* in line 8, Horace keeps our attention focused on the notion of *venter,* which accords with the constant concern with food and drink in lines 1-25.

The ethics of this Epistle, like the ethics of the *Satires* and of popular diatribe, draw their force from blunt, corporeal images. Still, the recalcitrant horse in lines 10-13, recalling the spirited steed of Epistle 14.8-9, suggest the far less-popularized ethics alluded to in the *Phaedrus* (246Aff.). Horace's charioteer pulls the horse away from its natural inclination towards luxuriant Baiae:

> mutandus locus est et deversoria nota
> praeteragendus equus. "quo tendis? non mihi Cumas
> est iter aut Baias" laeva stomachosus habena
> dicet eques; sed equi frenato est auris in ore.

The natural inclination of the horse has to be overcome. Amid the humor of Horace returning home as fat as a Phaeacian *(pinguis ut inde domum possim Phaeaxque reverti,* line 24) and the sneer at Vala's prodigality, Horace has connected Epistles 14 and 15 with a subtle Platonic allusion.

Epistles 16-17-18

While it is not usual to group these Epistles together, I will argue that a kindred dramatic tone is present in each, and that Horace relies upon the reader's familiarity with classical tragedy so that he may fully appreciate the portrait of the *sapiens* which is here drawn.[135] The three Epistles allude to some of the best-known elements of Theban myth; Dionysus and Pentheus appear in Epistle 16, Amphion and Zethus in Epistle 18, and, perhaps most importantly, the blinded Oedipus is subtly suggested in Epistle 17.

Since Epistle 16 reserves its most vivid and perplexing images for its conclusion (lines 73ff.), one is tempted to read it backwards, in light of the confrontation between Dionysus and Pentheus, drawn from Euripides' *Bacchae*. How soon in the Epistle do the Bacchic images come to the fore?[136] The poem opens with a description, for the sake of Quinctius, of Horace's Sabine farm. We are offered details of the landscape (lines 1-7):

> ne perconteris fundus meus, optime Quincti,
> arvo pascat erum an bacis opulentet olivae,
> pomisne an pratis an amicta vitibus ulmo,
> scribetur tibi forma loquaciter et situs agri.
> continui montes, si dissocientur opaca
> valle, sed ut veniens dextrum latus adspiciat sol,
> laevum discedens curru fugiente vaporet.

Like the Hellespont with its *vicinas turres* in Epistle 1.3, the landscape here seems to foreshadow, by its rupture *(montes...dissocientur)*, the discord between Horace and his correspondent. We cannot but recall the importance of the landscape in the demise of Pentheus in the *Bacchae* ; Euripides' Pentheus sees a doubled sun and twin Thebes as he lapses into madness *(Bacchae*, lines 918ff.). In light of this, it seems that Horace has chosen the details of his landscape in lines 1-7 with a view towards the climax of the poem. *Bacis*, used of olives in line 2, is very likely a pun on *Bacchus* ; this is continued at line 63, where

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135 The reliance upon drama for *paideia* in these Epistles is of a kind with the adaptation of dramatic material in the *Ars Poetica*, in which ideas about literary composition are entwined with ethical speculation.

136 Kilpatrick, POF pp. 96-102, sees the imagery of the *Bacchae* at work only in the final seven lines.

liberior prepares us for Bacchus, or *Liber*, in the concluding lines. Perhaps we are to see, as well, in the phrase *amicta vitibus ulmo*, a verbal picture of the Bacchic *thyrsos*.

Dionysus' character also seems to color the portrayal of slaves, in lines 46-48 and 69-72. In each of these sections, the slave exchanges half-lines with his master. The threat of torture is present throughout. In the first instance, the slave seems to belong to Horace, but there is no clear identification of the speakers in the second case. Nevertheless, in the suggested exploitation of the *captivus*, one can easily surmise that the scene alluded to in lines 69-72 is the kidnapping of Dionysus by pirates:[137]

> "vendere cum possis captivum, occidere noli:
> serviet utiliter; sine pascat durus aretque,
> naviget ac mediis hiemet mercator in undis,
> annonae prosit, portet frumenta penusque."

Horace is being humorous in earnest when he calls Dionysus *vir bonus et sapiens*, for he intends to make this composite character, who is something more than human, into an ethical model. It is troubling that the three appearances of the phrase *vir bonus* (35, 57, 73) seem to be unconnected, and that the second instance of it is plainly sarcastic.[138] One would expect Horace to offer some sort of guidance for Quinctius, in order that he might become a *vir bonus*. But the Epistle offers instead an example of an accidental lack of vice (*nec furtum feci nec fugi*, line 46) and a "vir bonus" who prays silently, during his public devotions, for the ability to deceive people (*"pulchra Laverna/ da mihi fallere, da iusto sanctoque videri,/ noctem peccatis et fraudibus obice nubem,"* line 60ff.). The ability to "cast a cloud" surely hints at Dionysus' power over Pentheus. But we have nothing of the true *vir bonus* in these examples.

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137 See for instance Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* 3.38 (ed. Immanuel Bekker, Teubner 1854, p.82). Ovid (*Metamorphoses* 3.511-733) inserts the kidnapping tale into that of Pentheus' demise.

138 McGann (p. 75-6) thinks the tone of the Epistle strongly Stoic, and sees it as distinct from all of the other Epistles, which express the "less arduous ideals of *decorum, carpe diem, nil admirari* and *aequus animus*". He sees no irony or double-entendre at work in the poem at all.

One element of this Epistle which is especially allusive is the appearance of Augustus in line 29. Horace proposes to Quinctius that public life can cause a man to forget his own identity (25-31):

> si quis bella tibi terra pugnata marique
> dicat et his verbis vacuas permulceat auris,
> "tene magis salvum populus velit an populum tu,
> servet in ambiguo qui consulit et tibi et urbi
> Iuppiter", Augusti laudes agnoscere possis:
> cum pateris sapiens emendatusque vocari,
> respondesne tuo, dic sodes, nomine?

The capricious desire to adopt the *nomen* of the *sapiens* is like the desire to hold the *fasces* (line 33); one loses sight of the fact that the power of bestowing the tokens of political office belongs to another, and is therefore impermanent.[139] Is Augustus the ultimate source of political power, or is Horace suggesting that he, like Pentheus, must recognize authorities above himself? The matter perhaps does not admit of a definite answer.

Dionysus makes a plausible model for the Stoic *prokopton ("ipse deus, simul atque volam, me solvet"*, line 77) only if the reader is willing to ignore the consequences of the Euripidean scene of lines 73ff. We know that Dionysus will take his revenge in a most cruel way. The god, masquerading as a slave, is silently planning his apotheosis, the "emasculation" of Pentheus, and the collapse of the palace. The result of Dionysus' conquest in Euripides' drama is not very far removed from the climax of Epistle 10:

> naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret
> et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix.

In each case, the *sapiens* takes his place on the side of *ananke*. The victory of *natura* in Epistle 10, and of Dionysus in 16, are each symbolized by ruined structures (the *fanum* and the palace of Pentheus, respectively). One cannot accuse Horace of demanding too much from his reader in this; his allusion merely suppresses a direct reference to the climax of a drama which would have been familiar to anyone.[140]

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[139] The misplaced *nomen* suggested in line 31 perhaps reflects the loss of *onoma* lamented by Hermogenes in the *Cratylus* (see my Introduction).

[140] Prof. M.C.J. Putnam has reminded me of Dido's tormented dreams at *Aeneid* 4.469ff;

Rather than offering moral *sententiae*, Horace has created a fundamentally dramatic Epistle in which the confusion of sacred and profane *(miscebis sacra profanis*, line 54) on the part of the fraudulent man points forward to Pentheus' failure to recognize the presence of divinity. Political authority is revealed as resting upon poor foundations. And Dionysus can claim the role neither of the omnipotent Stoic god nor of the ideal *sapiens* ; what is most compelling here is the fate of Pentheus. This is an innovation upon *exemplaria Graeca* which one would not expect in a prosaic ethical treatise.[141]

While the Sixteenth Epistle relies heavily on Bacchic images, several features of the Seventeenth Epistle recall the *Oedipus Coloneus* of Sophocles. The poem is adressed to a man with an ominous name -- for *Scaeva* is suggestive not only of left-handed clumsiness, as many have pointed out, but also of the name of Oedipus' father, Laios.[142] The lameness or awkwardness traditionally associated with the Labdacidae resurfaces in the final image of the *planus*, the helpless wanderer, whose alleged deception seems to make him into a *scurra*, and thus sets him up as the moral *vitandum* of the Epistle.[143] Another link

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Virgil's language assumes a naturally *dramatic* (cf. *scaenis)* source for the images she sees:

Eumenidum veluti demens videt agmina Pentheus
et solem geminum et duplices se ostendere Thebas,
aut Agamemnonius scaenis agitatus Orestes
armatam facibus matrem et serpentibus atris
cum fugit, ultricesque sedent in limine Dirae.

The imagery of the *Bacchae*, like that of the *Oresteia*, has quite simply become common coin in Augustan literary culture.

141 We know from Diogenes Laertius (8.180) that Chrysippus in one of his works quoted nearly the whole of Euripides' *Medea*, prompting a comment from one of his readers that he held in his hands "Chrysippus' Medea". In view of the tiresome quotations, this work must not have been very subtle or allusive.

142 Kilpatrick, p. 132, note 91. The undertone of *skaiotes*, or clumsiness, which is cited regularly, I take to be certain. But the name reflects a great deal more than simply that; all of the satiric names that Horace uses (e.g., Maenius, Bestius) have a hint of *skaiotes*. As Kilpatrick points out *(ibidem)*, the connection of *skaios* and *apaideutos* is at least as old as Aristophanes.

between the Epistle and the Oedipus-tradition may be seen in Horace's opening admonition to Scaeva (line 3-4):

ut si/ caecus iter monstrare velit.

The *locus classicus* for the blind guide is the close of Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus* (lines 1586ff.), in which Oedipus, on the threshold of his death and therefore of his elevation to heroic status, leads Theseus to the spot which is to be consecrated by his death. Near the mid-point of the Epistle, the trite proverb (line 36):

non cuivis hominum contingit adire Corinthum

also reminds us of the beginning of Oedipus' wanderings, especially in light of the response to it:

quid? qui pervenit, fecitne viriliter?

which suggests a journey undertaken in a spirit of *hybris*.[144] As with Dionysus in the previous Epistle, the specifically tragic figure of Sophocles' Oedipus infiltrates the moralizing message of the poem.

Yet the centerpiece of the poem seems to have no connection to these Oedipal allusions: we have a spiteful exchange between the hedonist Aristippus and a Cynic (lines 18ff.), the tone of which recalls the confrontation of Pentheus and Dionysus in the previous poem. The Cynic is not as flexible or "Protean" as Aristippus; he is attached to his rags as if they were his "uniform" (lines 23-32):

omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,
temptantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum.
contra, quem duplici panno patientia velat,
mirabor, vitae via si conversa decebit.
alter purpureum non exspectabit amictum,
quidlibet indutus celeberrima per loca vadet

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143 Kilpatrick (POF, p.132) identifies the *planus* as a "malingerer". There is nothing in the word itself to suggest this. The word derives from the Greek adjective *planos*, "wandering" (cf. *planetes:* see Walde-Hoffmann (p.318). In Sophocles' *Coloneus*, the Chorus first identify Oedipus as *planatas, planatas tis ho geron* (line 123). The phrase *fracto crure planum*, on the face of it, does not indicate a ruse, but a real injury.

144 *Hybris* is also suggested by the phrase *caelestia temptat*, which describes the active life of men in political power.

personamque feret non inconcinnus utramque;
alter Mileti textam cane peius et angui
vitabit chlanidem, morietur frigore, si non
rettuleris pannum. refer et sine vivat ineptus.

Aristippus is the consummate actor, since he can change his *persona* (and be convincing) with each new change of clothes. The Cynic, though his *pannus* is *duplex*, is himself *simplex* in that he can only present one *persona*.[145]

Can we be sure that Horace wants Scaeva to follow the example of Aristippus? For Aristippus admits that he is as much the *scurra* as the Cynic is (lines 19-21):

"scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et
splendidius multo est. equos ut me portet, alat rex,
officium facio, *etc.*

He begins to look very much like the opportunistic Creon in the *Coloneus*, while the Cynic, ever inflexible, takes on the likeness of Oedipus himself. To read the character of Aristippus in this way certainly undermines his moral authority. And Horace might wish us to feel symapthy for the Cynic character, who is *ineptus* (line 32); as we recall from the First Epistle, it is largely Horace's own ineptitude, in contrast with Maecenas' perfection, which establishes the character of the *prokopton* that the Book of Epistles seeks to elaborate. The Epistle is neither a simple advocation of the Aristippean ideal, nor is it a completely sarcastic *sermo* along the lines of Epistle 15.[146]

If there is no straightforward ethical "message" to be learned from Epistle 17, it is nonetheless a kind of *therapeia*, in which the reader is invited to consider the adaptability of the philosopher's *persona*, and to relate it to the *personae* familiar from drama. As in

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145 See *duplex* used of Odysseus, the ethical paradigm of Epistles One and Two, at c.1.6.7.

146 I agree with McGann (pp. 77 note 1) that one ought not follow Jacques Perret in reading the poem as a simple satire; however, Perret does observe Horace's creative adaptation of Tiresias in *Satire* 2.5 (Jacques Perret, *Horace* (English translation by Bertha Humez, New York University Press, 1964) p.104). Kilpatrick's brief resume of thought on Epistle 17 (POF p.131, note 78) indicates the lack of consensus on the poem.

Epistle 16, allusions to a well-known dramatic situation invite the reader to reflect upon the elements of plot which the poet has carefully suppressed. The device is used again in the following poem, in which the debate of Amphion and Zethus, drawn from Euripides' *Antiope,* is made the model for disagreements between fraternal spirits.

The longest of the Epistles in Book One (only 1.1 is comparable in length), the Eighteenth forms, along with 1.1, 1.2 and 1.19, a *chiasmus* of poems framing the entire book (with the pattern Maecenas-Lollius-Lollius-Maecenas).[147] We would doubtless be better equipped to understand all of Horace's nuances in this poem if we had before us the whole of Euripides' *Antiope,* or Pacuvius' version of the tragedy, for it is clear that the figures of Amphion and Zethus are crucial to the development of the poem.[148]

As in the preceding Epistle, the discussion seems to center upon the distinction between the *scurra* and the honest friend. In both we look for a model of personality which is approved by philosophy, and in both Horace is deliberately vague. Horace first claims (lines 3-4) that it is relatively simple to detect the *scurra:*

> ut matrona meretrici dispar erit atque
> discolor, infido scurrae distabit amicus.

One can easily see how the *matrona* and the *meretrix* differ in *color.* But Horace's words draw attention to the superficial distinctions, of the kind employed by dramatists to suggest the roles of different characters on the stage (cf. *Ars,* lines 231-3: *effutire levis indigna tragoedia versus, ut festis matrona moveri iussa diebus, intererit satyris paulum pudibunda protervis).* Similarly, the difference between *asperitas agrestis* and *libertas* (lines 6-8) is

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147 As noted, for example, by McGann (p.77). Also see Fraenkel on the two Epistles to Lollius (pp. 314-321).

148 This Epistle is mentioned by Bruno Snell (p.73) in his discussion of the *Antiope* of Euripides in *Scenes From Greek Tragedy* (Berkeley 1964), pp.71-98. The fragments can be found in A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (1892)* Vol 3., pp.40-54; the fragments of Pacuvius' version are in O. Ribbeck, *Scaenicae Romanorum Poiesis Fragmenta* (frags. 1-20, 348-352). It is likely that Horace's interest in the figure of Amphion stems, in part, from his appearance in Plato's *Gorgias* (485Eff., and 506C).

a matter of superficial appearance *(tonsa cute, dentibus atris).*[149] These two examples -- the *rusticus* and the *matrona* -- are borrowed from the Thirteenth Epistle (as underlined by the mention of *lana* in both poems);[150] and here again they are broad caricatures, drawn from the theatre. As in the two previous Epistles, Horace's ethics will be bound to dramatic *personae.*

Most of the poem can be described as evolving in a tone of *rixa,* or malicious quarrel. This tone begins with the boisterous *conviva* at line 15ff:

> alter rixatur de lana saepe caprina,
> propugnat nugis armatus: "scilicet ut non
> sit mihi prima fides?" et "vere quod placet ut non
> acriter elatrem? pretium aetas altera sordet."

Following this, the *dives amicus* (line 24ff.) speaks of the contest ever waged by the ambitious poor to seem larger that they are (desine mecum certare, line 30f.). The centerpiece of *rixa* is of course the episode of Amphion and Zethus (line 40ff.). Further along, the reenactment of the battle of Actium is a sham quarrel pitting Lollius against his brother (lines 59ff.):

> quamvis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque
> curas, interdum nugaris rure paterno:
> partitur lintres exercitus, Actia pugna
> te duce per pueros hostili more refertur;
> adversarius est frater, lacus Hadria, donec
> alterutrum velox Victoria fronde coronet.

Each of these instances is tinged with the theatrical, and each has a source in one or more of the previous Epistles.[151]

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[149] McGann (p. 79) notes: "The account of *asperitas* at lines 6-8 is unlikely to have much relevance in its detail to Lollius." Lollius, nonetheless, is warned against presenting a certain *asperitas* in lines 44ff., where he is told not to reject a request to go hunting, in deference to his devotion to the *inhumana Camena.*

[150] Epistle 13.14 and 18.15. Although here *lana* is connected with the *conviva* and not the *matrona,* these two figures are closely parallel.

[151] The difficult *conviva* creates a "worst-case scenario" for the kind of dinner Horace had prepared for Torquatus in Epistle 5; an impasse between the wealthy patron and the ambitious pauper reminds us of the disastrous turn in the relationship of Philippus and Volteius Mena in Epistle 7; the discord between the *vita contemplativa* of Amphion and the *vita activa* of Zethus recalls the situation between Horace and Aristius Fuscus

Can ethical precepts be presented in this atmosphere of *rixa?* The best advice that Horace has for Lollius is to read and discuss philosophy with the learned *(inter cuncta leges et percontabere doctos,* line 96).[152] But the *convivium* which Horace sketches here (lines 10ff.) is hardly the ideal Platonic symposium, where one could expect philosophical discussion. One of the *convivae* is behaving like a schoolchild, repeating his lessons by rote (line 12ff):

> sic iterat voces et verba cadentia tollit,
> ut puerum saevo credas dictata magistro
> reddere vel partes mimum tractare secundas.

Here we have an image of education on an elementary level, and a suggestion that mime is merely a puerile version of tragedy. The second *conviva* (quoted above, line 18) delivers a parody of Phoenix' words to Achilles at *Iliad* 9.444 (according to Kiessling-Heinze); yet Phoenix is the paradigmatic mentor in the context of the *Iliad.* If Lollius is meant to learn at the tables of the great, this is a stark revelation of what goes on at such gatherings.

Horace wants Lollius to see by example that the sort of learning which is ideally sought in a symposiastic setting is, in practical terms, difficult to attain. *Parrhesia,* which is essential to this environment, is here abused by the trivial *conviva* in line 18.[153] Much of the advice in the latter part of the poem (lines 76ff.) concerns the proper times for speech and silence: Lollius is told when to keep secrets, when not to speak on behalf of a dubious character, when to be gregarious.[154] It is taken for granted that his tastes will be more refined than those of the men with whom he will have to associate himself *(nec,*

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in Epistle 10; the distance between Lollius and his brother in this Epistle reminds us of the military backdrop of the disagreement between Julius Florus and Munatius in Epistle 3.

152 The richness of this line is perhaps most keenly felt by Fraenkel (p. 319).

153 The word *elatrem* is chosen for its connection with specifically Cynic *parrhesia,* as it suggests the *Kyon* (see Kiessling-Heinze ad. loc.). On the importance of the symposium as an element of *paideia,* both generally and within the plan of Plato's *Laws,* see Glenn Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City,* 317-18.

154 Knowing when to be silent is a piece of advice which had a role in Euripides' *Antiope:* see Nauck, frag. 218.

cum venari volet ille, poemata panges, line 40).[155] In an atmosphere where ill-considered words can be ruinous, the thoughtful young man will have to rely principally upon a dialogue with his books in his philosophical ventures.

Horace leaves all the important questions of ethics as problems upon which Lollius must meditate alone (lines 97ff.). He can only counsel Lollius to be self-consistent -- a worthy sentiment, when one considers the fluctuation of *personae* which have been revealed in the poem.[156] Instead of presenting a dogmatic stance in any of these matters, Horace suggests a simple prayer (lines 107ff):

> "sit mihi quod nunc est, etiam minus, ut mihi vivam
> quod superest aevi, siquid superesse volunt di;
> sit bona librorum et provisae frugis in annum
> copia neu fluitem dubiae spem pendulus horae."

Here he is at his Socratic best; for he has adapted the concluding prayer of Plato's *Phaedrus* (279):

> *Socrates:* Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry. Anything more? The prayer, I think, is enough for me.

That Horace should have recalled this prayer *(satis est orare*, line 111) is significant in several ways. In the first place, Socrates' prayer ends on the hopeful note that Isocrates will carry on the Socratic tradition *(Phaedrus*, 279). Horace could give Lollius no higher accolade than this; just as the rhetorical and philosophical talent of the young Isocrates is evi-

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155 In advising Lollius to avoid peculiar behavior, Horace says (line 59f.): *quamvis nil extra numerum fecisse modumque/ curas.* Here he may be speaking directly to Lollius the aspiring poet; *numerum* and *modum* are specifically poetic terms, as we see in Epistle 19 (lines 24 and 27). Fraenkel (p. 318) sees Lollius as a poet: "What he has most at heart is to write poetry".

156 The notion of *sibi convenire* is embodied by Eutrapelus, the "easy-going" one, who is not oppressed or perverted by his fortune. *Eutrapelia*, as Wickham notes, is a philosophical term. This person may be the Volumnius of Cicero's correspondece; see Wickham's note (p.309-10). Clearly Cicero had as much fun with the name as Horace is having here. Eutrapelus, or Volumnius, recalls Odysseus *polytropos*, the ethical model of the early Epistles. Horace's puns on *volvere* will be discussed in connection with Epistle 19.

dent to Socrates, who had praised him just before the concluding prayer, Lollius' promise is keenly sensed by Horace. Horace does not ask the gods for an *aequus animus* ; he is sure that he can attain that on his own. And instead of Socrate's "gold", Horace asks for books. This part of the prayer looks forward to Epistles 19 and 20, which take up, respectively, the importance of Horace's previous *libri* and the fate of the present *liber*. When we consider the debased symposium which Horace has sketched here, it seems that Horace's prayer for books is in part a lament for the disappearance of Platonic symposia and dialectic. Finally, Horace reminds his reader of the "trap" of the Heraclitean flux with the phrase *neu fluitem*, a final look back at the *aestus* of the earlier Epistle to Lollius.

Horace's use of the elements of drama in these three Epistles seems to look ahead to the *Ars Poetica*, in which precepts apparently intended for the dramaturge carry a moralizing undertone. If the date of the *Ars* is accepted as definitely posterior to 21/20, then one is tempted to read these Epistles as "preliminary versions" of the dramatic material in the longer poem.

Epistle 19

While this is frequently considered the Epistle most concerned with literature or literary criticism, C.O. Brink has surprisingly little to say about it.[157] Among the recent readings of the poem, two of the more interesting are those of C. W. MacLeod and Warren S. Smith.[158] MacLeod argues for the unity of the argument of the Epistle by reading Horace's discussions of Greek lyric poetry and of his own poetic originality as material for a standard form of Horatian moralizing. In his view, the argument of each of the Epistles is seen as a partial fulfilment of the philosophical programme presented in the opening

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[157] Brink I (pp.179-183).

[158] C. W. MacLeod, "The Poet, the Critic, and the Moralist: Horace, *Epistles* 1.19" *CQ 27.2* (1977) 359-376, and Warren S. Smith "Horace Directs a Carouse: *Epistle* 1.19" *TAPA* 114 (1984) 255-271.

Epistle.[159] Smith finds in the Epistle a more specific kind of unity; he reads the motifs of wine, poetry, and quarrel as elements of a symposiastic poem which deliberately avoids the technical jargon of symposia. As I have argued above, the philosophical value of symposia is called into question in the Epistle immediately preceding this one. Thus, while I agree with Smith's detection of symposiastic elements, it is clear, I think, that these elements are to be viewed as subservient to the philosophical agenda of the Book as a whole. I shall try, in the following pages, to analyze the poem in a way which accommodates both Smith's and MacLeod's perspectives. I shall further seek to establish the manner in which this Epistle returns to some of the themes of the earlier Epistles, and creates "closure" for the book.

The disrupted symposium, a *topos* familiar from the *Odes*, is suggested by the concluding lines of the Epistle; here Horace explains his reluctance to give public readings (41ff.):

> hinc illae lacrimae. "spissis indigna theatris
> scripta pudet recitare et nugis addere pondus"
> si dixi, "rides" ait "et Iovis auribus ista
> servas; fidis enim manare poetica mella
> te solum, tibi pulcher." ad haec ego naribus uti
> formido et, luctantis acuto ne secer ungui,
> "displicet iste locus" clamo et diludia posco.
> ludus enim genuit trepidum certamen et iram,
> ira truces inimicitias et funebre bellum.

These lines clearly recall Ode 1.27 *(natis in usum laetitiae scyphis)*, in which Horace tries to combat *barbari mores* and to bring order to an amatory situation which seems impossibly complicated. The Battle of the Lapiths and Centaurs is, of course, the *locus classicus* for this sort of confusion (Horace mentions this in Ode 1.18.8). The *collegium* of poets, who seek to draw Horace into a quarrel, seem to be more like barbarous Thracians than civilized men at a symposium. In a sense, the tone of this Epistle proves that Horace had been too optimistic in his assumption at Epi. 1.1.38 ff.:

> invidus, iracundus, iners, vinosus, amator,
> nemo adeo ferus est, ut non mitescere possit,
> si modo culturae patientem commodet aurem.

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[159] MacLeod (see previous note), p. 360.

The poets of Epistle 19 clearly display several of the vices listed here. In trying to separate himself from vulgar *imitatores,* Horace is nevertheless forced into a *Centaurea rixa.*

The dedication to Maecenas, joined with *Camenae* in line 5, looks back to the opening of the first Epistle, and the quasi-anagram *Maecenas/ Camena.* We are asked to consider a passage from the comedian Cratinus: poetry cannot be created by water-drinkers. Of course, the images of a drunken Homer and Ennius, and drunken Fauns and Muses, are presented tongue-in-cheek; they form a kind of *ekphrasis,* a petrified symposium, as one would find incised on a cup or crater. But the tone changes perceptibly with line 12-14:

> quid? siquis voltu torvo ferus et pede nudo
> exiguaeque togae simulet textore Catonem,
> virtutemne repraesentet moresque Catonis?

This image returns us to *personae* as they are represented on the stage; but the specific instance of Cato brings to mind both the Cynic of Epistle 17 *(quem duplici panno patientia velat)* and the disheveled Horace of Epistle One. Cato's garment is an *exiguum textum (exiguaeque togae...textore,* line 13): this seems to contain a hint of *textum* in its literary sense (cf. *exiguos elegos* at *Ars* line 77). Cato's appearance also suggests that of a madman *(voltu torvo, pede nudo),* or perhaps a barbarian: these are very similar to the "trappings" of the *prokopton,* as given in Epi.1.94. Horace will step into Cato's role at the end of this poem, when his critics sarcastically claim that he is *tibi pulcher* (line 45); these words ignite his anger, because he is still the awkward character whom Maecenas ridiculed in Epistle One. The *prokopton,* the embodiment of *concordia discors,* is nothing if not externally awkward.[160]

The passage from philosopher to poet, beginning in line 21, is effected by a Lucretian borrowing; Lucretius is, of course, the ideal bridge between poet and philosopher. Horace's innovation is the adaptation of Greek meters *(pedes),* and thus the Callimachean/ Lucre-

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[160] It is ironic that Kiessling-Heinze's note on *textore,* pointing out that it is an instrumental ablative, compares *inaequali tonsore* from Epistle 1.94, without mentioning that these two points are exactly comparable in content and are deliberately linked together.

tian imagery of lines 21-22 carries not only the suggestion of "untrodden roads", but of *vestigia* as the shadow of *pedes*, or meters:[161]

> libera per vacuum posui vestigia princeps,
> non aliena meo pressi pede.

In line 28 below, Horace is more overt in his use of *pes* as meter *(temperat Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho).*[162]

Another facet of this verbal play of *pes* as meter is connected with the idea of *crasis*, the proper mixing of wine and water. This fits into the symposiastic imagery which Smith has discussed at length.[163] Horace may have understood *temperare* to be connected with *tempus*, in the metrical sense of quantity as equal to time. Four famous but vexed lines (26-29) discuss the relation of meter and Horace's adaptation of it:

> ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes,
> quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem:
> temperat Archiloci musam pede mascula Sappho,
> temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar.

It is easy to see in these lines, I think, a proclamation that Horace did indeed find new combinations for Sapphic and Alcaean meters, in his use of Asclepiadean meters. He was metrically conservative in a broad sense; but he was not completely bound to the archaic models. In the context of *iambos, numeros, modos*, and *pede*, in lines (23-28), the notion of *temperare*, or reordering metrical *tempora*, becomes part of the vocabulary of metrics.[164] The allusions to metrics have a moral component as well; Epistle 18 taught Lollius to

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161 see Kiessling-Heinze ad loc. Surprisingly, these lines are not mentioned by John V. Cody, *Horace and Callimachean Aesthetics* (Collection Latomus 147; Brussels, 1976). Horace is nowhere more attuned to the Callimachean ethos than in this passage (cf. Callimachus, Epigram 28 (ed. Pfeiffer, vol. 2, p. 88) and the Lucretian prooemia, 3.3 *(ficta...vestigia)* and 4.1 *(avia...loca))*.

162 The exact construction of these lines is controversial; see Fraenkel's discussion (pp. 345-7). I understand *pede* simply as "meter", without specific grammatical connection either to *Archilochi* or to *mascula Sappho*.

163 art. cit. above.

164 For the connection between *tempus* and *temperare*, see Walde-Hoffmann, p.661 (s.v. "tempero").

respect the proper *numeri* in his social behavior (line 59), and Epistle 2.2.143 will connect *sapere* with the true rhythms of life *(verae numerosque modosque...vitae).*

In the First Epistle, Horace had described his spiritual discomfort as a complete upheaval in order (lines 97ff.):

> quid mea cum pugnat sententia secum
> quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit
> aestuat et vitae disconvenit ordine toto.

By considering the subtle adjustments in poetic texture that each of the lyric *diadochoi* make upon the work of their predecesors, it seems that Horace is suggesting, finally, that the solution to his psychic discomfort is rooted in the creation of lyric: he has come to the Platonic conclusion that the insistence upon order in the form of poetry can serve as a powerful cure for disorder in the soul. The poet has a conrtol over verbal *numeri* and *modi* which he must try to apply to his *discordia.* Plato, in the *Republic,* represents Socrates as interested in the ethical component of music; after sketchily expounding the metrical theories of Damon, which he confesses not to understand fully, Socrates summarizes the relation of music and metre to the formation of a healthy soul (401Ef.):

> And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or him who is ill-educated ungraceful.

The passage which complements this one is to be found in the *Timaeus* (47cff.):

> Moreover, so much of music as is adapted to the sound of the voice and to the sense of hearing is granted to us for the sake of harmony; and harmony, which has motions akin to the revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by the intelligent votary of the Muses as given by them with a view to irrational pleasures, which is deemed to be the purpose of it in our day, *but as meant to correct any discord which may have arisen in the courses of the soul, and to be our ally in bringing her into harmony and agreement with herself*; and rhythm too was given by them for the same reason, on account of the irregular and graceless ways which prevail among mankind generally, and to help us against them.

Musical *numeri,* created with the same proportions as the parts of the soul (the *numeros...vitae),* are instruments of psychic *therapeia.* The placement of an Epistle concerned

primarily with metrics at the close of a collection of ethical Epistles betrays, I think, a close familiarity with these Platonic texts. In Epistle 2.1, and in the *Ars*, Horace returns to the ethical connotations of *numerus* as it applies to metrics and music.

Epistles 13 and 20

In these two poems, which seem to be complementary, Horace is concerned with the impact which his books will have upon their readers, and with the biases which his readers will import into his text. In other places he seems to allude to the physical appurtenances of his books, just as he is concerned with his own physical appearance in the First Epistle. Finally, he alludes to his book of Epistles as a living and intelligent creature, an essential part of his *familia*, or perhaps more truly of himself.

In Epistle 13 Horace calls his books (presumably his *Odes) volumina*, punning on *volvere* ; the books may slip and roll away on their own if Vinnius, the poet's courier, fails to assert himself sufficiently (lines 7 ff. and 18). Many comic motifs are marshalled in order to suggest to the reader that the book's *minister* might cut a ludicrous figure, if the intended reader is unwilling or unable to afford the leisure to read the package. Horace fears that the book will be seen as common and rustic *(agnum)* or as trifling *(glomus...lanae)*, or finally as luggage *(cum pilleolo soleas)*. That the book may appear to be a burden is maintained throughout *(gravis*, line 6; *onus*, line 10), and the image is helped if Vinnius was indeed a powerful man, as Nisbet has suggested.[165]

The book, Horace seems to say, cannot simply stand on its own merit. If the reader is in a poor frame of mind, it may appear to him comic when it is intended as a tragedy; it may seem rustic, when it is meant to be urbane. Most importantly, it should not be *molestum*, like an *onus*, and overstay its invitation. In the final Epistle, in which the book is made into a prostitute, Horace fears that the book will lack gravity. One would expect the book *(liber)* to behave like a free man, and not a slave, for Horace makes the point here at

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165 see Kilpatrick, POF p.17 (and note 49), citing R.G.M. Nisbet, "Notes on Horace, *Epistles* I" *CQ* 9 (1959) 73-6.

line 20 that he himself is *libertino patre natus*, and he has shown concern for the proper education of the book *(nutritus*, line 5).

As with the figure of Vacuna at the close of Epistle Ten, Horace has placed Vertumnus emblematically at the opening of Epistle 20. Vacuna's "emptiness" personified the ruin of *res*, physical matter, in the earlier poem; Vertumnus here seems to work in two ways. As a year-divinity, he stands appropriately in the *sphragis* of the collection, in which Horace reveals his exact age, expressed as a completion of the turning years *(implevisse Decembris*, line 26). Ianus in line 1, and December at the poem's end, form a natural pair of parentheses. The rhythm of the year sets the tone for the augur's prognostication of the life of the book; it will have a happy youth, but will lose favor with the approach of old age *(donec te deserat aetas*, line 10). After this, it will be soiled by the constant handling of the *vulgus*, and end its life in some slavish condition, out of sight and mind. It will likely spend its last days as a teacher of *grammata* in some obscure corner. It was in the First Epistle that Horace complained about *tarda tempora* and the need for each stage of life to attend to philosophy; there he first introduced the plan of presenting *elementa* as ethical guides (Epistle 1.27). There too one finds the collocation of *senes* and *pueri* (1.26). We cannot but feel a strong pessimism in these reminiscences of the opening Epistle. Cicero had intended that his writings should be a *summa* of Greek philosophy in the Latin tongue;[166] Horace lacks all confidence that he shall endure as a philosophic guide for future generations.

The other facet of the symbolic Vertumnus that connects with the idea of books is his "turning" nature. We may profitably recall two Platonic passages which concern writing and the *fata libelli* in connection with these two Epistles. The first is from the *Phaedrus* (275), the second from the *Parmenides* (128).[167]

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[166] One thinks especially of the preface to the *Tusculan Disputations*.

[167] The *Parmenides* may well have been the vehicle for Horace's incorporation of the aging horse motif in the First Epistle; see *Parmenides* 137 for the quotation of Ibycus and its context in philosophizing.

> *Socrates:* I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches *(logoi)*. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about *(kulindeitai)* anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves.

> I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling us something which is new.... *Zeno:* Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; for what you speak of *(i.e., Zeno's apparent plagiarism of Parmenides' doctrines)* was an accident; there was no pretence of a great purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of the being of the many, if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of the one. Zeal for my master led me to write the book in the days of my youth, but someone stole the copy; and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates.

In the first passage, Socrates speaks of the misinterpretation of a written text as a vulgarization or violation of it, and Horace's admonition to his *liber* adapts this tone perfectly. The notion that the book itself will roll away *(kulindeitai)* is reflected in Epistle 13 by Vinnius' difficulty in handling the book, and also by the etymology of *volumen (volvere)*. For Plato, a book may be as defenseless as a child; Horace's book is just as helpless, but humorously it is sent out to look for trouble. In the second passage, Zeno is at hand to explain the true nature of his book, which had been misconstrued by Socrates. As Horace relies on his book to be his apologist, so too Zeno created his book as a bulwark for his master Parmenides. In each passage, the initial motivation to write the book is undercut by the fear of its escape from the author *(non erit emisso reditus tibi*, line 6). Plato's suspi-

cion of the written word is woven into the fabric of the Epistles. This notion of semantic flux neatly complements the development of the idea of material flux in the first ten Epistles.

The Nature of the Epistles: A Second Look

In concluding his monograph on the *Epistles*, McGann takes up anew the question of the epistolary nature of the poems. Since his discussion is both brief and comprehensive, and since I am in agreement with its major conclusions, it will be simplest to indicate by reference to McGann's own words the points at which I see my arguments diverging from his.

I am in complete agreement with McGann that the book of Epistles has a real unity, that it "exhibits a complex set of reciprocal relationships", and that "the Epistles supplement, contrast with, and comment on one another" (McGann, p. 93f.). I follow McGann's lead in searching for unities that arch over several Epistles, and share his point of view of the overall unity of the book:

> "...the qualities of being self-contained and complete in itself belong to the book rather than to the single Epistle."

It is primarily here that McGann parts company with the interpretation of Eduard Fraenkel.[168] In envisioning the spirit in which Horace put the book of Epistles together, McGann has the following (and I beg the reader's indulgence to quote at length):

> The book is an aesthetic object, brought into being, no less than the single poem, by the poet's powers of organization. It is probable that most, if not all, of the epistles were composed after the project of a book of hexameter poems in epistolary form and with an ethical preoccupation had been conceived. It is unlikely that any which may have been written earlier escaped re-working in the light of that project. The processes of drafting (in most cases at least), of working over, and of polishing were not carried out for each epistle in isolation, but took account of the relationships with other parts of the book, whether existing or planned, which came into being when one part took shape. As the book neared completion, it must have been worked over as a whole, with adjustments being made simultaneously in different parts. The epistles themselves suggest that in this or some very similar way the book took shape. The writings which Horace gave to the

[168] see Fraenkel, p.322 and McGann, p.94 note 1.

> world were not real letters intended to have their effect in the real world, but poems cast in the form of letters (p.93).

Horace may well have had more control over his material than McGann seems to allow, and perhaps the re-workings were not as frequent as imagined above. In any event, McGann has helped the cause of the interpreters of these poems by insisting upon the unity of the book.[169]

McGann is less satisfying when, in disclaiming the opinion of Courbaud that the Epistles chronicle, in a linear fashion, Horace's conversion to Stoicism,[170] he compares them to the *Monobiblos* of Propertius. In both cases, individual poems must be considered "synchronically", as presenting different aspects of one theme. Neither book, says McGann, can be said to "tell a story" (p. 97). In abandoning Courbaud's view of a linear progression towards Stoicism, McGann rejects the entire notion of linear progression (p. 96). He is therefore not inclined to see the development of dramatic tendencies in Horace's thought as he leads his reader from one Epistle to the next. For McGann, the internal order of the Epistles might as well have been different, excepting of course the programmatic poem which opens the collection and the *sphragis* which closes it.

If we commit ourselves to this strictly synchronic view, we have no basis for suggesting a development, for instance, between the two poems addressed to Lollius. Nor can there be any consideration of the dramatic tension that evolves in the sequence of Epistles to Maecenas (1-7-19). The extension of the semantic range of *res* that eventually makes it encompass the notion of brute matter *(res / materia)* in Epistle 10 cannot be understood apart from the linear progression of the poems. It is not, to be sure, a perfectly straight line. One might compare the progression of ideas in the Epistles with a musical score, which incorporates the synchronic quality of harmony and the diachronic quality of melody. One could not expect to obtain a satisfactory reading of the book by ignoring the

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169 This trend is now more and more visible in critical work on all the Augustan poets; see *Arethusa*, Volume 13.1 (1980) on the Augustan poetry-book.

170 see Courbaud, p.355ff. and McGann, p.96 note 5.

sequence of poems, or by postulating an order for them which supersedes that of Horace.

THE DISCURSIVE EPISTLES

The scale of the Epistles in the Second Book is wholly different from that of the first. At the beginning of his literary career, Horace had composed hexameter poems of considerable length -- the *Satires* -- and it is interesting that he should return to this format, after having distanced himself from the *ludicra* of his youth.[171] The lengthier Epistles accommodate the fusion of diatribe and philosophy, as do the *Satires*, and the tone is generally that of relaxed conversation.[172]

My purpose here is to establish a "family relationship" between the longer Epistles and those of the first Book. In light of the foregoing analysis of the Epistles of Book One, we can ask the following questions of Book Two. First, to what extent do the images of one Epistle join with and enhance those of its neighbor? Second, can the themes of the Second Book of Epistles be seen as extensions of those of the First Book? If it can be shown that the longer Epistles resume themes that are important to the poems of the first book and that their arguments develop in an analogous fashion, then a case can be made that the longer Epistles are properly placed after the shorter ones, and are to be read as complements specifically to these (rather than to the *Satires).* This chapter will argue that the progression of *ainoi,* the exemplary stories and fables which Horace frequently employs, from the *Augustus* to the *Florus* suggests that these poems ought to be read in the sequence which the manuscripts offer, despite the fact that poems are usually dated in the

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171 Satire 2.3, with its 326 lines, is comparable to the Epistles to Augustus and Florus in its concern with philosophical issues. Despite the similarity in their size and content, the *Satires* and *Epistles* are always treated separately. N.M. Horsfall called for the obliteration of this distinction on the grounds that the titles have no ancient authority ("Horace, Sermones 3?", *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 4.6 (June 1979), 117-19, provoking hostile responses from H.D. Jocelyn (*LCM* 4.7 (July 1979), 145-6) and W.J.N. Rudd (ibid., p.147). Horsfall rightly complains that critics are not as attentive as they should be to the interrelationships between the *Satires* and the *Epistles* (but see the introductory remarks of Karl Buechner, *Studien zur roemischen Literatur* vol. 8 (Wiesbaden 1970) 97-115). In any case, doing away with convenient points of reference does not facilitate exegesis.

172 Fraenkel (p.399) senses in the poem an "easy grace of educated men talking to one another".

reverse order, around 12 B.C. for the *Augustus* and around 19 for the *Florus*.[173]

The Epistle to Augustus

In one important respect, the *prosphonesis* which introduces the Epistle to Augustus differs from rhetorical *laudatio*, and that is in the characterization of Augustus as the consummate servant of the Roman *populus*. The force of *sustineas, negotia*, and *publica commoda* clearly points to this. Horace returns to the notion of *publica commoda* at other points in the poem *(publicus usus*, line 92, *utilis urbi*, line 124). On one level, we are sharing in a private joke between the two, which has its source in Augustus' well-known complaint that he does not figure in Horace's poetic work (*irasci me tibi scito, quod non in plerisque eiusmodi scriptis mecum potissimum loquaris)*. To offer a *longus sermo* to the *princeps*, Horace can conveniently fall back on the excuse that his *sermo* is in some tangible way *utilis urbi*, that it will have some influence upon Augustus himself and thus ultimately be of help to the people of Rome. The tenor of these first four lines is thus far more serious than it is playful; what Horace is up to here is either *paideia*, or *therapeia*, or both. As such, we naturally expect the poem to bear some relation to the *paideia* offered to Lollius in Epistles 2 and 18, and to the *therapeia* of Epistle 4. The reader will be curious to consider whether the literary discussion presented to Augustus differs markedly from that offered to Maecenas in Epistle 1.19 (that is to say, whether Horace felt that he had to "keep his distance" when engaging in a dialogue with the *princeps)*.[174]

Horace begins with the grave responsibilities of the *princeps*. They are expressed in a tricolon:[175] *armis tuteris, moribus ornes, legibus emendes*. The latter two verbs *(ornare,*

[173] We have no manuscript authority to read these poems in the sequence "Augustus-Florus-Pisones" (see Brink II, p.14ff.). On the other hand, we can be reasonably certain that the "Augustus" and the "Florus" are in the order that Horace intended. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt the sequence "Epistles I-Augustus-Florus".

[174] In light of the Greek tradition of Epistles sent by intellectuals to potentates (principally the Epistles of Plato and Isocrates), it is surprising that no study of Horace's place in this genre has ever appeared.

[175] See Brink III, 37, on the rhetorical balance of these lines.

emendare) are as relevant to the world of letters as they are to the life of society.[176] By selecting precisely those words which denote legislative acts as clearly as they do poetic creation, Horace suggests that the work of the poet is identical with that of the statesman. If this is convincing to Augustus, then the poet can rightly claim to offer a lesson to the *princeps*. The poet's principal concern ought to be the creation of a *legitimum poema*, and *lex* is the common denominator between Horace and Augustus. This notion dominates the whole of the *laudatio* with which the poem begins. In accordance with the tradition established by Romulus, Augustus is called upon to put an end to war, to parcel out fields, and to establish towns *(aspera bella componere, agros assignare, oppida condere)*. Again, the multivalent verbs *componere* and *condere* are as appropriate to the writing of poetry as they are to statecraft, and *asperitas* is a feature not only of war, but of unfinished verse as well.[177]

In all of this there is the suggestion that the heroic leader can alter human life for the better. All the more disconcerting, then, is the anonymous appearance of Heracles, at the end of his mortal life (lines 10ff.) Is it possible that Heracles is left unnamed because *euphemia* prohibits the utterance of the name of one whose sufferings were so immense? By concluding his list of divinities with the quintessential hero of *labor*, Horace returns us to the *tot / tanta negotia* which began the address. As Fraenkel notes, Horace had, in Odes 3.14, already made the connection between Heracles and Augustus.[178] Here, however, there is no tone of triumph. The comparison lies in the fact that the heroic life is incomplete until it has ended. Disregarding the *ingentia facta* of still-living heroes, the fickle *populus* reserves its judgement for the dead. Thus the ruler finds himself as much subject to time and history as the poet; but Horace has deliberately chosen to allude to Augustus'

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[176] Cf., for instance, *Ars* 447-8: *(ambitiosa recidet/ ornamenta)* ; for *emendata*, see line 71 here.

[177] cf., *res componere gestas* (line 251); *seu condis amabile carmen* (Epi. 1.3.24); *asperitatis... corrector (line 129).*

[178] Fraenkel, p.384-6.

fate *before* he develops the same idea in connection with that of the poet (culminating in line 49). And just as *fulgor* clearly suggests the pyre on Mount Oeta (and the brilliance of Augustus' star upon his deification), the ambiguous reference to *artes (urit enim fulgore suo, qui praegravat artes/ infra se positas)* in line 13 reflects the poetical/political labor of Augustus. The image undermines considerably the note of progress that has gone before; it contains a hint that a personality as large as that of Augustus can have an adverse effect upon the *artes* -- both political and literary -- of contemporary Rome.[179] The image of *fulgor* is further supported by *urit* (line 13) and *exstinctus* (line 14), and by the iteration *orituruml ortus* (suggesting the sun) at line 17, which concludes the *laudatio*.[180] A glance at Ode 4.2 (especially lines 37ff.) reminds us of Horace's fondness of solar metaphors in connection with Augustus.[181]

Having left Augustus upon an impossibly exalted height, Horace turns to the *populus* in line 18; he returns to address Augustus directly only at the conclusion of the poem (lines 208ff.), and thus the poet's diatribe is aimed squarely at the *populus* alone. The first section of the diatribe (lines 18-49) is concerned with the *fautores veterum*. The *sorites* argument, which blurs any line that can be established for the equation of old poetry with great poetry, is a kind of *ratio* (line 47); it is also *ratio* (at line 20) which has made clear to all the preeminence of Augustus. The repetition of *ratio* inaugurates a sort of obsession with number, which runs through the entire poem. In the following section (lines 50-98), the establishment of a canon of authors seems to involve the fixing of a proper number *(numerat*, line 61). The learned will disagree as to the order of the poets *(ambigitur quo-*

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179 Brink (III, pp.46-49) discusses the "mixed metaphor" which results from the notions of *fulgor* and *gravitas*. He suggests (without much confidence) that there may be "something Pindaric" in the combination. I might add that it is worth comparing the final scene of Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, in which Heracles laments the withering of his limbs brought about by the Hydra's venom (lines 1090ff.).

180 Brink (III, p.56) astutely points out the objectification of Augustus suggested by the neuter phrase *nil....tale*, and sees a hint here of Augustus' "rising star".

181 For Augustus as *Sol pulcher*, see Fraenkel (pp.438-440) on c. 4.2. Also cf. *divis orte bonis, optime Romulae/ custos gentis* (c.4.5.1).

tiens, uter utro sit prior, line 55), but the number remains essentially fixed.[182] Horace is thus concerned with number, order, and also with time. The pedantry which all this represents has already been cast aside by the fact that Augustus has essentially recreated the "Golden Age" in matters of culture *(pinguimus atque/ psallimus et luctamur Achivis doctius unctis,* lines 32-3). Perhaps there is no longer room for cultural improvement. This might ultimately be the sense of lines 13-14; the emperor's achievements have utterly overwhelemed the cultural improvements that have been made possible under his rule.

Since vulgar (and fallible) *ratio* has only accidentally placed Augustus in a position of historical primacy, Horace now proposes to reevaluate the *ratio* which underlies the canon of Roman poetry. The most ancient records (lines 23ff.) have been irrationally ascribed to the Muses. The moral value of these documents Horace would not dare to impugn; neither will he allow it to be said that they are well-understood by men of his own day (this becomes clear with the reference to the *carmen Saliare* in line 86). What is well-understood (because it is part of contemporary *paideia)* is the earliest hellenizing poetry, beginning with Livius Andronicus. Here then is the target for Horace's criticism. But again, there is no suggestion that Horace has any intention of attacking the moral value of ancient poetry. It is the *formal* quality of these works that offend; they are not *exacta* (line 72). Since the tone of the Epistle is decidedly one of *utilitas,* we must ask why Horace is presenting to Augustus a protracted argument that the formal quality of ancient poetry is harmful.

Horace's answer seems to be that nobility in poetry arises from a *numerus,* but not the *numerus* which represents their age or their standing in the canon. The true *numeri* of noble poems are those of their formal perfection, the prosody which governs them (lines 69-75):

non equidem insector delendaque carmina Livi

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182 Brink (III 104-5) bluntly denies the possibility that *uter utro sit prior* can have a temporal sense. We must keep in mind, however, that Horace is equating (albeit humorously) age with nobility in poetic productions. If we divorce temporality from the phrase, we lose some of the humor of the antiquarian mania which is being derided here.

esse reor, memini quae plagosum mihi parvo
Orbilium dictare; sed emendata videri
pulchraque et exactis minimum distantia miror;
inter quae verbum emicuit si forte decorum,
si versus paulo concinnior unus et alter,
iniuste totum ducit venditque poema.

Archaic verse is by nature disordered; it is only by chance *(forte)* that proper order may occur in it, and only rarely *(unus et alter)* does it achieve the harmony which is created by poetic *numerus*. The *techne* of poetry consists in the appreciation of *numerus*, and therefore it should be left to the craftsmen to compose poems (lines 114-117). The bold implication of this line is that laudable and edifying content in poems, which makes them *utilis urbi* and conformable to the *mos maiorum*, is not a matter of specialist knowledge. Inasmuch as the *profanum vulgus* can appreciate the moral quality of poetry, there is nothing remarkable in it. A more profound moral wisdom is required for the true appreciation of poetic *numerus*.

The section which immediately follows (lines 76-89) turns away from the analysis of poetic form which is beginning to unfold, and rather suddenly begins an inquiry into the "archaists' motives".[183] It begins with a strong *indignor* (line 76), and ends with fighting language (*nostra sed impugnat, nos nostraque lividus odit*, line 89). Horace detects a political motive for the excessive love of ancient literature (lines 79ff.), and he implies that political conservatism is also at the root of opposition to new literature. A pun on the name of Livius (who has appeared twice, lines 62 and 69) may be seen in *lividus* in line 90; the envy or *livor* that consumes the archaists is "read back" into the name of the *protos heuretes* himself (the image is resumed with *dente lacessiti* in line 151). Anger can also be heard in the harsh, sputtering alliteration of lines 80-81 (*clament periise pudorem/ cuncti paene patres)*, in which the repeated pattern of initial consonants seeks to mimic a typically "unfinished" verse. The *paires* are not willing to unlearn their boyhood lessons (there may well be a hint in these lines of opposition to Augustan rule). Insistence upon preserving the transmitted texts will of course result in the preservation of their blemishes. On the lit-

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[183] The phrase is Brink's (III, p.124).

eral level, Horace has already made it perfectly clear to us that he has no intention of re-writing, or for that matter erasing, the ancient *carmina* (line 69). But to repeat them in public, and to insist shamelessly that they are in no need of *venia* or of *emendatio*, is to admit that the sins of past ages are welcome in the present.

The spirit of the Augustan age, which strives for perfection, is fundamentally at odds with Republican conservatism, which is encapsulated in the word *pudor*.[184] Horace himself, however, lives totally in the present, and his emphatic pronominal language (*nos, nostra)* in line 89 is more a nod to Augustus and the zeal for perfection in public as well as in literary endeavors than it is a defense of the narrow circle of contemporary poets. Having come rather late to the realization that the Augustan order has cleared the field for a perfection of poetry (he returns to this theme in the Epistle to Florus, lines 47ff.), he now casts his lot with the current *nomothetai*. Furthermore, the next section (lines 90-92) makes it clear that the needs of the people at large supersede the desires of the *patres: (quid haberet/ quod legeret tereretque viritim publicus usus?)* These lines create a rift between the will of the *patres* (and, along with them, of the *populus)* and the will of Horace himself (and, presumably, of Augustus). If Augustus is the quintessential *nomothetes* of the age, then perhaps the time is ripe for the appearance of an heroic, and autocratic, *onomatothetes*, for (as Socrates argues in the *Cratylus)* the two are to be identified.

A relatively brief section (lines 93-110) is devoted to the contrast of Greek and Roman *ethos*.[185] At this juncture Horace is not so much concerned with Greek literature as he is with the broader conception of Greek culture. In fact, of the arts here listed, only tragedy

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184 cf. *Carmen Saeculare* 57: *iam Fides et Pax et Honor Pudorque/ priscus, et neglecta redire Virtus/ audet.*

185 Brink devotes rather a lot of space (III, pp. 132-6) to a discussion of the Aristotelian source for these lines (*Politics* 8.6). I might only add that Horace has shifted the aetiology of artistic creativity away from Aristotle's *euporia* and onto *bella*. Aristotle thinks that *ta Medika* simply increased Greek wealth, and as a result accelerated the enthusiasm for art. Horace adopts the posture that a departure from militaristic morality is the cause of dilettantism, not the result of it. Also, Horace does not mention artistic endeavors which post-date *ta Medika*.

(line 98) has any verbal component. A humorous tone is present throughout (beginning with *nugari* in line 93).[186] Upon reflection, the catalog of arts seems somewhat strange. Horace begins with "physical culture" *(gymnastike* and *hippike),* continues with the visual arts *(plastike* and *graphike),* and closes with music and tragedy. The metaphor of Greece as an *infans*[187] (line 99) reinforces the fact that Horace is not here concerned with the spoken or written word as such. The acme of this phase of Greek culture seems to lie in *graphike,* the ability to represent *mens* just as easily as *vultus* upon a *tabella* (line 97).[188] In contrast, the arts of the ancient Romans, while rooted in materialism, were connected with words rather than with visual representations. There is an oral didactic tradition *(maiores audire, minori dicere per quae/ crescere res posset, minui damnosa libido,* lines 106-7). The written word of the law is represented on *tabulae* (line 23), while Greek *tabellae* are associated with painting.[189] The careful disposition of *nummi* brings us back (via *expendere)* to the beginning of the poem, and the "weighing" of Greek and Roman authors (line 30).[190] Horace wants his reader to consider that there is an artless kind of virtue

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186 There is some evidence (see Walde-Hoffman, s.v. "nugae") for an etymological relationship (via *nugina,* "seed") between "nugae" and "nux". If Horace had been thinking along these lines, the rather opaque metaphor of "nux" in line 31 would be somewhat clearer; for "nux" is there connected with Greek and Roman literature, and "nugari" here stands in place of "indulge in the arts".

187 A calque upon *nepios, infans* prepares the reader for the argument that the verbal arts can claim greater sophistication than the visual arts (lines 187ff.). These lines, on the whole, are vaguely reminiscent of Horace's description of his ineptness in Epistle 1.1 *(diruit aedificat...),* for in both instances a lack of concentration or attention is at issue.

188 When artistic *insania* visits the Romans, *mens* is again mentioned (line 107). The "mutability of mind" which made the Greeks seem puerile has had its effect on the Romans as well. Because of the importance of the idea of *mutatio mentis* in the transition between Greek and Roman ethos, I cannot agree with Brink's seclusion of line 101 *(quid placet aut otio est quod non mutabile credas?).* If it is felt that the generalization which it contains is disruptive to the sequence of ideas (see Brink III, p.139), it would be simplest to print this line in parentheses.

189 Horace is deliberately suppressing the notion that the Greeks used *tabulae* to publish their laws as well; his aim here is mainly to honor the *ethos* that led the ancient Romans almost instinctively to publish the laws.

190 By connecting *res* and *recte* here, Horace reminds us of the word-play which connects

inherent in the placing of *nummi* under careful *nomina* which nevertheless resembles the exacting methods of artistic work in Greek culture. The "weighing out" of coin is thus a metaphor for the critical processes which are part of the creation of verse.[191]

Horace himself appears in the midst of his harangue upon dilettantism:

> ipse ego, qui nullos me adfirmo scribere versus
> invenior Parthis mendacior, et prius orto
> sole vigil calamum et chartas et scrinia posco (111-13).

We remember that *oriri* has been used specifically of Augustus (line 17). Is Horace suggesting here that, as one who is *prius orto sole vigil,* he has been considering the question of writing and culture even before the arrival of Augustus upon the scene? It is surely significant that he makes himself out to be "more vicious than the Parthians", for the Parthians are symbolic both of the limits of Augustus' power and of the external boundary of Greco-Roman civilization. When the Parthians are again mentioned (at line 256), it is in the context of the formal *laudatio* which closes the poem as it had opened it. By aligning himself with the Parthians, Horace perhaps considers himself, as an artist, to exist outside the political confines of the Augustan world, just as Augustus shall exist beyond the confines of the mortal world upon his deification.

In enumerating the tangible benefits which the poet brings to society (lines 118-138), Horace proves that the poet is actually a "maker"; he demonstrates by example the etymology of *poeta.*[192] Concentrating his *amor* into the making of verse, the poet cannot be

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these two words in Epistle 1.1. I wholly disagree with Perret (p. 145) when he argues that Horace is claiming that "the Romans of the past were chicaners, greedy for gain".

191 Brink (III, p.145-7) does not come to a definite decision upon the exact meaning of "nomen" here. It is possible that Horace has in mind the Greek *nemein* (distribute) as one of the connotations of the word (see my Introduction for Horace's puns on "nomen"). The phrase "expendere nummos" recalls "pensantur" in line 29 and with it the notion that "scripta" can be judged by weight; see Brink (III, p.68-9) for the Aristophanic origins of the image *(Frogs 797).*

192 In the lines immediately preceeding (114-117), Horace creates a bridge, connecting with the praise of poetry in lines 118-138, with a calque on the word *fabri* (line 114). *Faber* (deriving from *facere)* is a precise equivalent for *poeta* (from *poiein).* Common speech, (as Porphyrio argues), connects *fabrilia* most readily with *ferramenta* (see

accused of the fickle dilettantism of the Greeks. All that the poet has to offer to the community is *versus*, verbal (not visual) representations. At the same time, his obsession with *versus* makes him seem to be a philosopher or a madman.[193] Despite the anti-social appearance of the poet, his verses give rise to two distinct kinds of benefits. The first is educational (lines 126-131), and the second is religious (132-13). The first genus can be further divided into the *paideia* of youth and the *therapeia* of adults --specifically *consolatio* -- *(inopem solatur et aegrum*, line 131). At the beginning of education, the poet is needed for the very formation of the power of speech *(os tenerum pueri balbumque poeta figurat*, line 126).[194] Having the power of shaping the mouth, the poet alone is able to bridge that stage of life which is *infans* (recall the metaphor at line 99) with that which is verbal, and thus the poet is more essential to education than are the creators of visual art.[195] Now, in the center of the Epistle Horace comes to the "epodic" power of verse. The poet, in an intermediate position between men and gods,[196] is revealed to be just as important to the

Brink III, p.154-5). Hence we have the *poeta* whose words influence physical nature. This argument would falter if we accept Brink's "daggers" in lines 115 and 116. But I think that the text can stand on the following grounds. There is no "tautology" (Bentley's term) between *habrotonum aegro/ non audet nisi quis didicit dare* and *quod medicorum est/ promittunt medici*, because the former relates a specific act *(audet dare)* while the latter is a generalization *(promittunt)*. The balance that Horace sought in these lines is created by two specific acts *(navem agere, habrotonum dare)* and two generalizations *(promittunt, tractant)*. Conversational tone admits the near-tautology of lines 114-116. In any event, Bentley's *melicorum/ melici* would create yet another tautology alongside *scribimus... poemata* (see Brink III, 152-3).

193 The accidental virtues of the poet (lack of avarice, lust, and gluttony) are presented in a way which recalls Horace's advice to Lollius in Epistle 18. This reinforces the idea that the present Epistle is also "paideutic".

194 Brink (III, p.167ff. and 429f.) cites several Platonic parallels for the notion of "formare" or "figurare" in educational contexts. Plato aside, the only pre-Horatian example cited is attributed to Diogenes the Cynic *(apud* Stobaeus). The parallel instance of "os figurare" in the Cratylus (414b, *stoma plattein*, see Brink III p. 167) does not concern the education of the young, but the primordial creation of words by the *nomothetes*.

195 Brink (III, 171-2) takes "orientia tempora" to refer to the adolescent years. It is indeed a strange way of expressing this idea; perhaps "orientia" is placed here once again to recall Augustus or the Augustan Age *(nil oriturum alias*, etc.).

196 So, for example, Buechner (op. cit.), p. 104.

life of men as the heroic statesman. Beyond his influence over the forces of nature, the poet's prayers have an effect upon war and peace *(impetrat et pacem,* line 137). His influence extends as far upwards as downwards *(carmine di superi placantur, carmine Manes,* line 138), but also brings the divinities into the intermediate realm inhabited by men *(praesentia numina,* line 134). The plastic arts have no such efficacy.

Following the climactic vindication of the poet at line 138, Horace again leaves present circumstances to return to the origins of literature (lines 139-176). The *archaiologia* of this section is wholly Platonic -- not, of course in an intellectually servile way, but constructively, offering what amounts to a "Romanization" of Plato's account of the origin of civic poetry *(Laws,* 700aff., delivered by the "Athenian Stranger"). I quote it at length only because it seems never to have been discussed in connection with this Epistle.[197]

> In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music -- that is to say, such music as then existed -- in order that we may trace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning. Now music was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns; and there was another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and another, celebrating the birth of Dionysus, called, I believe, "dithyrambs". And they used the actual word "laws", or *nomoi,* for another kind of song; and to this they added the term "citharoedic". All these and others were duly distinguished, nor were the performers allowed to confuse one style of music with another. And the authority which determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical shouts of the multitude, as in our days, nor in applause and clapping of hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators should listen in silence to the end; and boys and their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by a hint from a stick. Such was the good order which the multitude were willing to observe; they would never have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of vulgar and lawless innovation. They were men of genius, but they had no perception of what is just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights - - mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, can only be judged by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such licentious works, and adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this way the theatres

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197 Although Gordon Williams discusses this passage in connection with *Ars Poetica,* lines 202ff. (see *TORP,* pp. 336ff.).

> from being mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of good and bad in music and poetry; and instead of an aristocracy, a sort of evil theatocracy has grown up. For if the democracy which judged had only consisted of educated persons, no fatal harm would have been done; but in music there first arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness; -- freedom came following afterwards, and men, fancying that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the absence of fear begets shamelessness.

Further consequences of this excessive liberty, Plato soon explains, are disobedience of rulers, parents, and elders, loss of respect for oaths and for the gods themselves, and finally a sort of relapse into the "old so-called Titanic nature" (701c2), and the onset of unrelenting evils, all of this springing from *eleutheria.* In the Horatian version, the same *libertas* (line 146), carrying poetic, moral, and legal connotations, is the cause of grief in primitive society; the erosion of musical criticism (the failure to judge *nomoi)* proceeds along a parallel course with the erosion of political *nomoi.* But there is a causal relationship here as well; it is the failure of music to provide ethical education which leads to political discord.[198] On the surface, we are looking at the natural evolution of satiric verse, from rustic Fescennine to political invective, and the consequent restriction of *parrhesia.*[199] The "stick" which kept ancient Greek audiences well-behaved *(rhabdou kosmouses, Laws* 700c7) is the same "stick" *(fustis)* which strikes fear into the makers of *mala carmina.*[200]

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198 E.B. England, in his commentary on the *Laws* (Volume I, Oxford 1921, p.408) remarks "It is amusing to read Arist. *Probl.* 19.28 (919b38) that the *nomoi* which were *sung* were so called because, in illiterate ages and peoples, actual laws were sung -- like versified Latin gender rules." Indeed this is more than amusing for our examination of this Epistle, since the ancient *carmina* and *foedera* have already been grouped with *annosa volumina vatum* as products of the Muses (lines 23-27).

199 Brink (III, 193) rightly takes issue with A. Momigliano's excessive scepticism about the existence of a Roman form of *parrhesia* (A. Momigliano, *JRS* 32 (1942), 124: "the Romans never had a proper translation of *parrhesia").* The lack of a "proper translation" might be more a matter of idiom than of political deficiency. Greek especially favors compound words with *pan* (see *LSJ,* 9th edit., p. 1294 col. 1- p. 1299 col. 2; this does not even take into account compounds in *par, pam,* etc), while Latin avoids compounds of *omni* (see *OLD* pp. 1248-9; I count only 15 compounds in all).

200 Brink (III, p.198) rightly, I think, considers that *formidine fustis* (line 154) "may be no more than 'fear of a good hiding'". Capital punishment is not likely to be a component of this image. I agree with Brink (as against the view of Momigliano, for which see previous note) that one cannot pin down Horace to an exact locus in the XII Tables for his conception of *mala carmina.* The XII Tables legislate against *occentare, incantare,*

By appealing to ancient Italic rites, Horace connects the origin of Fescennine verse with the core of the Roman character. He insists that the roots of this ethos cannot be eradicated, for even if the infusion of Greek culture had the effect of adjusting the *numerus* (line 157) of Roman versification, some of the *vestigia ruris* will always be readily perceived (160). It is this ethos which permits, after the Punic wars, a satisfactory integration of Greek tragedy into Roman culture (lines 161-167):

> serus enim Graecis admovet acumina chartis,
> et post Punica bella quietus quaerere coepit,
> quid Sophocles et Thespis et Aeschylus utile ferrent.
> et placuit sibi, natura sublimis et acer;
> nam spirat tragicum satis et feliciter audet,
> sed turpem putat inscite metuitque lituram.

Once again Horace seems to be working within the conceptual framework of the Platonic *Laws:* that the Roman spirit should be *"naturaliter tragica"* is an innovative idea, and it recalls the "Athenian Stranger's" rationale for the exclusion of tragic poets from the ideal city (817aff.):

> And, if any of the serious poets, as they are termed, who write tragedy, come to us and say -- "O strangers, may we go to your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our poetry -- what is your will about these matters?" -- how shall we answer the divine men? I think that our answer should be as follows: -- Best of strangers, we will say to them, we also according to our ability are tragic poets, and our tragedy is the best and noblest; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy. *You are poets and we are poets, both makers of the same strains, rivals and antagonists in the noblest of dramas, which true law can alone perfect, as our hope is.*

Horace has adapted Plato's idiosyncratic view of perfect tragedy to fit the aboriginal Roman character. By a careful ordering of the simple economic realities of their lives, the archaic Romans were in no need of the corrective influence of tragedy, or for that manner of *mousike* in any form. But if this character adapts itself naturally to tragedy, it has no natural aptitude for comedy (line 168ff.). Plautus is singled out as one who puts wealth before art; again we have the metaphor of *nummus* as then numbers of poetry (lines

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and *excantare*, the latter two being clearly magical. Concerned chiefly with the efficacy of *carmina* as such, Horace may have deliberately conflated these three.

175-6):

> gestit enim nummum in loculos demittere, post hoc
> securus cadat an recto stet fabula talo.

While the lack of form in comedy is censured in the phrase *non astricto socco* (very likely an equivalent expression for *pes solutus),* the misuse of *nummi* of which Plautus is accused carries with it the suggestion of misused *numeri.* Plautus' *fabula* resembles a statue; if it is well-balanced, it will stand on its own feet *(recto talo).*[201] To liken comedy to the plastic arts reveals its inherent flaws; its lack of fixed forms is like the *antitypia* of the material with which the metalsmith works. The embarrassment which a model suffers at the hands of a poor sculptor or craftsman returns at the close of the poem (264ff.):

> nil moror officium quod me gravat ac neque ficto
> in peius voltu proponi cereus usquam
> nec prave factis decorari versibus opto, *etc.*

Here Horace warns the reader not to make the facile connection between the pecuniary obsession of ancient Rome with that of comedy; for the formal qualities of ancient comedy are base, while the care and precision with which the *maiores* preserved their *res* at least reveals their effort to impose order and proportion by means of *numeri.*

As the Epistle approaches its close (177ff.), there is a perceptible shift from a reasoned account of the state of culture towards a representation of chaotic behavior. We recall that this is precisely the tendency in Epistle 19, in which an attempt to vindicate artistic innovation turns into the spectre of *funebre bellum.* One can perceive in the contemporary life of the theater not progress, but rather a regression into baser pleasures, namely the devaluation of *voluptas aurium* for the sake of *voluptas oculorum,* which is "uncertain", or not bound by certain laws of composition (as is the former). In a half-humorous way, Horace reminds us in line 183 of *numerus* ; this *numerus* is not the tool of

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201 See Brink (III, 215) for the history of the exegesis of *recto talo.* My suggestion, that the image is suggestive of statuary, seems to be a novelty. However I cannot understand a sudden appeal to the imagery of a "wrestling match or fight" (Brink, ibid.), as some commentators have suggested. The relevant Pindaric *topos (Isthmians* 7.12f., *orthoi estasas epi sphuroi)* applies to the establishment of a Dorian *apoikia,* and very likely recalls setting up a statue.

the skilled poet, but merely the mass of men.[202] What we see paraded through the theater now (which are labeled *gaudia vana)* are the spoils of war, especially the whole of Corinth (line 193).[203] Thus *Graecia capta,* the principal *external* cause for progress in Roman culture, is now internalized as a spectacle *within* the theater. Horace has turned the world inside-out; *res gestae* and *res ludicrae* switch piaces.

The absurdity of all this can only be appreciated by the detached mind of Democritus (line 194). We are invited to recall the appearance of the sage in Epistle 12 (to Iccius); only Democritus can appreciate the *katachresis* that is rampant in the theater. Visual *spectacula* have an effect that can be easily read upon the faces in the audience *(vulgi converteret ora,* line 196). These spectacles thus effectively undo the formative work of the poet *(os tenerum... poeta figurat).* Of the assembled masses in the theater, it is the *equites* upon whom Horace counts to preserve order; but as soon as the *equites* become dissatisfied, the *plebs* rallies to arms, eager for displays of violence *(aut ursum aut pugiles).* The image of the theater in chaos is expanded (in lines 200-2) with the *strepitus* of the crowd. Such a description of noise is appropriate to the narrative of a battle, and this is only fitting when the crowd is engrossed with the spectacle of *praeda.*[204] The actor, smeared with purple, stands out as a caricature of a senator wearing his *clavus.*[205] With this caricature, Horace has succeeded in bringing all of the orders of society into his grotesque parody of the theater.[206] The parody ends not here, but later (lines 208-213), with a Platonic allusion

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202 Cf., Epistle 1.2.27: *nos numerus sumus et fruges consumere nati.*

203 I cannot understand *captiva Corinthus* as a metonymy (see Brink III, 431-2). It is perfectly comprehensible that the phrase should be a simple exaggeration -- all Corinth is dragged into the theater as a spectacle -- and thus *Roma potens* (line 61) fills the theater in order to ogle *captiva Corinthus.* It is in connection with this line, more so than with *Graecia capta* above, that Horace is introducing the capture of Corinth of 146 B.C.; see G. Nenci, "Graecia capta... Hor. Ep. II.I.156", *ASNP* ser. III.8 (1978) 1007-1023, and Brink III, 431-2.

204 Cf. *strepitus* in c.1.15.18 (of the Trojan War).

205 Kiessling-Heinze *(ad Ars Poetica* line 15) remark that there *purpureus late qui splendeat pannus* recalls the senatorial *latus clavus.*

to the magical powers that a poet wields over his audience *(ut magus, et modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis*, line 213), causing complete disorientation and confusion. The exaggeration brings the concept of the *theatrum* back to its *physis:* it is a place where sight overwhelms hearing.[207]

Returning to Augustus to conclude the Epistle (lines 214-270), Horace offers a solution to the cultural crisis: essentially, one must live "the life of books".[208] A glance at the libraries of the Palatine temple of Apollo in line 216 is clearly intended to reassure Augustus that his cultural priorities are in order (as are lines 245ff. on Augustus' choice of poets). But a deeper lesson is carried in the tale of the poetaster Choerilus. In these lines a clear parallel is drawn between Augustus and Alexander, and with this Horace dissolves the initial fiction that no *comparandum* could be found for Augustus *(te nostris ducibus, te Grais anteferendo*, line 19). Having attained the political stature of Alexander, Augustus finds himself as much a cultural force as Alexander had been. Horace has created a "worst-case scenario" of imperial patronage, in which it can be made clear that political omnipotence can oppress cultural progress,[209] and he finds the precedent for this in the person of Alexander (lines 232-244). Misshapen verses are purchased with *regale nomis-*

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206 By reading *laena* in line 207 (with Brink III, 231), the caricature is perhaps more vivid than if *lana* is left unmolested. But *lana* could hardly refer to anything other than the actor's garment. One strong argument in favor of *lana* is line 27 of Epistle 1.10 *(non qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro/ nescit Aquinatem potantia vellera fucum, etc.):* there also we have a "fraudulent dye", but the image centers on the raw material *(vellus)*, not a finished product *(laena)*.

207 Commentators regularly adduce *Ion* 535c in connection with these lines. This point of comparison merits a deeper inquiry. Socrates is concerned with the madness or sanity of theatrical (or representational) emotions when he devises the above example. Horace comes back to this with the example of the apparently mad Argive in Epistle 2.2 (lines 128ff.).

208 The exhortation, as Wickham notes (and Brink agrees, III, 238) is Lucretian (1.265-9, *nunc age... accipe)* and didactic; see Cyril Bailey, *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (Oxford 1947), Vol.2, p.644 for the Lucretian usage.

209 We thus return to the opening notion *urit enim fulgore suo qui praegravat artes/ infra se positas* (line 13).

ma.[210] These *Philippi* bear images that are more or less crudely stamped upon them; they they stand in sharp contrast to the lifelike images of Apelles and Lysippus.[211]

As a kind of *sphragis* for the Epistle, Horace reverts to himself, and in contemplating the fate of poor poetry, describes his own funeral. It is a difficult image to comprehend, and there is still no unanimity in the interpretation of the closing lines of the poem.[212] Probably we are intended to recall the cruel fate of the personified *liber* in Epistle 1.20. One question which is seldom asked of this passage is, on what grounds can the poet suddenly place himself in Augustus' place, proffering himself as a proper subject for poetry? If Horace is to be praised as a poetic giant, then we ought to compare Epistle 1.19 on this point. If then it is a question of poetic reputation, it seems that Horace envisions the annihilation of his own work, along with the poor verses written in praise of him; the phrase *uno cum scriptore meo* must mean that his own rolls of poetry are packed away in the *capsa* along with those of his adulator. Horace is fond of the idea that authors can be packed together in a box (e.g., *Satires* 2.3.11, *stipare Platona Menandro),* and, at the close of Ode 3.29, he seems to think of himself as a *volumen (mea virtute me involvo,* line 55). Thus

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[210] By choosing the word *nomisma* Horace returns to the word-play between *nummus* and *numerus* ; but what is more, *nomisma* represents the perfect juncture of the semantic fields of his reading *nummus* (coin) and *nomos* (law), since it is patently derived from the latter.

[211] What sort of image did Horace have in mind when he wrote *Philippos?* Brink (III, p. 246) is sure that these are the gold staters frequently mentioned in comedy. If Horace as thinking of a coin which bore the image of the king, it would be a numismatic anachronism -- some would claim -- since portraits on coins are considered to postdate the deification of Alexander (see Barclay V. Head, *Historia Numorum* (1967 Argonaut Press, Chicago, reprint of 1911 edit.), "Introduction", p.lix.). Interestingly, however, one of Philip's silver tetradrachms shows, on its obverse, "a bearded horseman, wearing kausia and chlamys, very like the horsemen on the coins of the fifth- century Macedonian kings; here no doubt Philip himself is represented" (Colin M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins,* (University of California Press, 1976) p.146). If Kraay is correct, Horace might well have in mind a portrait coin. Kiessling-Heinze, ad. loc., merely say "Goldmuenzen mit dem Bilde Koenig Philipps", without numismatic references.

[212] Brink (III, 263-5) argues that, since *capsa* is nowhere else connected with funeral paraphernalia, only *porrectus* suggests a funeral. Kiessling-Heinze take the allusion as certain.

good arguments can be found that there is a composite image at work here, and a funeral is being conflated with the process of discarding unwanted paper. Such a conflation, although perhaps grotesque, is hardly incomprehensible. One must remember that the poem opens with a jarring funeral scene -- that of Heracles; but there is a strong implication there that Augustus will share a similar fate. If any sense is to be made of the metaphor in line 264-5, it is with reference to the notion of a funeral-mask; and again, although there is conflation of images, the plastic representation that *cereus* suggests fits in with one of the most important themes of the poem -- the failure of visual art to strengthen civic morality.[213] Horace's fear of being distorted in wax is the same as his anxiety that the formative work of the poet will be defeated by the plastic arts.[214] As the poem begins with the judgement of the deified emperor, so it ends with the conviction of the failed poet.

By adapting the aetiology of musical decline from Plato's *Laws*, Horace offers Augustus a lesson on the parallel fate of music and legislation. In addition to this, the conclusion of the poem reminds us, by its suggestion of an unflattering image of Horace, of the *discordia* of the artist, a persisitent theme of the First Book of Epistles.

The Epistle to Florus

Since a large part of my aim in analyzing the Epistles is to demonstrate their Platonic character, it is gratifying for me to be able to quote the following passage from Brink's essay on the *Florus* (Brink III 520):

> It is almost as if Horace was appending a poetic illustration to the passage of Plato's *Phaedrus* mentioned above *(Phaedrus* 278c-e). For there we find a message to the poets as well as other composers of speeches and writings. It runs as follows. If such a writer has written with a knowledge of truth, if he can defend his statements when challenged, and finally, if he can demon-

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213 *Cereus* is not common before Horace; inventively, Horace at *Ars* 163 has it governing an infinitive. Plato is particularly fond of metaphors involving wax (cf., *Laws* 633d, *Timaeus* 74c, *Republic* 588d).

214 One might note that there is an etymological connection between *ficto* here *(ficto in pei-us vultu)* and *figurare* above (line 126).

> strate by his own words the inferiority of his writings, he should be called "lover of truth" ("philosopher") or something like it rather than poet, etc.

Brink goes on to praise the evolution of thought in the poem:

> Nothing could be more lucid, artistically pleasing, and intellectually convincing than the three stages through which the poem passes -- from the epistolary situation to poetic criteria and, finally, to moral choices.

In his reading of Horace's great autobiography, Brink has traced, with great sensitivity, Horace's Platonic inheritance: writing is not an end, but rather a means, for the wise man. He does not, however, reflect upon the great fiction that runs all through Platonic and Horatian discourse, that writing is in fact the preferred (or the only) means of communicating the great discovery that truth is not to be sought in writing.

In my reading of the *Florus*, I seek to demonstrate that Horace's debt to the *Phaedrus* is greater than Brink has suggested. Moreover, the Phaedrian quality of the *Florus* is best understood in its position immediately following the *Augustus*, which historically postdates the *Florus*. In the comparative dearth of scholarship on these two poems, few have concerned themselves with the unity of Book Two of the *Epistles*.[215] I hope to show that the flow of argument from the *Augustus* to the *Florus* resembles that of Book One of the Epistles.[216]

We might well call the opening problem of the Epistle (the hypothetical sale of a slave) a kind of *ainos*, for the Epistle seems to be wholly built around *ainoi*.[217] Horace likens

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215 In 1954 M.J. McGann complained (in "Horace's Epistle to Florus (Epist. 2.2)" *RhM* 97 (1954) 343-358) of the lack of studies on the *Florus* ; indeed he could only cite Fr. Klingner's pages of *Erklaerung (Philologus* 90 (1935) 464-8) for work that had been done in the half-century preceding him. The situation today is little improved, for R.B. Rutherford, in his brief paper on the poem ("Horace, *Epistles* 2.2: Introspection and Retrospection", *CQ* 31.2 (1981) 375-380) relies upon little outside of Brink (but see Brink (III 451) for the relevant pages in Stegen, Becker, and Pasoli on the *Florus).*

216 In my reading of the *Florus*, I follow (for the sake of convenience) more or less the paragraph-divisions of the poem given by Brink. I am grouping the lines thus: 1-25; 26-40; 41-54; 55-76; 77-86; 87-105; 106-125; 126-144; 145-157; 158-179; 180-204; 205-end.

217 McGann (op. cit., p.347, n.11), following Eduard Fraenkel, includes "anecdotes of all kinds, little dramatic scenes based on some literary source (e.g., Sat. 2.3.187 ff. 295 ff., Epist. 1.16.73 ff.) and similar illustrative material" under the rubric of *ainos* ;

himself to the slave, but the reader is not sure how far the comparison can be pushed. As Rutherford has noted, the literary and musical talent of the slave reflects Horace's own reputation.[218] But the slave has demonstrated a *vitium* on only one occasion *(semel hic cessavit,* 14). There is no specific reason given for this deviation in the slave's diligence, but it is called, half-seriously, a *fuga* (line 17). The next instance of *fuga* which the Epistle presents is that of Horace at Philippi (line 49), and while *fuga* is not spelled out here as such, we are surely meant to recall it from the context of Odes 2.7.9-10 *(celerem fugam),* just as surely as *decisis humilem pinnis* (line 50) recalls Epistle 1.20.21 *(maiores pinnas nido extendisse).*

McGann speaks of the "suspense" created by the opening hypothesis of the *Florus.*[219] But the tone of the *Florus* is carried over smoothly from the *Augustus,* in the sense that the mercenary of Lucullus resembles Choerilus in the preceding poem. It is surprising that the connection is so smooth, for the traditional dating places the first poem several years after the second.[220] The tale of Alexander and the artists who surrounded him, which closes the *Augustus,* clearly looks back to the *odium poetarum* of Epistle 19. Choerilus, as a paradigm of this class, is a "poetic mercenary" in the same sense as Plautus in the *Augustus* ; he cannot separate his verses from the *nummi* which they earn for him.[221] The *Florus* describes how the mercenary persona of the poet, which he must adopt in his relations with the *primi urbis,* moves away, in legal terms, from *usus* and towards *manci-*

whether or not the Greek word will support this widened meaning, the example of the *servus mendosus,* the *Luculli miles,* and the Argive *ingenium* are all clearly cut from the same fabric.

218 Rutherford (op.cit.), p.376; also McGann (op. cit.) p.346, who cites on this point G. Kettner, *Die Episteln des Horaz* (1900), p.160, which I have been unable to consult.

219 McGann (op. cit.) p.344.

220 The dating has not changed much since Mommsen (Hermes 1880); see Brink III 522ff., and Brink I 184ff. (on the date of the *Ars).*

221 See Brink (III 244ff.) on Choerilus. His tale is ainos proper, for its putative source is historical (Brink III 281 cites Curtius 8.5.8), just as the story of Lucullus' champion is thought to have been derived from a source such as Sallust's *Histories.*

patio. Horace rarely brings the legal terms, upon which he plays, into the foreground, preferring to weave together elements of different personae into what he perceives to be his own role in Roman society.[222] In this respect the *Florus* seems to revise, or rather rearrange, the distinctions which Horace had made between the *sapiens* and his adversaries in the First Book.[223]

Even more than in the *Augustus*, Horace shows a penchant in the *Florus* for using prosaic terms for money and coin. Using the license available in the composition of satire, Horace mentions large sums of *nummi* (lines 5, 33, 164-5).[224] One part of the humor centering upon *nummus* involves the similarity between *as* and the first syllable of *aerumnis* (line 27), which sounds like *aes*.[225] The mercenary is supposed to be concerned with his wages; yet his refusal to take on great labors after he has made up for his losses sounds like a poetic *recusatio*. His general exhorts him thus (lines 37-8):

> i, bone, quo virtus tua te vocat, i pede fausto,
> grandia laturus meritorum praemia. quid stas?

The soldier's sarcastic reply, duplicating the general's *ibit (ibit/ ibit eo quo vis qui zonam perdidit*, lines 39-40) reminds us of Horace's well-known oath of fealty to Maecenas in Ode 2.17.10. *(ibimus, ibimus)*.[226] With these words, the soldier lays aside his duty to his praetor in a much less gentle fashion than Horace is able to do, when he finds himself having to explain to Augustus why he cannot follow the emperor's orders for poetic production. It would have been perfectly clear to Horace's audience that *pes* connotes poetic meter, and

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222 Except, of course, in line 159 *(mancipatio/ usus)*.

223 The slave of the *Florus*, in one respect, points all the way back to the *liber mundus* addressed in Epistle 1.20; and with the detail of the slave's *tali* (line 4) we also recall the *fabula* of Plautus in the *Augustus (an recto stet fabula talo*, line 176).

224 see Brink's note (3.274) and Axelson, *Unpoetische Woerter*, p.108.; and note the frequency of such expressions in the *Satires*.

225 For *as*, see Walde-Hofmann p.71, and Ernout-Meillet, p.50. Also cf. *Augustus*, lines 240 and 244 *(aera* and *aere)*.

226 Brink notes the parallel (III 288) as anadiplosis, but the irony inherent in Horace's recollection of that phrase is either not felt by him or discounted as irrelevant.

the phrase *i pede fausto* sounds as much like an exhortation to compose heroic verse as it does an order to attack a citadel.[227] The mercenary, *contentus vivere parvo*, is a very faithful reflection of Horace himself, who would rather sleep than engage in the madness of composing verse merely for the sake of fattening his estate (lines 52-54).[228]

Thus the first excuse for Horace's silence (or his absence from the Roman poetic forum) is built around arguments that he is a poor mercenary, with an undertone that he has deliberately created this fault for himself. The next argument for silence grows out of a resume of his education and of the "amusical" nature of the city which seems to have entrapped him. The *miles*, however, carries over from his own section (ll.26-40) into the next (ll.41-54). Horace's studies are interrupted by the Republican call to arms, in the course of which he proves himself to be as lax a soldier as the *miles Luculli* above. Although he describes himself as *rudem belli* (line 47), no doubt because of his absorption in his studies both at Rome and at Athens, Horace was nurtured in the city which could most vividly appreciate the devastation of civil war; thus the lesson of his youth which he deems most worthy of mention is his reading of the *Iliad* (ll.41-2):[229]

> Romae nutriri mihi contigit, atque doceri
> iratus Grais quantum nocuisset Achilles.

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227 Horace chooses the Greek *zona* for the soldier's purse, rather than the more precise and prosaic words available for it (see Brink 3.288). It is possible that the poet is trying to conflate the ideas of the lost money-belt with the "rape" of a citadel (his specialty): the phrase *lyein ten zonen* is used of sexual intercourse (see *Odyssey*, 11.245) and the well-known Homeric use of *kredemna lyein (Iliad*, 16.100; *Odyssey*, 13.388) for the taking of Troy cannot have been far from his thoughts.

228 One parallel (which seems to be frequently missed) connecting the *miles* with Horace is sleep; the soldier was robbed of his fortune while he slept (line 27), but Horace is ready to make the same mistake in lines 52-54 by "resting on his laurels".

229 Brink (III 289f.) seems to think that the lines are a kind of stylized reference or shorthand for the title of the *Iliad*. There is likely to be something more to the lines than this; nor is the "paraphrase" in the *Ars Poetica* (140-1) to be taken merely as a title for the *Odyssey*.

If the way that Horace chose to refer to his reading of the *Iliad* at the beginning of his education is indeed connected with civil disorder in Rome, then we should reject Brink's claim that the *Florus* is not a political poem.[230] The circumstances of Horace's regrettable departure from Athens *(dura sed emovere loco,* line 46) are echoed later in his conception of the poet's duty *(verba movere loco,* line 113), and they retain the note of violent upheaval in the later passage.[231]

A more clearly political tone is adopted in lines 65-76, in which Horace lists his *officia.* One has to wonder if Horace intended the sarcasm of lines 65-6,

> praeter cetera me Romaene poemata censes
> scribere posse inter tot curas totque labores?

which so clearly reflect the opening lines of the *Augustus* (with the repeated *tot* matching *tot...tanta).* Gentler connections had already been made in the *Augustus* between the *officia* of the emperor and those of the poet. Here perhaps the identification of the two is even more central to Horace's intentions, for its climax (which might well also be called the climax of the poem) comes in the description of the poet as *censor* (lines 109-118):

> at qui legitimum cupiet fecisse poema,
> cum tabulis animum censoris sumet honesti;
> audebit, quaecumque parum splendoris habebunt
> et sine pondere erunt et honore indigna fruentur,[232]
> verba movere loco, quamvis invita recedant
> et versentur adhuc inter penetralia Vestae.
> obscurata diu populo bonus eruet atque
> proferet in lucem speciosa vocabula rerum,
> quae priscis memorata Catonibus atque Cethegis
> nunc situs informis premit et deserta vetustas.

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230 see Brink III 551: "The letter to Florus... is one of Horace's finest poems; but it is not political."

231 Brink (III 292-3): "The line is so constructed, by inversion of word-order and metrical placing, as to bring out what Horace seems to wish to convey -- the enforced nature of his movements in the Civil War." He does not consider line 113 in connection with line 46.

232 I have printed Brink's text, with Horkel's *fruentur* in place of the MSS. *feruntur* or *ferentur.* I prefer this last reading, since the idea *sine pondere erunt* suggests volatility, especially with *versentur* two lines below.

Is Horace here merely talking about resuscitating archaisms? The restoration of old words sounds like an allusion to Augustus' restoration of the *prisci mores*, but the force of this, again, will only be fully apparent to the reader who has recently reviewed the *Augustus*.[233] Beyond this, however, we have the work of the *censor*, who must eliminate certain words from public attention.[234] These lines may well refer to one of Augustus' *lectiones Senatus*. Horace has twice made reference to his "lost sense of place" in the poem -- his "expulsion" from Athens, and the loss of his paternal estate upon his return to Italy. But here, by making his poetic *persona* into a *censor*, he regains authority over the business of men's lives; he is truly a counterpart to Augustus in his control of Rome.[235]

These climactic and arguably political lines upon the poet's authority occupy the center of the poem. From this point forward we learn of the poet's preference for a life in obscurity, in which he can be content with his own poetry and immune from criticism (126-8):

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[233] For the way in which Augustus himself would have referred to the "ancient ways", cf. *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* ch. 8: Legibus novi(s latis complura e)xempla maiorum exolescenia iam ex nost(ro usu revocavi et ipse) multarum rer(um exe)mpla imitanda pos(teris tradidi).

[234] See Brink (III 334), citing pseudo-Acro's intuitive connection between these lines and the censor's removal of senators, and Mommsen's appreciation of the "humor" here (Mommsen, *Roemische Staatsrecht* 3.1, 402 n.2 and 421 n.2).

[235] Suetonius, describing the *lectio* (*Vita Augusti*, ch.35) says:

> "Senatorum affluentem numerum deformi et incondita turba (erant etiam supra mille, et quidam indignissimi et post necem Caesaris per gratiam et praemium adlecti, quos *Orcinos* vulgus vocabat) ad modum pristinum et splendorem redegit duabus lectionibus, etc."
>
> Considering this macabre nickname for the shadowy senators of the "forties", it is interesting that Orcus indeed appears in the *Florus* (line 178).
>
> H.S. Jones (*Cambridge Ancient History* 10.149) accepts three such *lectiones* as certain: in 28, 18, and 13 B.C. The *Florus* is generally dated at around 19, but the *terminus ante* has always rested upon the idea that Horace could not claim to have abandoned lyric after the composition of the *Carmen Saeculare* in 17; thus the poem justifiably fits into the years 18 and 17 as well as 19. Horace may well have been alluding to the *lectio Senatus* of 18. But if he is simply speaking in generic terms, he is then recalling the *lectio* of 28 and the history of the procedure as such. Either way, one feels that a glance was cast at Augustus.

praetulerim scriptor delirus inersque videri,
dum mea delectent mala me vel denique fallant,
quam sapere et ringi.

To avoid *rictus*, the poet falls silent; thus the remainder of the poem is dominated by the silence, and feigned insanity, of the *sapiens*. There is a wide-cast irony in the fact that the section which purports to instruct the poets on what words to chose (i.e., what to say) is immediately followed by the tale of the Argive who enjoyed listening to tragedies that were played out entirely in his own head, and in an empty theater (lines 128ff.). Horace is seemingly "deconstructing" the idea of *rhetorike*, and hereafter we are given a series of moral thoughts (not indeed "sayings", or *dicta)* which Horace recites to himself quietly *(quocirca mecum loquor haec tacitusque recordor*, line 145).

The deluded Argive (lines 126-140), alone in his theater, completes the image of the impossibly crowded theater proposed in the *Augustus* (lines 194-207). The crux of Horace's lesson to Lollius in Epistle 18, which had already been introduced in the first letter to Lollius, is, as we have said, that social conditions frequently complicate and endanger intellectual pursuits, save for reading in solitude. The vindication of reading in the *Augustus* suggests that the Argive of the *Florus* is portrayed as an avid reader of tragedies, vividly reenacting them in his own memory. Surely the point of this *ainos* would be lost if Horace were describing one who is truly mad, for he emphasizes the man's prudence in all other respects (lines 131ff.):

cetera qui vitae servaret munia recto
more, bonus sane vicinus, amabilis hospes,
comis in uxorem, posset qui ignoscere servis
et signo laeso non insanire lagoenae,
posset qui rupem et puteum vitare patentem.

Horace's Argive is a "revised" model of the *sapiens*, now a silent thinker, who makes use of the theater in way quite incomprehensible to his fellow citizens. His outward behavior recalls that of the *ingenium* in lines 81ff.:

ingenium sibi quod vacuas desumpsit Athenas
et studiis annos septem dedit insenuitque
libris et curis, statua taciturnius exit
plerumque et risu populum quatit.

Even if Horace does not have his own studies in mind,[236] the ethos of Socrates lies behind the *ingenium*.[237] Since the *ingenium* is a Socratic figure, and the *Argivus* continues in the same vein, it is too much to say, with Brink, that the lines in which the poem turns towards philosophy are unconnected with what has come before and what will come after.[238]

Read in isolation, the diatribe which Horace offers after line 145 seems to be more or less hackneyed talk about the folly of *avaritia*:[239]

> si tibi nulla sitim finiret copia lymphae,
> narrares medicis: quod quanto plura parasti,
> tanto plura cupis, nulline faterier audes?

Yet the images from which the diatribe is built have already appeared in the poem, in completely different contexts. First, Horace draws a parallel between unquenchable thirst and avarice (ll. 146f.). But *nulla copia lymphae* sounds very much like *puroque simillimis amni* above (line 120). The force of the poet, the raging stream that will cleanse Latium of its verbal impurities, seems here to turn back upon the poet himself. This allusion is also a *punctus* against the putative Callimachus of line 100; it represents a new and unexpected aspect of the famous *Assyrios potamos*. In another respect, it recalls the ambivalent force of liquids in Book One of the Epistles. Likewise, the right of purchase by *libra et aere* a few

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236 It is always said that Horace could not have been thinking of his own stay at Athens; seven years before Philippi, Horace was seventeen years old. He is thought (for no good reason) to have gone to Athens in the same year as Cicero's son (i.e., 45, from Cicero's letter *ad Atticum* 12.32: see Perret, p. 14f.). To me it does not seem hopelessly absurd to have Horace beginning his studies in Athens in 48. How, at any rate, is one to explain the fact that Horace, in 45, already moved in the social circles of such youths as L. Calpurnius Bibulus and M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus?

237 One is reminded of the beginning of the *Symposium* (175A-B) where Socrates, absorbed in quiet contemplation and standing perfectly still outside the door of Agathon's neighbor, is late to join the banqueters.

238 Brink III 357. The remark is strange, for Brink has already connected the *Argivus* with "the deluded spectator below 128ff., Democritus, who cannot look after his property, *dum peregre est animus*, *Ep.* 1.12.12, suicidal Empedocles, *A.P.* 464-6n., and the mad poet, *A.P.* 457-60n." (Brink III 312). I am at a loss as to why Brink rejects the connection of philosophers and madness in the present (lines 141ff.) passage.

239 Thus Brink III 360-1.

lines later on (158ff.)

> si proprium est, quod quis libra mercatus et aere est,
> quaedam, si credis consultis, mancipat usus

recalls the beginning of the *Augustus*, for there we have the *trutina (libra)* borrowed from Aristophanes' weighing of tragic *logoi*.[240] And finally, the produce of the field, which is *emptum* for all mortals regardless of ownership, reminds us of the poet's work in his own "fields" above *(luxuriantia compescet*, line 122).

Brink refuses to see the final section (lines 205-end) as an *exhortatio ad mortem*.[241] Even if one were to read it as an *exhortatio ad vitam*, one would still hear the resonance of *pallida mors aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas/ regumque turres* in the lines on Orcus (215ff.):

> quid vici prosunt aut horrea? quidve Calabris
> saltibus adiecti Lucani, si metit Orcus
> grandia cum parvis, non exorabilis auro?

These lines are the focus, so to speak, of the latter half of the poem. The "reaper" Orcus looks back to the *vilicus Orbi* of line 160 (the similarity of *Orbius* and *Orcus* being, no doubt, intentional), and looks forward to the metaphorical "end of the banquet" at the poem's conclusion.[242] Brink's suggestion that *avaritia* dominates the conclusion of the poem ought to be qualified thus: the *avaritia* for arable land predominates here. The technical terms of agriculture *(occare, metere)* fit together perfectly with the concluding reminiscence of Horace's Epistle to his own *vilicus* at line 211: *quid te exempta iuvas spinis de plu-*

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240 One might speak of this as ring-composition; another element of the ring is the return of *iurgia* in line 169: *(qua populus assita certis/ limitibus refringit iurgia)*, which looks back to *excludat iurgia finis* at line 38 of the *Augustus*. It ought to be noted that little weight can be put upon the word *refringit*, an emendation of Horkel's that is far from the transmitted *refugit* ; everyone agrees, however, that a verb synonymous with, e.g., *depellere* must be lurking behind *refugit* (perhaps *refutat*, with only two letters altered).

241 Brink III, 402.

242 *Orbius* is most likely a name chosen at whim; it is tautometric with *Orcus* in the genitive singular. If Orbius was indeed a neighbor of Horace (as some have extrapolated from the text, *more scholiastarum)*, the poet still probably only chose to mention him because of his provocative name.

ribus una? (cf. Epist. 1.14.4f.). Therefore the seemingly abrupt digression on the *Genius* (lines 183-189) is meant not only to explain the discordant talents of the competing poets earlier in the poem (lines 97ff.), but also to recall Amphion and Zethus from Epistle 18 (lines 183ff.):

> cur alter fratrum cessare et ludere et ungui
> praeferat Herodis palmetis pinguibus, alter
> dives et inportunus ad umbram lucis ab ortu
> silvestrem flammis et ferro mitiget agrum,
> scit Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum,
> naturae deus humanae mortalis, in unum
> quodque caput voltu mutablilis, albus et ater.

Framing the fraternal conflict in terms of rural labor (line 186), Horace seems once again to be adapting Euripides' *Antiope*, with the industrious Zethus as a foil for the lax Amphion.[243] Horace's *Genius* is thus a point of confluence for a Platonic image (the Socratic *daimonion)* and an Euripidean (or, more generally, a dramatic) one. Horace is again Amphion, refusing to enter into the *vita activa*. The vigor of lines 120ff., seeming to promise that the poet's river-like influence upon the Latins would prove to be a great blessing *(opes)*, is not sustained throughout the poem.[244]

One can speak of two kinds of unity that bring coherence to the two longer Epistles. One is the formal unity of words appearing in both poems, for instance the recurrent *nummus*, with its pun on *numerus* ; there is also the sarcastic use of *labor (Florus*, line 66), recalling the opening line of the *Augustus*. Another recurrence, one which seems to indicate a ring-composition in the two poems, is *iurgia (Augustus* line 38, *Florus* line 171). Thematic unity is evinced by the two wholly distinct descriptions of the theater.[245] The

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[243] See previous chapter (on Epistle 18) for a discussion of the theatrical force of the figures Amphion and Zethus.

[244] see Brink III 441ff. on *Genius* ; Brink is not disposed to read this as a specifically Platonic reference.

[245] Also, one might consider *paulatim mercaris agrum (Florus,* 164) to be a kind of *sorites* paradox, as in *Augustus,* line 45f.

thematic relevance of the theater, at first hopelessly confused, and at last completely empty, is difficult to grasp firmly until the poems are read sequentially.

The *Augustus* suggests a bond between statesman and original poet, since both are creators of *leges*. In the *Florus*, however, the poet falls carefully silent, settling upon a life which is introspective and somewhat solipsistic; the corrupt theater of the *Augustus*, "purified" by the Argive's silent recollection of drama, seems to be the only possible *restitutio*, in Horace's mind, of classical drama. The flow of the argument between these two long poems, finally settling upon the necessity of reading and recognizing the impossibility of shared artistic experience, seems to expand the content of Epistle 18, in which the promised lesson (i.e., how to make use of *maiores)* surreptitiously turns out to be a protreptic towards reading, and a caution against *convivia*. Thus the close of the *Florus* seems to retrace the movements of Epistles 18, 19 and 20. This strongly suggests that the historically prior *Florus* has been re-worked to fit together with the *Augustus*, or else that the *Augustus* was composed, in part, as a companion-piece to the *Florus*.

THE ARS POETICA

Although the *Ars* is one of the monuments of European literary culture, scholars have too often contented themselves with piece-meal treatments of it, and most are reluctant to read it with the expectations that they would bring to the reading of an Horatian *sermo*. Thus while the bibliography for the *Ars* has become vast, there is a dearth of explication.[246] The issue of its date is stale-mated, in the absence of clear testimony as to the identity of the Pisones to whom the poem is addressed.[247] Given these circumstances, the safest way to discuss the *Ars* is to steer clear of chronological speculation and try to understand it on its own terms.

The most comprehensive body of scholarship on the *Ars* belongs to C.O. Brink. His two volumes devoted to the poem take literally nothing for granted. He felt it necessary to produce a new text of the *Ars*, and to reserve his critical reading of the poem for the final chapters of his massive commentary. For Brink, the ordinary kind of *Textgeschichte* is inapplicable to Horace, for our earliest sources of the text are apparently "cross-fertilized".[248] The text has almost to be divined, and one has to defer to the powers of divination of Bentley before all others. It is likewise with the exegesis of the poem, for Brink argues that the principles of order regulating *Ars* are essentially the same as those for the *Odes:* "Ideas are imaginatively, not conceptually, associated in his mind."[249] Needless to say, how certain ideas fit together is largely a subjective matter; and it is by no means clear that Brink has exhausted all possible venues of *extispicium*. Nevertheless, the weight of Brink's authority seems to have extinguished, at least temporarily, the ardor of Horatian critics, since so little literary criticism has been exercised upon the poem in

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246 W. Kissel's bibliography for the *Ars* from 1936-1975, *ANRW* II, 31.3 (1981) lists approximately 120 items, and of these, some 18 concern the *Nachleben* of the *Ars*.

247 Brink, I 239-243. R. Syme, "The sons of Piso the Pontifex", *AJP* 101 (1980) 333-341, inclines towards a late date (c. 10 B.C.).

248 Brink II 20.

249 Brink II 455.

recent years.

Those interested in the poetry of the *Ars* will be disappointed with his concluding essays,[250] and turn to another recent landmark in scholarship on the *Ars*, the long essay by Gordon Williams in *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry*.[251] Williams distances himself from the traditional kind of analysis of the *Ars*, in which parallels are sought from the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, and from the tradition of Hellenistic literary criticism. For Williams, Horace has so completely blended his sources that it becomes impossible to insist on his having had one or another source in mind exclusively when he composed any given section. Williams also finds in Horace an innovative use of Hellenistic Epigrams, especially those of Dioscorides.[252] On the question of philosophical allegiance, Williams is more willing than Brink to see a strong connection with Plato's *Laws*, and successfully argues that Horace has generalized one important Platonic argument concerning the development of music *(Laws* 700 and *Ars* 202ff.).[253] Overall, Williams is much more willing than Brink to admit that Horace used his materials creatively.

My purpose in this chapter is twofold. First, I will consider one of Brink's clearest statements on the Aristotelianism of the *Ars*, and argue that it presents only a partial picture of Horace's philosophical affiliations in the poem. Next, I will seek to widen William's reading of *Ars*, lines 202ff., and argue that Platonic ideas are present all through the poem. I believe that a strong case can be made that Horace was interested in the various meanings of the word *melos* ; in composing the *Ars*, the notions of "limbs" *(ta mele)* and of musical or metrical phrases (also *mele)* recur in the examples which Horace chooses to illustrate his precepts. Also, mistakes in music and inconcinnity in works of art can best be understood with reference to the Platonic notion of *plemmelia* (discord resulting from

[250] Brink II 445-523.

[251] *TORP* 329-357.

[252] *TORP*, 342-3.

[253] *TORP* 336-40. See my discussion of the *Augustus* for this section of the *Laws*.

improper articulation). From the most basic elements of *iunctura* (verbal composition) to the creation of artistic wholes, Horace's aesthetic vocabulary appeals to the metaphor of limbs, sections, and articulation, suggesting ultimately the Platonic ordering principle of *diairesis*. I believe that Horace consciously manipulated his readers' response to the aesthetic demand for articulation by presenting, sometimes humorously and by means of paronomasia, images in which limbs are centrally important. I will discuss the idea of articulation under three rubrics: *membra, sectiones*, and *plemmelia*. My discussion of the *Ars* is a sort of antithesis to the kind of scholarship which, in the tradition of Norden, seeks to "dismember" the poem into various "headings".[254]

Brink's clearest manifesto of Horace's Aristotelianism is prefixed to his commentary on the *Ars*.[255] I quote it at length, in order to respond to several of its points in turn.

> Plato employs the idea of "wholeness" in polemical contexts of two dialogues, *Gorgias* 503e-4a and, more specifically, *Phaedrus* 263-4. In both cases, the "arts" -- painting, architecture, shipbuilding, etc. -- are used as models for such wholeness. "Cogent composition", *ananke logographike* (264b), requires his dialectic method. It is likened to organisms: every discourse must fit together like the body of a living creature *(Phaedrus* 264c). "The fitting relation of every part to every other and to the whole" (264c) is the criterion demanded.

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254 Eduard Norden's analysis ("Die Komposition und Litteraturgattung der Horazischen Epistula ad Pisones", *Hermes* 40 1905, pp. 481-528), which dissects the *Ars* into the discrete chapters of a *schema isagogicum*, is nowadays becoming less influential. Brink's paragraph divisions, while helpful to the casual reader of the poem, seem to be made in the same spirit as Norden's (with the escape-clause that poetic associations blur the incisions). R.K. Hack, whom Brink cites frequently, long ago argued that Norden's scheme was too restrictive (in "The Doctrine of Literary Forms" *HSCP 27* (1916) 1-65). I concur with Hack in his assertion that the *Ars* is essentially Platonic in spirit. But Hack is given to excessive generalization in the matter of Horace's Platonism, and his interpretations of Platonic passages are frequently superficial. Still, Hack's article deserves to be read more frequently today, especially for his lucid resume of ante-Norden scholarship on the *Ars* (pp. 1-17). Also to be noted is Ezio Bolaffi, "Probabili Influssi Platonici su Orazio", *Atheneum* n.s. 11 (1933) 122-127, concerned mainly with the *Ars*, but frequently unconvincing. For an argument that the *Ars* observes a structural pattern based upon the "Golden Section", see K. Gantar, "Die Anfangsverse und die Komposition der horazischen Epistel ueber die Dichtkunst", *SO* 39 (1964) 89-98.

255 Brink II 78-9.

> In spite of a glance at the tragedians, poetry is not primarily in view at *Phaedrus* 269a. A serious application to tragedy and epic is not on record before Aristotle's *Poetics*. Unity is one of the fundamental postulates. Tragedy must be perfect and whole, 7, 1450 b 23; a whole, *holon*, is that which has a beginning, middle and end (7, 1450 b 26). The metaphor again is that of an organism, 7, 1450 b 34, or of any art that produces things made up of parts. The relation of parts must be "according to necessity or probability" (7, 1451 a 121 and 9, 1451 a 38). The inherent logic here demanded is not that of Plato's dialectic but of Aristotle's logic. The necessity or probability by which a certain kind of person will act or speak in a certain manner has over-all validity, *katholou*. When necessary it recalls Aristotle's logic, which operates with attributes that belong to all instances of a given subject, and *katholou* is his term for it *(Post. Anal.* 1.4-6); but when probable it merely resembles necessary connections -- it is only quasi-logical. Aristotle cannot have been unaware that poetry deals in contingent matters. But for all that, it is its approximation to *katholou* which to him renders it at any rate "more universal" and "more philosophic" than the mere factuality of history *(Poet.* 9, 1451 b 7 and 5).
>
> This is clearly the home of H[orace]'s *simplex.... et unum*. Aristotle's postulate has been moved out of its restricted place within the context of tragedy, however great the importance attached to it.

Though the "organism" analogy may have come from either Plato or Aristotle, Horace's fascination with the *failure* of coherence in an organism makes it likely that Plato's influence was the stronger one (see below on *Republic*, Book 9).

1. membra

The *Ars* begins with a grotesque painting (lines 1-5):

> Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
> iungere si velit, et varias inducere plumas,
> undique conlatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
> desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
> spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?

The inspiration for Horace's opening "grotesque" is not far to seek. Lucretius, in his discussion *de generatione animalium (DRN*, 5.821ff.) had described the short-lived *monstra* of *terra mater* thus (lines 837-848):

> multaque tum tellus etiam portenta creare
> conatast mira facie membrisque coorta,
> androgynum, interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum,
> orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim,
> multa sine ore etiam, sine vultu caeca reperta,
> vinctaque membrorum per totum corpus adhaesu,
> nec facere ut possent quicquam nec cedere quoquam
> nec vitare malum nec sumere quod foret usus.

cetera de genere hoc monstra ac portenta creabat,
nequiquam, quoniam natura absterruit auctum
nec potuere cupitum aetatis tangere florem
nec reperire cibum nec iungi per Veneris res.

Lucretius creates a menagerie of creatures which simply do not work. In Darwinian terms, one can explain the demise of these creatures as a result of selective pressures from their environment. Horace of course is not concerned with biological adaptation, but with artistic cohesion. What Horace most shares with Lucretius in this connection is an awareness of the *function* of *membra*. Each part of Horace's composite image, and each example of a "purple patch" in the following lines, is hardly ludicrous in and of itself. The problem with these elements lies in their misplacement. Commentators on this passage of the *Ars*, while citing the similar grotesques found in Plato and Virgil, do not emphasize the fact that the notion of *undique collata membra* can be traced to Empedocles, who makes an important appearance at the end of the *Ars*.[256] Empedocles, who epitomizes madness in the *Ars* (perhaps *honoris causa)* turns out to be a defective creature himself, despite all his intellectual victories, and the act of leaping into Aetna is his idea of returning a shabby product to the forge, just as Horace insists that poorly made verses be reduced to their raw material -- presumably, bare words, without *iuncturae (male tornatos incudi reddere versus*, line 441).[257] The frame of the *Ars*, then, is much like that of the *Florus:* we begin with raw material that is in some way characterized by a defect *(servus vitiosus)*, and we end in despair *(capsa porrectus aperta)*, with an awareness that *ars* cannot succeed in completely masking some defects. It is not the case that the madness of Empedocles merely represents one of several possible outcomes for the poet; rather, the sane poet is an ideal, without any assurance from Horace that such an ideal can be attained. It is the inability of the poet to live with his own poor verses that drives him into insanity. If Horace intended that

256 Brink II 85 (for example) cites *Aeneid* x.210-11, and *Republic* 488a. Bailey's commentary on Lucretius (vol. 2, p.1460ff.) carefully considers the Empedoclean material.

257 I will defer the discussion of the last lines of the poem to the end of the chapter, in connection with C.O. Brink's article, "Horace and Empedocles' temperature: a rejected fragment of Empedocles", *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 138-142.

the *Ars* be an expository document, from which literary instruction may be derived, it is difficult to understand why the poem opens and closes on such a strong note of artistic impotence.[258]

It is hard to know whether ancient painters actually worked "limb by limb", as Horace suggests. The term *melopoiia* certainly does not apply to painting, but it does apply to music and poetry; Horace had already Latinized the poetic meaning of *melos* in *Satires* 1.4.62 *(disiecti membra poetae).*[259] Thus even in the painted Chimaera, there is a strong hint that the discussion will be more concerned with *poesis* than with *pictura.*

The Lucretian "grotesque" might be called the "material cause" of Horace's opening tableau, demonstrating how tenacious these primordial limbs were in their coherence.[260] Horace's intention is quite the opposite; he wants to reveal to the artist the power of aesthetic "centrifugal force" (or perhaps self-destruction). We have no hint from Lucretius that such things are amusing, for he is absorbed in the contemplation of the miraculous *(mira)* fertility of Mother Earth. For a "formal cause" of the Chimaera, we must turn to Plato. The Chimaera is a Socratic tool for the understanding of the self, for the soul consists of *membra* which are perpetually at war, each with their own energies and aims. Thus Socrates' metaphor for the parts of the soul in Book 9 of the *Republic* may be brought to bear here (588Cf.; Socrates and Glaucon are the conversants):

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258 Walter Wili *(Horaz und die augusteische Kultur,* Basel 1948, p. 314f.) sees the grotesque elements of the beginning and end of the poem as adopted from Satire. No doubt this is true with respect to form, but the elements have a different force in the philosophical milieu of the *Epistles.* Brink (II 516-17) makes a connection between the initial and final tableaux of the poem, but his discussion of this point is insubstantial.

259 Plato in the *Laws* (795e) appreciates the affinity between *melos* and *meros* -- a nearly identical word, but lacking a poetic denotation. Bolaffi (art. cit., p. 123-4) connects *disiecti membra poetae* with poetic *eidola* at *Republic* X (600E); but *eidola* lack the solidity of *membra,* and seem to belong to a wholly different semantic field. An interesting article by H.I. Marrou ("Melographia", *L'Antiquite Classique* 15 (1946) 289-296) examines two inscriptional appearances of the educational term *melographia* ; while there is no agreement upon the exact meaning of this term, it seems to be connected with music.

260 I borrow the Aristotelian tags from the chapter-headings in Pierre Grimal's *Essai sur l'Art Poetique d'Horace* (Paris 1968).

> S: Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes. G: Of what sort? S: An ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one. G: There are said to have been such unions. S: Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will. G: You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose. S: Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second. G: That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say. S: And now join them, and let the three grow into one. G: That has been accomplished. S: Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature. G: I have done so, he said.

Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine an idealized human soul, and proceeds to paint a horrendous image, wholly unlike the beautiful and heroic allegory of the soul in the *Phaedrus*. Horace begins his lesson in like manner. He seems to have been inspired by Plato's procedure of leading the reader by the hand, as it were, through the creation of the "grotesque". But we are not to be discouraged by the ugliness with which *Ars* begins, because we have an intuitive sense that this is all by nature propaedeutic; Horace, we are sure, will teach us how to avoid creating such a monstrosity. It is easy to miss the hint that such a hopelessly confused product as is here painted can only come from a disturbed soul: perhaps that of the philosopher, or the madman, with whom Horace identifies himself in *Epistles* 1.1.94ff., and 1.8. The soul is known to be composed of monstrosities, but a work of art should be free of them, or hide them securely. It has to, as it were, find a human skin to cover the monstrous animal tendencies which rage within its viscera. Thus we may laugh now if we see a poor conflation of gentle and savage elements, of serpents twinned with birds, and lambs grafted onto lions. But we must weigh all this again when we come to consider the equally grotesque materials which the tradition has to offer to the aspiring poet (line 146): *nec gemino bellum Troianum orditur ab ovo*. Helen and the Dioscuri represent as monstrous a miscegenation as the initial Chimaera. Therefore, avoidance of some

parts of the poetic tradition might turn out to be necessary in light of the formula *simplex et unum.*

Plato's demand that a well-ordered *logos* is like an animal, whose body is self-consistent, and must lack neither head nor foot, throws light on Horace's bronze statue (line 33):[261]

Aemilium circa ludum faber imus et ungues, *etc.*

We are now working with a model which is not a freak of nature, even though it may be vitiated in some small respect. That the statue is correct in the details of its *ungues* is Horatian short-hand for cultural refinement.[262] A human form with only minor flaws, like the one here suggested, is strikingly similar to the *servus vitiosus* of the opening of the *Florus.* By looking away from beasts and towards the human form, we sense that Horace is moving from formal or physical concerns to ethical ones. The unity which Horace's statue lacks is that of the credible "human exterior" in Socrates' model (adduced from the *Republic* above).[263]

For Horace, one of the essential ethical *vitia* is *hybris*, in the sense of man's intrusion into the works of the gods: *gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas*, c.1.3.26. The lesson is also not far off in the *Ars*, for at line 63 the poet sharply turns away from his discussion of the life-span of words and offers a few examples of human engineering, which in themselves represent man's re-ordering of nature's elements. Water is channeled into earth, earth expels the water of swamps, and rivers learn to obey human masters *(doctus iter melius*, line 68). But all of these manifestations of regal arrogance *(regis opus*, line 65) are mortal. Of all the material to be found in epic (which we will have to consider with the appearance

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261 Wickham and others adduce a passage from Plato's *Phaedrus* (264c) in connection with the first nine lines of the *Ars*, but consideration of this passage should be reserved for lines 32-37.

262 cf. Epistle 1.1.104; Satire 1.10.71; Ars 294.

263 It is curious to note that in each poem a reference to pottery is closely connected to the representation of the human form *(argilla quidvis imitaberis uda*, Epi 2.2.8; *currente rota cur urceus exit*, *Ars* line 22).

of Homer in line 74), the demise of these works most reminds us of the obliteration of the Achaean wall in *Iliad* 12 (1-33). The wall, constructed without proper regard for the gods, embodies the *hybris* of the artificial re-structuring of nature. As in the beginning of the *Ars*, Horace has used an Empedoclean model (here the *neikos* and *philia* of the elements) for his poetic argument.[264] And while the ethical undertones here suggest an application to poets and poetry, we will have to wait until line 285 *(nil intemptatum nostri liquere poetae)* for the connection to become explicit.

If the first 72 lines of the *Ars* are to be considered an *exordium*, we are surprised to find in them a wholly pessimistic view of human arts, for Horace seems to be saying that even if one can avoid the pitfall of artistic inconsistency, one has to accept finally the mortality of his work. How can the lesson on *onomatopoiia* be incorporated into this opening section? Horace calls our attention, in line 47, to *iunctura*, the fundamental creative process in poetry.[265] Linguistically, *iunctura* is prior to *ordo*, as morphology is prior to syntax, because *iunctura* works with the *elementa* of language. The poet's first task is the creation of words -- not, of course, the creation of language *a nihilo*, but the formation of compounds, epithets, and phrases. These are the smallest "limbs" with which the poet can work. It is true that *ordo* is presented in advance of *iunctura* (at line 41). But it is disposed of in three lines (plus one word), while *iunctura* is discussed for fifteen lines (45-59).

By beginning with *in verbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis*, Horace seems to be thinking of the process of *grafting*. Indeed, although the syntax of the sentence demands that *in* govern *verbis serendis*, one can see the line as a graphic pun, as if Horace intended to say

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264 Brink II 377 (on the phrase *symphonia discors)* recognizes that *rerum concordia discors* in Epi. 1.12.19 is an "Heraclitean oxymoron", applied to Empedocles' principles of *neikos* and *philia*.

265 Brink II 139 discusses *iunctura* as a rhetorical term *(synthesis)*, citing Arist. *Rhet.* 2, 1404 b 24-5. M. Ruch, in an excellent work ("Horace et les fondements de la "iunctura" dans l'ordre de la creation poetique (A.P., 46-72)" *REL* 41 (1963) 246-269) discusses Horatian *oxymora* as a species of *iunctura*, and suggests that Horace had been influenced by Sallustius' *Empedoclea* (which we know from Cicero, *Ad Quintum Fratrem* 2,9,3: Ruch, p.261). Ruch thinks Horace an Epicurean poet (p.250-1).

verbis inserendis. Inserere is the proper word for grafting, and the tmesis which separates the first from the last word in this line mirrors the physical act of grafting. *Sermo*, a word which Horace may have thought applicable to the *Ars* as a whole, is easily associated with *serere.*[266] It is perfectly fitting, then, that the next section (lines 60ff.) should begin with the Homeric reminiscence of leaves falling from their stock: *ut silvae foliis, etc.*[267] The falling leaves do not merely illustrate the brevity of human life, they represent the mortality of the plant (or a part of it), and thereby the mortality of the artistic effort of *onomatopoiia*, or *iunctura* ; the new growth of words is short-lived, and is soon swept up by the wind. Lack of coherence, as a universal notion, informs essentially all of the elements which are contained in the opening 72 lines. The failure of limbs to cohere is one species of mortality, and thus it is by nature the same as the inability of leaves to stay on the tree, and the impossibility that the "glue" of verbal *iuncturae* will assure the everlasting life of words.

In light of Horace's interest in the anatomy of words (and their disorders), it is fitting that the section on verbal *iunctura* should lead into a discussion of metrical *iunctura* (lines 73-88). *Diairesis*, in addition to being Plato's principle of ordering knowledge, is the term used in discussing the "limbs" of metrical lines (cf. *caesura).* Yet many readers find these lines to be wholly prosaic. If Horace's thumb-nail sketch has anything to teach the aspiring poet, it is that the genres are already fixed by tradition, and that there seems to be no room for invention. It is the mark of a competent poet that he can easily keep the genres separate. The description of elegiac metre *(versibus impariter iunctis)* reminds us of the unacceptable *iuncturae* of the Chimaera (not that this should be read as an invective

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266 Brink II 135-6 cites Varro, *Lingua Latina* 6.64 (the derivation of *sermo* from *series).* The idiom, *sermonem serere*, seems to mean, according to Brink, "to join words with another" (i.e., to converse); and while Brink leans toward accepting a "planting" metaphor in these lines, he seems not to have considered a "grafting" metaphor.

267 On the text, see Brink II 148-150. Brink, with Bentley, rejects *pronos* (perhaps *proprios...in annos* is more suitable).

against elegy).[268] More importantly, these lines prepare us for one of the most flagrant kinds of catachresis of genre: the lyric (or odic) representation of the notorious *Cena Thyestae* (line 91; this *topos* reappears later on in connection with the decorum of the stage, line 186). Why is Horace placing this part of the tragic tradition in such high relief? One possible explanation is that he finds it so hopelessly monstrous, like the tale of Leda's offspring, that any treatment of it will have something of the nature of the Chimaera.[269] The horror in the *Thyestes* arises from the failure of Thyestes to recognize the *limbs (ta mele)* of his own children; the dramatic *peripeteia* comes from the revelation of the children's heads, hands, and feet, their essentially human *membra.*[270] Miraculously, then, the *Thyestes* is the drama which hinges on the failure of the protagonist to recognize articulation, and it is thus in some sense anti-poetic. But lyric meters are the most finely articulated of rhythms, more complex than dactyls and iambs. Horace has discovered a natural antipathy between *carmina* and the *materia* of the *Thyestes*, but it is only clear on the etymological level (of words such as *melos* and *membrum).* The *Thyestes*, like the Chimaera, represents *iunctura* and *disiunctura* in a most carnal and graphic manner.

Another clear point of attachment between the notion of *membra* and that of tragedy comes into play in lines 220ff. The etymology of *tragoidia* is given in line 220: *carmine qui tragico vilem certavit ob hircum.* Tragedy, or "goat-song", develops naturally *(mox etiam,* 221) into a song performed by creatures that themselves have the *membra* of goats.

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268 For Horace and elegy, see Brink III 325 (on *Florus*, line 100) and 531: "The often-assumed hostility between the two last-named poets (scil., Horace and Propertius) is a matter of inference, not of fact."

269 Brink's note on the *Thyestes* at line 186 (II 247) reads: "A stock example of a horrific play, hackneyed and insipid to Persius' mind, 5.8-9 *si quibus aut Procnes aut si quibus olla Thyestae/ fervebit saepe insulso cenanda Glyconi." etc.* But in view of Quintilian's assessment (10.1.92) of Varius' *Thyestes*, the story is not part of humble or folk-literature, as for instance a Lamia-story (line 340) would be. Horace would have taken the Thyestes-dramas seriously, and might have felt that they had to be censured on Platonic grounds -- that they were inherently noxious to their audience.

270 cf. Seneca, *Thyestes* 1038-9: *abscisa cerno capita et avulsas manus/ et rupta fractis cruribus vestigia.* For the head as the essentially human bodily member, cf. *Timaeus* 44Dff.

These Satyrs are acceptable to the audience because it is relaxed and drunk, and most importantly *exlex (anomos*, 224). This last feature is no doubt an exaggeration, but it hints at the fact that the rustic crowd is not prepared to respect the *laws* of poetic composition; they are easily awed by novelty (line 223), and wholly uninterested in consistency of artistic form. It is almost as if Horace conceived of the Satyr-drama as the initial "grotesque" endowed with speech. It lapses easily into the ludicrous because of its incoherent members. Clearly Horace's interest in tragedy and Satyr-drama is in no way historically motivated; he seeks to explain its nature etymologically, with *tragos*.[271]

When the Satyrs take on urbane airs, they become absurd. Thus Horace warns (244-250):

> silvis deducti caveant, me iudice, Fauni
> ne velut innati triviis ac paene forenses
> aut nimium teneris iuvenentur versibus umquam,
> aut immunda crepent ignominiosaque dicta.
> offenduntur enim quibus est equus et pater et res,
> nec, si quid fricti ciceris probat et nucis emptor,
> aequis accipiunt animis donantve corona.

If the critic has been following Horace's lessons thus far, he will easily recognize "urbane Satyrs" to be chimerical. Their bestial impulses are not hidden by a human covering, and so it would strain credulity to have them behave as humans.[272] The viewer of the Satyr-drama is in a unique position, in that he can see before him the execution of a kind of art which is by nature impossible. Pure tragedy has a statue-like rigidity, like the proper *matrona*, while Satyr-drama is free from *lex* (lines 231-3):

> effutire levis indigna tragoedia versus,
> ut festis matrona moveri iussa diebus
> intererit satyris paulum pudibunda protervis.

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[271] Brink (II 273-277) admits that it is difficult to square Horace's treatment of these genres with Aristotle's account *(Poetics*, 4.1449a9 ff.). This is another good indication of the loose adaptation of philosophical material in the poem.

[272] Indeed, the vivid verb *nudavit* (line 221) makes it clear that these creatures are wholly without an outer covering; they display their passions transparently.

Horace does not require the categorical elimination of the bestial from the human characters of drama, as we can see most clearly in the case of Medea and Orestes (lines 123-4). But he demands that, in "high" tragedy, human behavior be completely clothed in a human skin.

2. sectiones

Democritus appears at line 297 of the *Ars* in an exordium which introduces the theme of the *poeta insanus*.[273] If we consider the context in which Democritus appears, we find that the notion of cutting appears three times (294, 297-8, 305). Here are lines 292-305:

> (vos, o/) Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non
> multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque
> praesectum decies non castigavit ad unguem.
> ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte
> credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas,
> Democritus, bona pars non unguis ponere curat,
> non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.
> nanciscetur enim pretium nomenque poetae,
> si tribus Anticyris caput insanabile numquam
> tonsori Licino commiserit. o ego laevus,
> qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam!
> non alius faceret meliora poemata. verum
> nil tanti est. ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum
> reddere quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi.

The first thing that must be understood here is that Horace is being just as ironic by the phrase *exsors ipsa secandi* (and *nil scribens ipse* in the following line) as he is in the self-effacing lines of the *Epistle to Augustus* (line 111-12):

> ipse ego, qui nullos me adfirmo scribere versus
> invenior Parthis mendacior, *etc.*

What Horace really means is that he will prove himself to be the very sharpest cutting-instrument, the perfect critic.[274] Because the critic is a "cutter", and because one of his

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273 Norden's scheme marks off lines 453-476 as the section *de insano poeta*, but this theme is too important to the *Ars* to be relegated to one corner of it (Norden, art. cit., p.508).

274 Brink (III 335, *ad* line 305) cites a parallel from Isocrates (in Plutarch, *Vita Decem Oratorum* 4.838c). Paul Shorey, *TAPA* 40 (1909) 188, mentions this line of the *Ars*, but makes no connection with Plato.

most important tools is the closely-pared nail (which he passes over *iuncturae* as a test of smoothness), one inevitably thinks about the wider associations of cutting in these lines.[275] So too, the mad poet is characterized by his untrimmed nails and beard, and in this he seems to be the opposite of the critic; yet the "disheveled man" may turn out to be (as in the First Book of Epistles) the paradigm of virtue.

There is a Platonic source for Horace's interest in division. It is chiefly in the *Statesman* that Plato is concerned with *diairesis*.[276] And it is in this dialogue that we find perhaps the most graphic simile for diairesis (287B):

> We must carve them (scil., co-operative arts associated with statesmanship) like a victim into members or limbs, since we cannot bisect them. For we certainly should divide everything into as few parts as possible.

But the *Cratylus* discusses cutting in a way which may also have been in Horace's mind as he composed the *Ars (Cratylus*, 387a):

> *Socrates:* In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.

Socrates postulates the existence of "proper divisions", which must be observed, all throughout nature. While the philosopher needs diairesis to ensure valid definitions between words, the poet needs diairesis in the metrical art.[277] The proper handling of a

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[275] Brink is too sceptical on the point of the well-pared nail (II 323 ff.); *praesectum* is well-enough established in the text for us to be able to say that by far the most likely explanation of the image is that given by Wickham, namely that the nail is thus cut to be of greater use to the tester of joints in stone. More than this cannot and need not be said.

[276] Jowett, in the introduction to his translation of the *Statesman* (vol. 4, p.435) says:

> "The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in Plato's mind with the political; the dialogue might have been designated by two equally descriptive titles -- either the "Statesman", or "Concerning Method". Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato is a revival of the Socratic question and answer applied to definition, is now occupied by classification; there is nothing in which he takes greater delight than in processes of division (cp. Phaedr. 266B); he pursues them to a length out of proportion to his main subject, and appears to value them as a dialectical exercise, for their own sake."

[277] It ought to be said, however, that the metrical and grammatical meanings of *diairesis*

melos requires a knowledge of where the joints are. When Horace addresses his readers at line 291 *(vos, o Pompilius sanguis)*, he implicitly poses the following question: are the Romans by nature poetic? While the answer seems to be a flatly negative one in lines 323-4 *(Grais ingenium, Grais dedit ore rotundo/ Musa loqui)*, the traditional education of the Romans is described as one rooted in division and enumeration, and to that extent it is akin to poetry. The humor of lines 326-330, in which we overhear an elementary lesson in arithmetic, reminds us of the archaic Roman concern with *nummi* in the *Epistle to Augustus* (lines 103ff.). In learning the fine points of dividing an *as* into twelve parts (not to say a hundred), the Roman child performs the same sort of arithmetic which the poet must exercise in dividing the twelve *longa* of the hexameter. The suggestion seems to be that the Roman lacks none of the technical skill which is demanded of the great poet; what he perhaps lacks is madness or *enthousiasmos.*[278] Horace withholds it from us, until line 412 ff., that, after all, the training of the poet demands exactly the kind of discipline in youth as he represents in the arithmetic lesson: *multa tulit fecitque puer, sudavit et alsit,/ abstinuit Venere et vino.*

The young arithmetician, once having mastered the proper divisions of the *as*, will be able to preserve his property *(rem poteris servare tuam)*. Another sense of *res* (a literary equivalent of *materia)* already appears in the poem (lines 40-4):

> . . . cui lecta potenter erit res,
> nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo.
> ordinis haec virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor,
> ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici,
> pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat.

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post-date Horace (Apollonius Dyscolus, Aristides Quintilianus).

278 Wickham, in his note on line 325, compares Plato, *Republic* 525: arithmetic in Plato's "ideal education" is "to be studied in the spirit of a philosopher, not of a shopkeeper" (with a colorful rendition of the verb *kapeleuein)*. Wickham misses Horace's ironic reversal of Plato's complaint.

Williams has pointed out the "delicious piece of irony" that Horace gives us with the phrase *aut ego fallor.*[279] In these lines on the difficulty of preserving *ordo*, Horace has subtly prepared his reader for the frequent failure of *ordo* in the *Ars*. The child at his arithmetic lesson, clearly a caricature of a nascent poet (as one senses from the comparison with the Greek ethos in the previous lines) looks to preserve his pecuniary *res* just as the poet strives to preserve his literary *res*. It seems relatively easy to identify the skill which the poet, as well as the *paterfamilias*, must possess; it is rare nonetheless to find one who uses the skill with proficiency.

In a similar way, we may speak of Horace's re-ordering (in one sense a dis-ordering) of the "Aristotelian" stages of life in lines 156-178. Here we find not merely a chronological rearrangement, but a sort of "deconstruction" of the *aetates.*[280] We want to take Horace at his word when he says *semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis* (178). But in each age, there is a hint of something which is out of place, or something *male adiunctum.* The child who has just learned to speak seems almost to have learned a precise dance or metrical pattern *(pede certo signat humum).*[281] And while the child seeks his equals in play *(gestit paribus colludere)*, his temperament is still by nature most unbalanced *(mutatur in horas)*. The next stage of life, that of the *iuvenis*, is characterized by tardiness *(utilium tardus provisor).*[282] The mature man seems almost frozen in inactivity *(commississe cavet quae mox mutare laboret)*. And lastly, the *senex* lives wholly outside of the present *(pavi-*

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279 *TORP* 330-1.

280 See Brink II 228 ff., and Williams, *TORP* 331.

281 cf. *Pollio regum/ facta canit pede ter percusso (Sat.* 1.10.42).

282 In the phrase *cereus in vitium flecti*, Horace may have been thinking of *Theaetetus* 194D, where Socrates attributes to Homer a *schema etymologicum* connecting *ker* or *kear* (soul) with *kerinos* (waxen). Another important parallel with this Platonic work is found in lines 361-2: *ut pictura poiesis: erit quae, si propius stes/ te capiat magis, et quaedam si longius abstes*, etc. With this one should compare *Theaetetus* 208E, where Socrates confesses his dissatisfaction with the argument after looking at it from a distance (as if it were a *skiagraphia)*. Wickham's note (p.404) on line 163 cites Plato, *Laws* 633 -- a similar context, but one with no etymological argument.

dus or *avidus futuri*, line 172; *laudator temporis acti*, line 173). None of the *aetates* is as ethically appealing as the chorus, whose role is assigned in lines 193-201. It is the chorus which has the power to create bonds between characters *(consilietur amice*, line 196) and, if its part is well-constructed, the chorus is the *iunctura* for the *membra* (or *actus)* of the drama. Thus, while Aristotle took middle age as a proper mean between youth and old age, Horace looks outside of the scheme of *aetates* altogether to find a link among them. It is difficult to accept Brink's view that these lines represent a Peripatetic notion on the "propriety of speech", when it is clear that Horace's principal concern is to point out the inconsistency of character which plagues each of these ages. The chorus is like the human "outer shell" of the image of the soul in the *Republic* ; it tempers the excess which each of the *aetates* brings to tragedy.

We look in vain in the *Ars* for a viable prescription by which dissimilar poetic *membra* can become *adiuncta.* As we approach the conclusion of the poem, Horace returns to the origins of poetry in lines 391ff., and here it seems that *numen* rather than *ars* will prove to be the source of poetic cohesion:

> silvestris homines sacer interpresque deorum
> caedibus et victu foedo deterruit Orpheus,
> dictus ob hoc lenire tigris rabidosque leones;
> dictus et Amphion, Thebanae conditor urbis,
> saxa movere sono testudinis et prece blanda
> ducere quo vellet. fuit haec sapientia quondam,
> publica privatis secernere, sacra profanis,
> concubitu prohibere vago, dare iura maritis,
> oppida moliri, leges incidere ligno.

Here Horace finds the resolution for the inconsistency of the Chimaera with which he began. While the human artist must avoid joining *placida* with *immitia* (line 12), it is not beyond the power of Orpheus to do so. The *sapientia* which Orpheus and the original poets gave to the world recalls, in one respect, the civilizing influence of Romulus, Liber, and the Dioscuri (and implicitly Augustus) from the introductory verses of the *Augustus.* Yet their great power resembles the art of diairesis *(secernere*, line 397), and again the language of

cutting is an important part of the image *(caedibus, incidere)*. In a state of nature, human affairs are not properly articulated; but with the providential coming of poetry, governance becomes possible through *ius* and *lex* (398-9). Furthermore, the abolition of *vagus concubitus* (397) -- surely a hint at Augustan moral legislation -- removes the fear of miscegenation and *monstra*.[283]

Orpheus and Amphion, each stepping into a Promethean role, seem to shatter the rule of *simplex et unum*. Though they give laws to mankind, they themselves are not bound by these laws. With one hand they offer civilized life, but with the other they remove the *privilegium* or *anomia* essential to the poet's creativity. Poetry which perfectly obeys the *nomoi* of verse can only be produced by the apparent madman, the *anomos*.[284] But the truly inspired poet will necessarily assume the nature of an Orpheus or an Amphion, even though the resulting madness looks like infirmity to the sober critic. It is one of Horace's most surprising *"disiuncturae"* in the *Ars* that this section should be so far removed from the discussion of musical corruption (lines 202-219), since it provides the "historical" background for that section.[285] Standing so close to the end of the *Ars*, Orpheus and Amphion are precursors of Empedocles, and not merely the dutifully recorded names of *protoi heuretai*. Clearly Horace is less interested in the history of music and poetry than he is in probing the composition of the poetic *persona*.

Both at the beginning and at the end of the *Ars*, Horace speaks of *iura* as it applies to poets. In the first case (line 10) it is the *quidlibet audendi potestas*, and in the conclusion it is the "right to die" (line 466). Artistic endeavor requires complete freedom *(quidlibet audendi)*, even to the point of giving shape to hopeless Chimaeras; and in the end, the artist reserves the right to earn fame by the manner of his death *(famosae mortis*, line 469)

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283 It is interesting to note that *vagus* appears in connection with marital infidelity here, and with unacceptable poetic and musical license in lines 215 and 265.

284 cf. Pindar's *numeri lege soluti* (c. 4.2.12). Pindar, the paradigmatic lyric poet, is uniquely able to dominate the *numeri* which stand as immutable laws for lesser poets.

285 See section 3 of this chapter for lines 202-219.

rather than by the success of his *oeuvre*.[286] Empedocles, the discoverer of the *concordia discors* which governs the elements of nature (cf. Epistle 1.12.19), is described as *frigidus*, and in leaping into the flames of Aetna he is seeking his opposite element -- *ardor*.[287] He sacrifices his life to attempting to prove the *concordia discors* of fire and cold; he tries to unite opposite elements by force, as the mad painter tried to unite incoherent limbs at the beginning of the *Ars*. The great artistic efforts which close the poem (lines 391-476) thus belong to figures -- Orpheus, Amphion, Empedocles -- who show none of the "Aristarchean" virtues which Horace demands of Pollio's elder son in lines 438-452.

Horace's interest in sections and divisions complements his interest in *membra*. In conclusion, I will consider how artistic failure in the *Ars* is characterized, in Platonic terms, as a failure of coherence among limbs.

3. plemmelia

An important passage of the *Ars*, lines 202-19, deals with failure in music. This section, describing the development of audacity in flute and cithara music, has already been discussed by Williams as having been inspired by Plato's *Laws*.[288] I can only point out some things upon which Williams is silent.

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286 Brink II 424 (on line 459) rightly compares *Theaetetus* 174A, the story of Thales falling into the well and the Thracian maid who ridicules him. But in the previous line, the Horatian *auceps* recalls another element of the *Theaetetus* (197Cff.), in which Socrates explains the difference between having knowledge and acquiring knowledge through a metaphor. In his image, facts are represented as birds in a coop, which are penned in but not necessarily held in hand by the bird-keeper. This is perhaps the clearest instance in the Horatian *Epistles* of adjacent images which seem to originate in the same Platonic dialogue.

287 cf. Wickham's parallel from Sophocles, *Oedipus Coloneus*, line 621. Brink (art. cit., p. 138 note 5) adds *Antigone*, line 88. Neither of these instances hints at a Presocratic physiology, as *Ars*, line 465 certainly does. Brink (art. cit., *Phoenix* 1969) tries to explain the connection of this section of the *Ars* with the Empedoclean theory of the seat of thought, located in the pericardial (presumably warm) blood. It is unconvincing to argue that Horace's Empedocles displays some sort of deficiency of "pericardial intelligence".

288 *TORP*, 336-40.

In linking the growth of cities and their populations with musical confusion and license, Horace again makes use of the notions of number and of *iunctura*. The *populus* was at first *numerabilis* (206); and here we have a *double-entendre*, for the people are not simply enumerable, but also subject to the influence of the musical *numeri* (line 211) which they hear. The extension of territory results in the loss of political *simplicitas*, which had been reflected in the form of the musical instrument *(simplex*, 202).[289] But when free men and slaves, ignorant men and learned ones, rustic folk and city-dwellers are all asked to be judges of one and the same art, only confusion and "theatocracy" (the aesthetic counterpart of "ochlocracy") can be the result. The society has now lost its proper articulation and *numerus*, which is perhaps capable of preservation only in a primitive state (as the section on Orpheus, lines 391ff., suggests). The *epodic* power of poetic *numeri* is weakened in proportion to the *numeri* of the audience.

Horace's adaptation of material from the *Laws* ought to be considered along with the discussion of music in the *Timaeus*. Music, as Plato has Timaeus explain, is a providential device which can redress imbalances in the soul of the hearer, and return the soul to the state of proper articulation with which it originally had been created (47C). When the proper "notes" of the soul do not ring true *(plemmelein)*, the epodic force of well-articulated music can set them aright *(emmeles)*. This peculiarly Platonic notion is adapted by Horace in the latter part of the *Ars*, in his description of poetic error. Immediately following one of the most important and memorable of the *sententiae* which the *Ars* has to offer *(omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci*, line 343), Horace discusses the inevitable *maculae* which find their way into poetry (lines 347-384). Forgivable mistakes are like notes missed on the cithara (348-50):

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289 Concerning the extension of the city-walls, Horace is of course speaking in general terms; Brink (II 266) says "No need, I think, to speculate, like K-H, whether Horace knew about the size of the Athenian theatre in different periods, or, like Wilkins, whether he knew that the circuit of the Roman wall had not been altered between the time of Servius Tullius and his own." Horace seems here to be indulging in "pure sociology".

nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem volt manus et mens,
poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum;
nec semper feriet quodcumque minabitur arcus.

In the worst case, a mistaken note might recur regularly, and then the performer loses his right to artistic *venia* (354-7):

ut scriptor si peccat idem librarius usque
quamvis est monitus venia caret; ut citharoedus
ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem;
sic mihi qui multum cessat fit Choerilus ille, *etc.*

With the phrase *chorda oberrare,* Horace latinizes the Platonic notion of *plemmelia.*[290] Moreover, by intertwining the craft of the *scriptor librarius* with that of the *citharoedus,* Horace invites his reader to draw a comparison between them, while bringing the point home with a "stumbling" repetition of the syllable *us (librarius usque).* Neither the *scriptor* here nor the *citharoedus* quite fits the bill of the "poet"; but the poet is exactly the one who must combine the skills of these two. Missing the same written character repeatedly is like missing the same note or string. Horace seems to be working from a Platonic vantage when he brings the discussion of artistic error down to the level of single letters and notes (the *stoicheia)* ; one might compare Socrates' lengthy analogy of knowledge and spelling in the *Theaetetus* (203-end), or the terrible difficulty that Socrates, in the *Cratylus,* has in explaining the presence of a "smooth" letter such as *lambda* in the "harsh" word *sklerotes* (where the Eretrian variant, *skleroter,* compounds his difficulty).[291]

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290 Brink chose to bracket line 349, thinking *persaepe* to be inadmissable. This is unfortunate, for in the *Phaedrus,* in a parallel discussion on ignorance in elocution (268E), Plato has Socrates ridicule the notion that one who knows how to sound the highest and lowest chords *(oxytaten kai barytaten chorden poiein)* can be called knowledgeable in music.

291 Ruch (art. cit., p.266-70) links the elements of painting, music, and metrics, without calling them *stoicheia* ; he makes no claim for a specifically Platonic infuence on this point.

These arguments seek to make it clear that Horace has not merely borrowed Platonic motifs in the *Ars*, but that he has recombined them creatively. While I do not for a moment doubt Brink's contention, made persistently throughout his writings on the *Ars*, that Horace was directly inerested in Aristotelian theories of poetry and rhetoric, I am persuaded that Horace had an equally thorough familiarity with Plato's text. To search for Horatian material in Neoptolemus of Parium, *via* Philodemus, is surely a worthy exercise for establishing the history of literary criticism in antiquity; but it ought not cloud the fact that Horace's interests were not confined to derivative handbooks of aesthetics. Brink, in the same argument from which I have quoted extensively at the beginning of this chapter, showed great contempt for Otto Immisch's proposition that the *Ars* betrayed the influence of Antiochus of Ascalon and the Middle Academy.[292] I hope to have made a strong enough case that Horace's affinity for Platonism is not restricted to intermediaries and *diadochoi*.

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292 Immisch, *Horazens Epistel ueber die Dichtkunst, Philologus* Supplementband 24.3 (1932), p. 26 ff.; Brink II 80.

CONCLUSION

In my view, the Epistles can be read as Academic documents, in the sense that Horace has placed himself squarely in the Academic tradition of reading and commenting upon Plato's text. The novelty of his approach is in the *poetic* adaptation of Platonic material. In the eyes of some, Horace's allusive use of Plato's works will condemn him to the ranks of amateurish thinkers. For those who read Horace primarily as a poet, these arguments will support the position that he had a close familiarity with Plato's text, as he was familiar with the texts of the poets which he took as his models.

On its simplest level, the "Cratylean" quality of the Epistles can be seen in puns on proper names. Maecenas is a Muse (Camena) partly because of the anagrammatic similarity between the two words. Bullatius is feverish because his name suggests boiling. Volteius Mena changes his style of life, and his mutability is encapsulated in his name, a pun on "turning" *(volvere).*

Yet in a more complex way, the Epistles take from the *Cratylus* the Heraclitean notion of flux as a poetic theme. The *sapiens* whom Horace envisions is not merely victorious over the quotidian world, but one who is aware that a certain permanence can be achieved, in spite of the flux, by virtue of the *numeri* of poetry.

As a critic of contemporary Roman culture, Horace is careful to provide the reader with points of reference in Plato's *Laws* when he comes to consider the causes of cultural decline. As a poet, however, he keenly senses the order which can be projected from perfect poetry onto the society at large.

Horace's recombination of Platonic images, and his reliance upon word-play, indicate that we must consider sources for the Epistles other than Hellenistic philosophical handbooks. The playful and conversational quality of many of Plato's dialogues carries over into the Epistles.

Horace is also concerned with comparing the virtues of the spoken and the written word. He warns his correspondent Lollius not to assume the existence of ideal *parrhesia.* But the risk of being misunderstood inheres in the written word as well: *volumina* have a tendency to "roll away" from their original intentions.

In the Epistles of Book Two, and in the *Ars Poetica,* Horace resumes and extends his penchant for seeing number as an ordering principle in nature, as well as in poetry, with his word-plays on *nummus* and *numerus.* Prosaic references to sums of money are deceptive; they recall the secular tone of many of the *Satires,* but the role of *nummi* has been changed in the context of the Epistles. Order in the "Golden Age" of the Roman Republic was preserved by the cautious treatment of *nummi.* The poet promises to help re-establish the social order, not by simply offering moralizing verse, but by ensuring that verse is formally perfect, that it respects *numeri* as cautiously as the *mos maiorum* respects pecuniary *res.*

In reading the Epistles, it is instructive to keep in mind Horace's great philosophic predecessor, Lucretius, as well as his heir, Ovid, author of a Pythagorean *tour de force* at the conclusion of the *Metamorphoses.* In each of these poets, philosophical issues confront the reader on the surface of the text. In Horace, however, we have very frequently a series of rather bland precepts on the surface, which are often taken to be the sum of Horace's philosophy. But when we consider, for instance, the way in which the idea of articulation -- the Platonic *diairesis* -- pervades the examples which Horace chose to demonstrate his aesthetic precepts in the *Ars Poetica,* we sense not only a familiarity with Plato's text, but a willingness to adapt it creatively.

Abbreviations

Numbers in parentheses refer to the "Bibliography" which immediately follows this list. All abbreviations not listed are standard ones (e.g., those of *L'Annee Philologique*, etc.).

Axelson (4)

Ernout-Meillet (28)

Fraenkel (31)

Kiessling-Heinze (47)

Klingner (52)

LSJ (55)

McGann (68)

OLD (82)

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